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Abstract 
This doctoral thesis contributes to a growing strand of literature on the nature 
and causes of trade liberalisation from a political economy perspective. In three 
core chapters, I identify distinct and novel features of trade liberalisation. 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that unilateral and cooperative trade policy de-
pend crucially on the degree of natural trade costs, or transport costs, in a model 
where terms-of-trade and profit-shifting motives for trade policy are important. 
When trade costs decline, a conflict of interest between unilateral and cooperative 
trade policy intensifies: unilateral policy aims to optimally exploit a country's 
monopoly power over its terms of trade, whereas cooperative policy aims to min-
imise losses in transit. In a framework where cooperative trade policy must be 
sustained by a reputational mechanism, I demonstrate that import tariffs can be 
lowered in response to decreases in natural trade costs, provided the long-run co-
operative objectives of minimising losses in transit are more important than the 
short-run temptation of distorting the terms of trade and shifting profits towards 
the domestic market. These temptations become larger when trade costs decline 
since when the degree of natural distortions of consumer prices, and the degree 
of natural profit-shifting are lower, import tariffs are more effective at doing the 
job. I also demonstrate that a free trade agreement can be supported for a larger 
range of discount factors when trade costs decline. 
In Chapter 3, I analyse the sustainability of unilateral and bilateral trade lib-
eralisation by introducing a time-inconsistency problem in addition to standard 
terms-of-trade manipulations. I find that the government's bargaining power vis-
a-vis a politically organised lobby is a key parameter in the determinatioJl of the 
sustainability of trade liberalisation. Unilateral trade liberalisation, which is when 
the government unilaterally sets the dynamically efficient trade policy, can be S11S-
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tained for every discount factor if the government has no bargaining power. This 
is because when the government has no bargaining power, it is only just compen-
sated for the short-run distortion associated with trade policy, and not for the 
long-run distortions which come about from overinvestment in protected sectors. 
As the government's bargaining power increases, the level of patience required 
to sustain unilateral trade liberalisation also increases, and when the bargaining 
power exceeds a critical threshold, the government is able to extract so much rent 
that it is better off continuing its implicit contract with the lobby. Bilateral trade 
liberalisation imposes further sanctions on the part of a deviating country when its 
trading partner punishes it. This ensures that bilateral trade liberalisation can be 
sustained for all levels of the government's bargaining power provided the world 
is sufficiently patient. However, for low bargaining powers unilateral trade liber-
alisation can be supported for a larger range of discount factors wherea.-; when the 
bargaining power exceeds a critical level, a trade agreement is needed to sustain 
trade liberalisation. 
In the la.'it of the core chapters, Chapter 4, the question I address is one of the 
nature rather than the causes of trade liberalisation as in the two chapters that 
preceded it. I carry out an empirical examination of the political-economy model in 
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). The model makes clear predictions regarding 
the tariff cuts in a trade agreement which can be perfectly enforced internation-
ally. There are two distortions of non-cooperative trade policy: terms-of-trade 
manipulations, and a dynamic inconsistency. Thus, when two countries come to-
gether to sign a trade agreement these are the distortions they solve. The model 
predicts that tariff cuts should be explained by a terms-of-trade component, which 
I capture by the value of net imports, and inter-industry capital mobility, which I 
measure using three different variables: persistence of profits, capital-labour ratios 
and four-firm concentration ratios. I find that the first two variables capturing 
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capital mobility perform very well at explaining the speed of liberalisation of US 
import protection on Mexican products. The results on the terms-of-trade com-
ponent are less convincing although on most econometric specifications I obtain 
the correct sign. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since World War II, the world has experienced substantialliberalisation of political 
barriers to trade. Several rounds of multilateral trade liberalisation under the 
auspices of GATT /WTO has ensured gradual reductions in import tariffs from 
over 40 per cent in 1945 to less than 4 per cent today in the developed world. 
In addition, the signing of a countless number of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements has intensified economic integration in most parts of the world. It 
is a challenging task for economists and political scientists alike to understand 
the nature and causes of this development, and in the academic world a growing 
number of researchers are trying to find answers to this issue. 
The present doctoral thesis will contribute to our understanding of three broader 
questions: (i) What drives countries to impose political barriers to trade such as 
import tariffs unilaterally? (ii) What drives the desire of governments to cooper-
ate over trade policy? (iii) Once countries have embarked upon a phase of tariff 
reductions, what can be said about the nature of the path from unilateral trade 
policy to internationally efficient trade policy? 
Although the GATT /WTO has been a successful institution in the post-war 
era, and has achieved immense results in the trade policy arena, there are concerns 
that multilateral trade negotiations have corne to a standstill in the recent Doha 
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round 1. During the ongoing financial crisis which emerged in 2007/2008, many 
countries around the world have resorted to protectionism in various forms, and 
there is genuine concern that the past success of reducing trade barriers will be 
compromised. In order to understand the recent slowdown of trade liberalisation, 
it is important to study the past success. 
The thesis is organised in three core chapters which make separate contribu-
tions within the general theme of political economy of trade liberalisation. Each 
chapter examines models where governments have particular motives to grant 
trade protection. Common to them all is the assumption that a country as a 
whole can improve its terms of trade through trade policy. This motive to grant 
import protection figures prominently in the trade literature. If a country acts 
in this manner, however, it is unlikely to go unpunished by international trading 
partners, and the result is a so-called terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma. 
Countries can thus improve their welfare by deciding to cooperate over trade pol-
icy by signing a trade agreement. The idea that terms-of-trade manipulations 
give rise to a problem which a trade agreement might solve dates back to Mill 
(1844) and Torrens (1844), while the first formal treatment was given in .Johnson 
(1953). Terms-of-trade distortions form the motive for signing trade agreements in 
Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002). Although 
the empirical relevance for terms-of-trade manipulations in the setting of trade 
policy have been met with considerable scepticism (see for example Ethier (2004, 
2007)), recent empirical studies have documented strong and significant evidence 
Focusing on 15 countries that were never GATT members, and that hence set 
their tariffs in a unilateral fashion prior to joining the WTO, Broda limao and 
Weinstein.(2008) estimate the degree of market power that each of these countries 
was able to exert on the foreign export (world) prices that it faced (as captured by 
lThe Doha round started in November 2001. As of 2011. talks have stalled over a divide 
between on the one hand. developed nations such as the EC. the CS and Japan. and on the 
ot her. developing nations represented mainly by Brazil. China. India and Sout h Africa. 
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the foreign export supply elasticities faced by these countries). Their estimates, 
show that most countries, even apparently small countries, have significant ability 
to alter their terms of trade on many imported products with their tariff choices. 
Another question is whether tariff cuts negotiated at the level of the GATT jWTO 
reflect the removal of that portion of the noncooperative tariff that embodies the 
terms-of-trade motive. Broda, Limao and Weistein (2008) also address this ques-
tion by checking whether measures of the power to affect world prices help predict 
the levels of noncooperative trade policies but do not help predict the levels of 
bound tariffs resulting from GATT jWTO negotiations. Focusing on the United 
States, they find that US non-tariff barriers and so-called statutory tariff rates, 
which have not been subjected to direct negotiations within the GATT jWTO, are 
significantly and positively related to the degree of market power that the United 
States exerts on the world prices of its import products, whereas the US MFN 
tariffs, which have been the subject of GATT jWTO negotiations, exhibit no such 
relationship. Similar papers which attempt to disentangle the degree of terms-of-
trade manipulations include Bagwell and Staiger (2006) and Ludema and Mayda 
(2010). 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I construct a model of international oligopoly 
where two countries are unilaterally driven into a terms-of-trade and profit-shifting 
prisoner's dilemma in the setting of trade policy. In addition to political import 
tariffs, world trade is subject to natural trade costs (or transport costs) which 
are outside the government's control. I identify interesting relationships between 
natural trade costs and trade policy. Unilaterally, the incentive to distort the 
terms of trade in a country's favour, and the incentive to shift profits towards 
the domestic market increases when trade costs decline. This is because when 
natural trade costs are lower, the degree of natural distortion of consumer prices, 
and the degree of natural profit-shifting towards the domestic market is higher, 
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making import tariffs more effective at doing the job. Cooperative trade policy, 
however, has a different objective. Acting cooperatively the two countries prefer 
to set import tariffs lower when trade costs decline. This is because when trade 
costs are lower, a smaller amount of the traded quantities are lost in transit, 
facilitating lower cooperative tariffs. Hence, when trade costs decline, a conflict 
of interest between unilaterally optimal trade policy and cooperative trade policy 
intensifies. I go on to examine the sustainability of cooperative trade policy when 
any cooperative trade policy must be sustained through a reputational mechanism. 
In an infinitely repeated game, I find that lower import tariffs can be lowered in 
response to falling trade costs provided the governments' long-run objectives of 
minimising losses in transit are sufficiently important relative to each government's 
short-run temptation to distort the terms of trade in its favour, and shifting profits 
towards the domestic market. I also show that lower import tariffs in response 
to falling trade costs can be sustained for the largest range of discount factors. 
Moreover, I show that a free trade agreement can be supported for a larger range 
of discount factors when trade costs fall, provided the firms interact strategically. 
The intuition behind this is that although the temptation to deviate from a free 
trade agreement increases when trade costs decline, the international externalities 
that are felt by both countries when punishment occurs outweigh the short run 
gains. 
It can be said that Chapter 2 very much goes into the heart of the first and 
second questions outlined in the beginning of this introduction, namely examining 
governments' incentives to either cooperate or conduct independent trade policies. 
The same can be said about Chapter 3 which is build around a two-country model 
of perfect competition. In that chapter, I introduce a time inconsistency in the 
setting of trade policy: the optimal trade policy for some future period may not be 
optimal once the future actually arrives. Time-inconsistency problems were first 
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introduced into economics by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980). 
They apply the idea to various economic circumstances such as central bank policy 
and taxation. In my framework, the idea is applied to a trade policy framework, 
and the idea is that owners of physical capital make investments that are irre-
versible in any given period, which is what I refer to as the short run, but after 
one period, that is in the long, capital can be reallocated to equalise returns across 
industries. This brings about a conflict of interest between the optimal trade pol-
icy in the short run, where capital is sunk, and in the long run where capital is 
perfectly mobile. It is assumed that tariffs are determined in a political-economy 
framework where owners of capital in the import-competing sector organise as a 
political lobby to obtain trade protection. I model the negotiation between the 
government and the lobby as a Nash bargaining situation with bargaining powers 
of the two parties exogenously given. The bargaining power of the government 
is a key parameter, together with the government's discount factor, for the sus-
tainability of trade liberalisation. The tariff obtained maximises the joint welfare 
of the government and the lobby taking the current capital allocation a'l given. 
In the next period, however, this encourages entry into the protected sector, and 
the government may not be compensated for this long-run misallocation of cap-
ital if its bargaining power is low. International terms-of-trade distortions exist 
alongside this time-inconsistency problem, and together they represent two pow-
erful motives to sign a trade agreement. I assume that any deviation from the 
politically optimal tariff (the tariff that obtains by political interaction with the 
lobby) must be sustained by a reputational mechanism. I distinguish between uni-
lateral trade liberalisation, in which the government unilaterally obtains a means 
of committing to the socially optimal tariff (the tariff which optimally exploits a 
country's monopoly power over its terms of trade), and bilateral trade liberalisa-
tion in which the two countries come together to maximise joint welfare. In an 
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infinitely repeated game, I show that unilateral trade liberalisation can be sus-
tained for all discount factors if the government has no bargaining power. In that 
case, the government is only compensated for the immediate distortions of trade 
policy through campaign contributions from the lobby, but not for the long-run 
misallocation of capital. As the bargaining power of the government increases, 
however, the degree of patience required to sustain unilateral trade liberalisation 
increases, and when the government's bargaining power exceeds a critical level no 
discount factor can support trade liberalisation. A trade agreement involves the 
maximisation of joint welfare of the two countries, such that in addition to solving 
the outlined commitment problem, terms-of-trade manipulations are internalised. 
This imposes additional sanctions on the part of the governments. In fact, it can 
be proven that trade liberalisation can be supported for any bargaining power 
provided the two governments are sufficiently patient. For low bargaining pow-
ers, unilateral trade liberalisation can be supported for a larger range of discount 
factors, whereas when the bargaining power becomes sufficiently large, a trade 
agreement is needed to sustain trade liberalisation. I do not attempt to model 
the factors underlying the determination of the relative bargaining position of the 
government and a lobby. \Vbat I have in mind, however, is that the bargaining 
power of a government is expected to be lower in an open political system based 
on several coalitions. The decentralisation of the political power gives a govern-
ment a lower bargaining position, as opposed to an autocratic system where the 
government might be able to extract more rents from the political negotiation. 
Interpreted in this way, the model predicts more trade liberalisation in more open 
and democratic political system, a prediction which is in line with casual obser-
vation. 
In Chapter 4, I examine a political-economy model very similar to the one 
in Chapter 3, but the question I am addressing is related to the third ques-
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tion outlined above. I assume that two countries have decided to sign a trade 
agreement which is perfectly enforceable internationally. I then go on to examine 
whether something can be said about the nature of the path of tariff reductions. 
The chapter is empirical, and it puts the political-economy model in Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare's (2007) to the data. The aim is to keep the empirical estimating 
equations tied as close as possible to the theoretical model. There are two motives 
to grant trade protection in the theoretical model: (i) to internalise an interna-
tional terms-of-trade distortion, and (ii) to solve a domestic commitment problem 
similar, and in this sense it is no different from the model outlined in Chapter 
3. Hence, when the two countries come together to sign a trade agreement, there 
will be two components of trade liberalisation, one that internalises terms-of-trade 
distortions, and one that ensures commitment on the part of the government. In 
a dynamic extension, it is predicted that the terms-of-trade component translates 
into an immediate trade liberalisation, whereas the political component is grad-
ual, and this gradualliberalisation depends on the degree of inter-industry capital 
mobility. The intuition is that as the economy adjusts to a new equilibrium with 
free trade, industries that employ more fixed capital will experience greater losses 
in the adjustment phase. I put this prediction to the data by finding empirical 
variables to capture the terms-of-trade manipulations and inter-industry capital 
mobility. I then examine if these variables can explain some of the variation of the 
US tariff cuts on Mexican imports after signing the North American Free Trade 
Agreement in 1994. I follow Bagwell and Staiger (2006) and usc net imports 
to capture the terms-of-trade component, and I experiment with three different 
variables to memmre the degree of inter-industry capital mobility: persistence of 
profits, capital-labour ratios and four-firm concentration ratios. I find that the first 
two measure of capital mobility perform very well ill terms of explaining tariffs 
cuts: more mobile industries experience bigger annual tariffs cuts than industries 
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that employ more fixed capital. The third measure is ineffective at explaining 
trade liberalisation. The variable capturing the terms-of-trade component ha.') the 
right sign, that is, the degree of terms-of-trade manipulations may explain part of 
the tariff cuts. However, on most specifications of the empirical estimating relation 
the results are insignificant. I conclude there is some evidence that inter-industry 
capital mobility can explain the gradual component of trade liberalisation, whereas 
the evidence on terms-of-trade manipulations is substantially weaker. 
In Chapter 5, I draw together the main results and insights from this thesis, 
and offer a discussion of possible extensions, before outlining avenues for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
The Self-enforceability of Trade 
Agreements in the Presence of 
Trade Costs 
2.1 Introduction 
The history of trade liberalisation in the post-war era is intimately related with 
the expansion of the GATT jWTO, and to the signing of a countless number of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Since World War II, average ad valorem 
import tariffs have been reduced from over 40 percent to less than 4 percent. 
There are clearly strong forces pushing countries to sign trade agreements, and it 
is important for economists and political scientists alike to understand the nature 
and causes of the desire to engage in cooperative trade policy. Why do countries 
sign trade agreements, and what determines the extent of trade liberalisation? Did 
it occur because governments became aware of the harmfulness of non-cooperative 
trade policies, or was it caused by external events which made cooperation more 
favourable? 
Alongside the substantial reduction in politically-induced tariff protection, the 
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Figure 2.1: The evolution of trade costs over time. 
post war era has witnessed a gradual decline in the overall level of trade costs. 
Figure 2.1 is taken from McGowan and Milner (2011), and it shows the trend in 
trade costs over the past three decades. Trade costs are mea.'mred using Novy's 
(2010) gravity approach, and it effectively gives a measure of the ratio of exter-
nal trade barriers to internal barriers. In the figure trade costs, for a sample of 
developed countries, have been averaged to give an idea of the overall trade costs 
in the developed world. The data begins in 1980 and records average trade costs 
of a little less than 450 percent of internal trade costs. In 2006, average trade 
costs have dropped to around 135 percent. In the present chapter, I study the 
nature of the relationship between trade costs and the apparent extensive trade 
liberalisation which has occurred up until now. 
I make a clear distinction between trade costs that are politically induced 
which in the present model consist of import tariffs, and those trade costs which 
are natural in the sense that governments are unable to influence them through 
policy. In the trade literature, it is most common to refer to such trade barriers 
as transport costs, but I stress natural trade costs because I want these to COlll-
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prise all kinds of barriers to trade which are outside the influence of government. 
These could include: transport technology, storage, inventory and preparation 
technology, communications networks, language barriers and so on. 
I construct a modified version of Vi's (1996) extension of the Brander (1981) 
model of oligopoly with two countries called Home and Foreign, and with one finn 
in each. Each firm produces one good, and these goods are substitutable according 
to a substitution index which varies between zero and one. If the index is zero each 
firm is a monopolist and there is no strategic interaction amongst them. If the 
index is one, the two firms produce homogeneous goods. Unilaterally, each country 
maximises individual welfare with respect to an import tariff, and the model offers 
two motives to grant such import protection: (i) a terms-of-trade motive, and (ii) a 
profit-shifting motive. The first motive arises due to the influence of import tariffs 
on the net-of-tariff price of an imported good. This motive is standard in the 
trade-policy literature, and it was first identified by Johnson (1953) for perfectly 
competitive economies1• The key is that a country as a whole can use its monopoly 
power over its terms of trade to improve welfare. The second motive arises due 
to rent-shifting made possible by the oligopolistic distortion. By reducing market 
access for the foreign exporter, import tariffs can shift profits towards the domestic 
producer. This motive is absent under perfect competition where prices equal to 
marginal costs. 
The incentives to impose import tariffs through improved terms of trade and 
higher domestic profits are not invariant to changes in natural trade costs. In fact, 
when natural trade costs are lower, the unilateral gain from imposing import tariffs 
is higher. This is because when Home's consumer prices and domestic profits are 
distorted to a lesser extent by natural trade costs, a politically induced import 
tariff is more effective at distorting terms of trade in Home's favour, and shifting 
lThe idea is further developed in Grossman and Helpman (}995). and Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999.2001) for perfectly competitive economies. 
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profits towards the Home producer in the domestic market. 
Unilateral trade policy produces international externalities, however, since a 
country's trading partner will see a worsening of its terms of trade and profits 
shifted away from their firm. These international distortions are greater the lower 
the level of natural distortions through trade costs. The countries engaged in 
a tariff war will find themselves caught in a terms-of-trade and a profit-shifting 
prisoner's dilemma and they may be willing to cooperate in order to reach a more 
efficient equilibrium. 
I first consider an equilibrium in which Horne and Foreign are able to sign a 
binding trade agreement which is perfectly enforceable. In this situation, Horne 
and Foreign simply maximise joint welfare with respect to import tariffs to reach 
the optimal level of joint welfare, thus neutralising the externalities of unilateral 
trade policy. However, since the presence of nat ural trade costs represents losses 
in transit, globally efficient trade policy involves setting lower tariffs when trade 
costs fall. More specifically, due to the oligopolistic distortion firms produce sub-
optimal quantities and in the absence of trade costs, it is optimal to subsidise 
them. When trade costs are positive, however, the governments balance subsidis-
ing the oligopolistic firms against minimising losses in transit. Hence, when acting 
to maximise global welfare, the two countries will set lower tariffs in response to 
exogenous decreases in natural trade costs. There is, therefore, a conflict of inter-
est between unilateral and global trade policy: unilaterally, it is optimal to raise 
tariffs when trade costs fall, whereas bilaterally it is optimal to lower the tariffs. 
The joint welfare gain from cooperation is thus larger when trade costs are lower. 
I then move on to discuss trade agreements in a framework where the two 
countries are unable to write binding contracts. While the literature on trade 
agreements offers several approaches to modelling imperfect contract enforcement, 
one particular approach which is based on repeated games stands out. According 
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to these models, trade policy cooperation is limited by countries' weighting the 
one-shot incentives to deviate from an agreed-upon tariff against the discounted 
benefits from future cooperation. This view of trade policy cooperation is a fair 
reflection of reality since the world is currently not equipped with an intcrna-
tional law enforcement agency capable of sanctioning nations that do not honour 
international agreements. The GATT /WTO has served as an international insti-
tution offering a negotiation forum, which allows countries to reach a higher wel-
fare through mutual tariff concessions. Outside enforcement is ensured through a 
number of rules, permitting countries to punish cheating nations2 . 
I model trade policy cooperation as a repeated prisoner's dilemma. The two 
countries can choose to sign any agreement specifying that tariffs be lowered from 
their non-cooperative levels. Once such an agreement is signed, however, any of 
the two countries has a one-shot incentive to deviate from an agreed-upon tariff 
by distorting the terms of trade in their favour, and shifting profits towards their 
respective domestic firms when the other country cooperates. It is assumed that 
if a country does not honour an agreed-upon tariff, the other country will pun-
ish it by reverting to the non-cooperative Nash tariffs forever as of the following 
period. Self-enforceability thus implies that the present discounted value of ho-
nouring a trade agreement must be greater than or equal to the one-shot payoff 
from deviating and the present discounted value of infinite Nash reversion. The 
requirement of self-enforceability may, therefore, constrain the trade agreement to 
a second-best one from a joint welfare-maximising perspective in order to keep 
each country's incentive to stay in the agreement. 
I consider two types of agreements which are subject to a self-enforcement 
constraint. The first type is based on what I define as the optimal self-enforceable 
tariff, and the second is a free trade agreement (FTA). 
2For example. Article 22.3 of the Cnderstanding on Rules and Procedures Governing tlw 
Settlement of Disputes. and a limited punishment rule by the GATT Article XXVIII. 
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The first type is the tariff which obtains when the two countries maximise 
their joint welfare with respect to import tariffs subject to the self-enforcement 
constraints. If the world is very patient the self-enforcement constraint is not 
binding, and the two countries are simply able to implement the internationally 
efficient tariffs. On the other hand, if short-run considerations are so important 
that the self-enforcement constraint binds, the agreement must involve tariffs that 
lie somewhere in between the efficient tariffs and the politically optimal Nash 
tariffs in order to persuade each country to adhere to the agreement. I then go 
on to examine how exogenous changes in natural trade costs affect the optimal 
self-enforceable tariffs. It turns out that if countries are very impatient such that 
short-run considerations are important, tariffs need to be raised in response to 
falling trade costs. This is because when trade costs fall the one-shot payoff from 
deviating from an agreed-upon tariff increases, since there is a greater benefit from 
distorting terms of trade in a country's favour, and shifting profits towards the 
domestic firm. On other words, in order to keep an impatient country's incentive 
to stay in the agreement, tariffs need to be raised in response to falling trade 
costs in order to reduce the short-run payoff from unilateral deviation. If the 
world is sufficiently patient, however, the long run payoff from cooperation is 
relatively more important, and for that reason the joint objective of minimising 
losses in transit becomes more important. While this may not imply that the 
internationally efficient tariffs are self-enforceable, countries care sufficiently about 
the future to sustain lower tariffs in response to falling trade costs. Hence, the 
relationship between tariffs and trade costs depends crucially on how patient the 
world is. I demonstrate that tariffs fall in respOIlse to falling trade costs for 
the largest range of discount factors, allowing the two countries to increa.'ip their 
welfare. 
The second type of agreement, a FTA, is useful for several reasons. First, the 
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post-war era has witnessed the emergence of a large number of FTAs, and it is 
therefore interesting to see how trade costs affect the sustainability of such an 
agreement. Second, because a FTA involves removing import tariffs a.'i a trade 
policy instrument it may be that such an agreement is the most self-enforcing 
if there are fixed costs associated with reinstating customs and border controls. 
Although I do not model such fixed costs explicitly, they could easily be added to 
the model. I define a critical discount factor above which a FTA is self-enforceable. 
This discount factor is given as the ratio of the one-shot gain from deviating from 
a FTA to the long-run loss from infinite Nash reversion. I demonstrate that the 
one-shot gain from deviating is greater when trade costs fall. This is because, 
relative to free trade, the one-shot benefit from distorting the terms of trade and 
shifting profits towards the domestic firm is higher when the natural distortion 
due to trade costs is lower. The long run loss from infinite Na...,h reversion is also 
higher when trade costs fall, since the punishment in terms of lost profit in the 
export market and worsened terms of trade is higher when trade costs are lower. 
Provided that firms interact strategically, I demonstrate that although the one-
shot benefit from deviating from a FTA is higher when trade costs are lower, the 
greater international externalities that would result from deviation ensures that 
a FTA is more sustainable when trade costs fall. Put differently, a FTA can be 
supported for a larger range of discount factors when trade costs are lower. This 
relationship is steeper when the degree of strategic interaction is higher. I also 
show that there is a discontinuity in the relationship between trade costs and trade 
policy cooperation. In fact, there is a trade cost threshold that must be crossed 
before a FTA can be supported at all. This is because when trade costs are above 
this threshold there are too many losses in transit such that free trade is far too 
deep a trade liberalisation from a joint welfare-maximising perspective. If firms 
do not interact strategically, there is no relationship between the critical discount 
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factor and trade costs. This is because, when each firm is a monopolist in its 
own market, the change (with respect to trade costs) in the unilateral gain from 
deviation is exactly proportional to the change in the long run loss. Hence, there 
is no such relationship. 
I would argue that this model is able to account for several aspects of the post-
war era trade liberalisation. First, provided the world has been sufficiently patient, 
this theory can explain the gradual (rather than immediate) fall in import tariffs. 
Due to the gradual decline in natural trade frictions, the world has experienced 
fewer losses in transit, making lower tariffs more self-enforceable. This has allowed 
successive rounds of trade liberalisation through the GATT /WTO. Second, the 
theory may be able to explain why the developed world has experienced much 
deeper reductions in politically induced trade protection, since transport costs are 
generally much higher between poorer countries. Finally, since the theory suggests 
that global free trade is more self-enforceable when trade costs are lower, it can 
help explain the emergence of the large number of FTAs since World War II. 
Moreover, I believe the model is relevant for the design of international trading 
institutions such as the WTO and the European Union. A relevant question is 
the deepness of political integration and the extent to which institutions such as 
the EU and the WTO should be given supra-national powers over trade policy. 
According to the theory, FTAs can be supported for a larger range of discount 
factors when trade costs are lower. This implies that when trade costs fall the 
European Union could actually return powers over trade policy to member states, 
knowing that trade liberalisation stands a higher chance of sustaining itself in the 
absence of a law enforcement agency. 
At the same time, the model can be relevant in times of economic recessions, 
since the degree to which governments value the future often depends 011 the 
state of the macro economy. In times of recession, governments may care more 
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about short-run considerations, and for that rea.<;on international law enforcement 
agencies may need to be deepened to deal with falling natural trade costs and the 
consequent increased incentives to deviate. 
The literature on trade policy reveals many channels through which trade costs 
affect the welfare of import tariffs. In models where there is free entry and exit 
a standard motive for imposing import tariffs is the so-called home-market effect. 
Two prominent examples are Venables (1985) and Venables (1987). The first 
of these models considers an oligopoly model with free entry and homogeneous 
products while the second uses Dixit-Stiglitz style monopolistic competition. In 
both models, a positive import tariff imposed by one country has the effect of 
attracting entry of firms in that country and exit in the other. This increases 
the amount of goods available not subjected to costly trade costs, thus increasing 
welfare for the country that imposes the tariff. Countries will consequently find 
themselves caught in a tariff war to attract firms. 
Using a model of multinational enterprises, Ludema (2002) constructs a similar 
model where firms face a trade-off between being close to foreign markets (to avoid 
trade costs) and to concentrate production at home (to exploit economies of scale). 
When trade costs are reduced the incentive to unilaterally impose import tariffs 
decreases since a smaller proportion of the traded quantities is lost in transit and 
the desire to exploit economies of scale is increased. The desire to cooperate is 
therefore also greater. Notice that the present model finds that the incentive 
to impose import tariffs increases when trade costs fall which is the opposite of 
Ludema's (2002) finding. It is therefore reassuring that the finding that a FTA 
agreement is more self-enforceable when trade costs are lower is the same in this 
model as in Ludema's (2002). But in my model the result has a different driver, 
namely that the externalities that unilateral trade policy impose internationally 
when trade costs are lower, makes a FTA more self-enforceable. 
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Ludema's (2002) model produces the counterfactual implication that there is 
a positive relationship between FDI and import protection. It is well known, how-
ever, that countries with larger FDI flows have lower levels protection. Hence, the 
present model demonstrates that the relationship between the self-enforceability 
of FTAs and trade costs carries over to an environment with different motives for 
trade policy. 
More recently, Zissimos (2010) models the formation of FTAs a.'> a coordination 
problem. He shows how distance can be used to solve such coordination problems 
between countries. His main finding is that countries that are located closer to each 
other geographically (distance could here be interpreted as transport costs) impose 
greater externalities (in the form of terms-of-trade and profit-shifting distortions) 
upon each other, thus increasing the desire to coordinate their trade policy choices 
by forming a FTA. As in the present model, however, Zissimos (2010) does not 
invoke a requirement that trade agreements must be self-enforceable. Other papers 
which consider similar issues in models of perfect competition include Bond and 
Syropoulos (1996), Bond (2001), and Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001). 
On the empirical side, very few papers have analysed the relationship between 
trade costs and cooperative trade policy, but ca.'>ual observation should convince us 
that there is indeed a relationship. In fact, of the many variables which might ex-
plain the emergence of trade agreements proximity stands out. In the first system-
atic attempt to model the predictors of FTA membership, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004) find that proximity is a good predictor of membership of FTAs. They find 
this result using a probit model for a sample of 54 countries (or 1431 country 
pairs). 
Since I have restricted this model to a two-country framework, I am not con-
tributing to the debate on regionalism as the absence of a third country omits 
the possibility of trade diversion. This could potentially affect both the long-
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run benefits from cooperation and short-run incentives to deviate for the case of 
preferential trade agreements. If it is assumed that trade agreements are signed 
between natural trading partners, however, this trade diversion effect may not 
pose a large problem. In any case, the present framework may be more applicable 
to the case of multilateral trade agreements as negotiated under the GATT jWTO. 
In the concluding section of this chapter, I discuss how my results might extend 
to frameworks with more than two countries. 
The present model also contributes to the literature on gradual trade liberal-
isation. In Furusawa and Lai (1999), the requirement that trade agreements be 
self-enforceable induces gradual trade liberalisation. They construct a two-country 
two-sector trade model in which there is an adjustment cost to be incurred for a 
worker to move from one sector to the other. If the two countries choose to 
embark on a path of trade liberalisation they will liberalise as much as possible 
while keeping each country's incentive to stay in the agreement. In every period, 
deeper trade liberalisation is made possible and the importable sector shrinks. In 
a similar model, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007), which will form the basis for 
empirical estimation in Chapter 4, show that trade liberalisation can be gradual 
due to imperfect mobility of capital. This allows faster trade liberalisation when 
capital is more mobile. That paper, however, docs not require trade agreements 
to be self-enforceable. In the present model, gradualism emerges from the ef-
fects of trade costs: a gradual but unanticipated exogenous decline in trade costs 
facilitates lower import tariffs, provided the two countries are sufficiently patient. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 I present the model of 
oligopoly which will be employed in this chapter. Section 2.3 discusses the uuilat-
eral trade policy equilibrium, before Section 2.4 moves on to discuss how coopera-
tive trade policy can be used to solve this inefficiency. In Section 2.5 and Section 
2.6, I discuss how the requirement of self-enforceability can change the outcomes 
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of cooperative trade policy, and Section 2.7 concludes while discussing some useful 
extensions. 
2.2 The model 
In this section I present a version of Vi's (1996) extension of the Brander (1981) 
model of trade with oligopoly. I consider a world with two countries called Home 
and Foreign and an infinite number of discrete time periods. Each country has 
one firm, each producing one good. I assume there is no entry/exit such that firms 
make abnormal profits in equilibrium. Preferences are identical across countries 
and can be represented by the following quasilinear-quadratic utility function in 
each period: 
(2.1 ) 
where qij is country i's consumption of country j's products, qi == (qih, qij) is 
country i's consumption vector, Qi == qih + qil and Ali is country i's consumption 
of the numeraire good. The numeraire is freely traded across countries to settle 
the balance of trade, and I assume that each coulltry's endowment of this good 
is sufficient to guarantee a positive consumption in equilibrium. The parameter 
'Y E [0; 1] represents a substitution index: when') = 0 goods are independent and 
each firm is a monopolist in its own market. As'Y increases goods become closer 
substitutes. Assuming, < 1 consumers have a ta.'lte for variety. :\'otice that "( can 
be thought of as a measure of the degree of strategic interaction between firms, 
such that a higher "( implies a more direct competition among firms. 
The two countries may not be symmetric in every aspect but for convenience 
I shall present all economic expressions for Home as the analogous expressions 
for Foreign are not hard to express once the reader has been presented with the 
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expressions for Home. By maximising utility in (2.1) it is possible to derive Home's 
demand for the Home firm's good and the Foreign firm's good, respectively, a<.;: 
Phh = a - qhh - ~ ( % I I and PhI = a - %1 -,qhh· (2.2) 
The analogous demand functions for Foreign's demand for the Home good and the 
Foreign good can be found by exchanging hand f in (2.2). Trade is subject to 
natural trade costs of the iceberg form. In order for one unit of exports to arrive in 
Home, 1 + ah units must be produced. Similarly, in order for one unit of exports to 
arrive in Foreign, 1 + a f units must be produced. I a<;sume there are no internal 
natural trade costs. In order to keep the analysis simple, I a<.;sume throughout 
most of the paper that trade costs are symmetric such that nh = n I = n. This 
assumption is arguably realistic as long as the analysis refers to trade between 
two developed nations, while if trade took place between a developing country 
and one which is developed the assumption may not be valid. This is because 
with a transport technology which is less evolved the concept of distance may 
be different. It is not unrealistic to assume that, say 2000 miles between two 
developing countries is different than 2000 miles between two developed countries. 
In Section 2.6, I deal with how asymmetry affects the r'elativc incentives of the 
two countries to cooperate. 
In addition to natural trade costs the governments of each country are able to 
impose political trade costs in the form of a specific import tariff. I a<.;sUllle that 
tariffs are country-specific such that Home sets a tariff equal to Titan imports 
from Foreign's firm, and Foreign sets a tariff equal to T J. I also a"lSUllle there are 
no internal political trade barriers. 
Both firms produce at the same marginal cost of c in their respective domestic 
markets, C = Chh = Cff, but due to trade costs (both political and natural) the 
effective marginal cost of exporting becomes ('Ih = C + n f + T f for the Home 
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firm and chf = C + fth + Th for the Foreign firm. Markets are segmented and 
firms compete in a Cournot fashion by choosing quantities in each country. In 
the Home market, the Home firm solves the problem, maxqhh 1fhh = (Phh - c) qhh, 
and the Foreign firm solves, maxqhf 1fhf = (Phf - Chf) qhf, yielding the following 
first-order conditions: 
Phh - C - qhh = 0 and Phf - C - (};h - Th - qhf = 0 . (2.3) 
Using (2.2) these conditions can be rewritten as: 
a - c - 2qhh - ,qhf = 0 and a - c - Th - Ql.h - 2qhf - ,qhh = O. (2.4) 
Summing the first-order conditions in (2.4) gives the following per-period quanti-
ties in Cournot equilibrium: 
where r (-) is defined as r (k, 1') == 2 - I' + kl', and I have normalised such that 
a-c = 1. By summing the quantities produced by each firm, I obtain an expression 
for the total quantity demanded by Home: 
By solving the profit maximising problems for the Home and Foreign firms, rc-
spectively, in the Foreign market it is possible obtain the analogous expressions 
for Cournot quantities in the Foreign market, qff, qfh and Qf· 
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The equilibrium quantities have the following properties: 
dqhh ~ ( (
dnh r (0,,) r (2,,) 
> 0 and dqhf = dq"f = _ 2 < O. 
dTh dCth r (0,,) r (2, r) 
dQh = _ 1 < 0 
dO'h r(2,,) 
If Home raises its tariff on imports of goods from Foreign, the consumption of 
foreign imports and the total consumption fall, but the consumption of Home's 
domestic good increases. Exogenous increases in natural trade costs, Cth, have thc 
same effect on quantities. In fact, what matters for the equilibrium quantities 
are total trade costs whether political or natural. A similar argument applies to 
quantities in Foreign. 
Using the first-order condition m (2.3) I obtain the equilibrium per-period 
profits of the Home and Foreign firms, respectively, in the Home market: 
Hence, I have, 
d7rhh d7rhh 2,qhh 
> 0; = 
Thh O'.h r(0,,)r(2,,) (2.6) 
d7rhf d7rhf 
= 
4qhf < O. 
Th O'.h r (0, ~ ( ) ) r (2,,) 
If Home raises its tariff (or there is an exogenous nse in natural trade costs) 
on imports from Foreign, the Home firm's profits from domestic sales rise, but 
the export profits of the Foreign firm in Home fall. It is possible to obtain the 
analogous profits of the Home firm and of the Foreign finn, respectively 7r f f and 
IT fh, in the Foreign market, and apply t . h { ~ ~ same argumcnts to profits there. 
There are two sources of gains from trade in the Illodel: an increased variety of 
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goods and decreased market power of the domestic industry. When the substitu-
tion index r is lower, consumers value variety whereas the pro-competitive effect 
is higher when r is higher. 
I define total consumer welfare m Home, Ch , to be the consumers surplus 
enjoyed from consuming every variety (provided r < 1), and the tariff revenue 
which is redistributed back to individuals in a lump-sum fashion. I can express 
this total consumer welfare in each period as: 
Ch (Th' G:h) = CSh (Tho G:h) + TRh (Th, G:h) 
1 1 2 (a - Phh) qhh + 2 (a - Ph!) qh! + Thqh!· (2.7) 
The total profits of Home's firm consist of the profits it makes from serving its 
domestic market as well as its profits from supplying the market in Foreign. I can 
express these per-period aggregate profits as: 
(2.8) 
The per-period welfare of each country can be expressed by adding up COnSUIIler 
welfare in (2.7) and profits in (2.8): 
Exchanging hand f in equations (2.7)-(2.9) gives the corresponding per-period 
expressions for consumer surplus, tariff revenue and aggregate profits for Foreign. 
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2.3 Unilateral trade policy 
When acting non-cooperatively, it is assumed that the governments of each country 
set tariffs so as to maximise their individual welfare. The governments move first 
by setting optimal tariffs and the two firms then set Cournot quantities subject 
to the tariffs chosen by the governments in each market. As discussed in Baldwin 
and Venables (1995) and Mrazova (2011), it is possible to decompose the welfare 
effects of import tariffs into a terms-of-trade effect (ToT), a volume-of-trade effect 
(VoT) , and a profit-shifting (PS) effect. Differentiating (2.9) with respect to Th 
yields:.l , 
(2.10) 
where PhI is the net-of-tariffprice of Foreigll's good sold in Home, or PhI = Phi-Tho 
The ToT effect is the variation in the net-of-tariff price which Foreign's firm receive 
for their exports to Home. In this model, the ToT effect is positive such that all 
increase in Home's import tariff improves Home's terms of trade. The tariff reduces 
Home's volume of trade (VoT :::; 0) due to a higher commmer price of imports, but 
it shifts profits from foreign exporters to domestic producers by reducing market 
access (PS ~ ~ 0). This last effect is due to the oligopolistie distortion where the 
import tariff moves the domestic firm towards the Stackelberg leader output level. 
This effect would be absent under perfect competition where prices equal marginal 
costs. Moreover, if there were no strategic interaction between firms (, = 0), then 
it will be the case that dd9hh = 0, such that there would be no profit-shifting 
Th 
incentive for imposing import tariffs. In this case, the only lllotive to unilaterally 
impose tariffs is to switch the terms oftrade in its favour. However, when oligopoly 
matters there are two motives: to improve the terms of trade and to shift profits 
towards domestic firms. Substituting the Cournot quantities (2.5) and the inverse 
:!See Appendix 2.8.1 for the derivation. 
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demand function (2.2) in (2.10), I can solve for the optimal non-cooperative tariffs 
for Home, and analogously for Foreign, 11.<;4: 
N 1 - O'h N 1 - O'f 
Th = 3 and T f = 3 (2.11) 
where the superscript N on the optimal tariff in (2.11) stands for Na.<;h, and is 
there to illustrate the prisoner's dilemma nature of non-cooperative trade policy. 
Notice that Home's (Foreign's) optimal tariff is independent of the trade costs 
incurred by exporting to Foreign (Home). Notice further from Appendix 2.8.1 that 
the governments do not set Nash tariffs strategically such that the Na.<;h tariff in 
Home (Foreign) is independent of the Nash tariff in Foreign (Home). This feature 
of the model is due to the fact that the two countries' markets are segmented. 
Because of the assumed linear demand function it is possible that tariffs become 
prohibitive. To rule this out I impose the condition, 
O'h < 1 - ~ , , ( 0' f < 1 - ~ , ,) , (2.12) 
on Home (Foreign) trade costs throughout the rest of this chapter. In Appendix 
2.8.3, I prove the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.1: If O'h < 1 - ~ , , (af < 1 - ~ , ) ) there e:rists a unzque 71071-
prohibitive Nash tariff for Home (Foreign). 
It is useful to see how changes in Home trade costs change the incentive to 
'See Appendix 2.8.2 for the derivation. 
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impose import tariffs. Taking the derivative with respect to nh ill (2.10) yields'-': 
= ( < o. f 0,,),)f(2,,),) 
1 (2.13) 
This implies that as G:h falls, the gain from imposing tariffs increases. This is 
because when natural trade costs are lower, the natural distortion of profits and 
consumer prices is lower, making import tariffs more effective at switching terms 
of trade in Home's favour, and shifting profits towards the domestic firm in the 
domestic market. Hence, the negative correlation between the Nash tariffs and 
• ~ N N b N 
trade costs, that IS ~ ~ = - ~ ~ < 0 (and 'i!t = - ~ ~ < 0). 
Unilateral trade policy is inefficient, however, as one country's welfare gain 
comes at the expense of the other. By taking the derivative of Home's welfare 
with respect to Foreign's import tariff it is similarly possible to decompose the 
welfare effect into a terms-of-trade (ToT), a volume-of-trade (VoT) and a profit-
shifting (PS) componentti : 
(2.14) 
where Pjh is the net-of-tariff price of Home's good sold in Foreign. Substituting 
Foreign's Xash tariff in (2.11) into (2.14) yields7 : 
(2.15) 
Hence, by acting non-cooperatively, international trade policy produces a terms-
of-trade externality and a profit-shifting externality. It is also clear from (2.15) 
"See Appendix 2.8.2 for the derivation. 
fiSee Appendix 2.8.1 for the derivation. 
7See Appendix 2.8.2 for the derivation. 
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that these externalities become more severe when trade costs are lower: 
It is similarly possible to see how the substitution index affects international ex-
ternalities by taking the derivative of (2.15) with respect to T 
d
2
Wh I -
dTfd'TN 
f 
An increase in the degree of strategic interaction among firms, thus, increases inter-
national externalities. A trade agreement may be used to overcome this prisoner's 
dilemma by inducing cooperation. 
2.4 Trade liberalisation with commitment 
In this section, I derive the most efficient tariffs which would obtain if the two 
countries were able to commit themselves to all future tariffs stipulated by a trade 
agreement. This implies that Horne and Foreign arc not allowed to deviate from 
an agreed-upon tariff. This case would arise, for example, if there was a supra-
national government, or some international law enforcement agency which was able 
to ensure that agreements are honoured. Given this environment, the governments 
of Horne and Foreign set two cooperative tariffs, T ~ ' ' and Tj', to maximise the 
present discounted value of their joint welfare: 
m a x ~ J J (Th, Tf, G:h, G:f) = -1  .c (Wh (Th, Tf. G:h, G:f) + W f (Th, Tf, Cfh, (}:f)), Th,Tf1-u -u 
(2.16) 
where <5 < 1 is the discount factor assumed symmetric across countries. As with 
unilateral policy the governments move first by setting efficient tariffs and £inns 
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then choose quantities subject to those tariffs. Taking the derivative of (2.16) with 
respect to Th yields the following first order conditionll; 
(2.17) 
Exchanging hand f in (2.17) gives the analogous first order condition for For-
eign's cooperative tariff. Substituting the inverse demand functions (2.2) and the 
Cournot quantities (2.5) into (2.17), I can solve for the internationally efficient 
tariff for Home, and analogously for Foreign, asu; 
(2.18) 
Thus, if Home and Foreign were able to commit to any tariff they would choose 
Tf and 77, respectively, in every period forever. In the absence of any trade costs 
Qh = Q, = 0, the efficient cooperative tariffs are negative. This is because in 
the presence of oligopolistic markets, firms produce suboptimal quantities and it 
is therefore efficient to subsidise them. As trade costs increase (both Home and 
Foreign, respectively, (}:h and (}:,), however, an increasing amount of the traded 
quantities are lost in transit. Hence, from a joint w e l f a r ~ ' - l l l a x i m i s i n g g perspective it 
becomes optimal to subsidise the traded quantities less, and as trade costs exceed 
a critical threshold it will be more efficient to impose a positive tariff to reduce 
the quantity lost in transit. If trade costs are symmetric, this critical threshold 
can be solved from (2.18) as, 
XSee Appendix 2.8.4 for the derivation 
!lSee Appendix 2.8.4 for the derivation. 
(2.19) 
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In Appendix 2.8.4, I show that as trade costs symmetrically approach their upper 
bounds in (2.12), the efficient tariffs in (2.18) converge to the Nash tariffs in (2.11), 
and in the limit they are equal: 
7 ~ ~ = 7r;: and 77 = 77 
Q - > l - ~ ' ) ' ' Q - - - > l - ~ ' 1 1
(2.20) 
Notice the conflict of interest between non-cooperative and cooperative trade 
policy. When acting unilaterally countries wish to set higher tariffs when trade 
costs fall, but from a bilateral perspective tariffs should be lowered when trade 
costs fall. In order to get a feel for the differences of unilateral and cooperative 
trade policy objectives, I draw the Nash and efficient tariffs as functions of trade 
costs in Figure 2.2. I have set I = 0.5 such that trade is eliminated when (f = 
1 - H = ~ ~ (see Eq. (2.12)). The reason for setting I equal to this value is purely 
for illustrative purposes, and it could be set at any other value yielding similar 
results. 
2.5 Trade liberalisation without commitment 
In this section, I focus on cooperative tariffs which must be sustained through a 
reputational mechanism. This implies that Home and Foreign do not necessarily 
achieve the highest possible level of long-run welfare in any agreement as in the 
previous section. This is because in every period, as will be clear below, each 
country is weighting the short-run gain from deviating from an agreed-upon tariff 
against the long-run benefit from adhering to it. Thus, because of the requirement 
of self-enforceability, one could say that from a long-run perspective, the two 
countries may be constraining themselves to a second-best agreement. 
I consider two types of agreements which are subject to a self-enforcement 
constraint. First, I solve for the optimal bilateral tariff which can be sustained 
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through a reputational mechanism. This optimal tariff depends crucially on the 
degree of patience of the two countries. Patient countries arc able to agree upon 
tariffs which are closer to the efficient tariffs of the previous section, whereas 
impatient countries cannot sustain significant departures from the Na."lh tariffs. 
Second, I will analyse the self-enforceability of global free trade. This particular 
case is useful since many countries have signed FTAs in the post-war era. Since 
a FTA involves removing import tariffs as a trade policy instrument, it could be 
argued that such an agreement is the most self-enforceable if there is a fixed cost 
associated with reinstating customs and border controls. I am not modelling this 
fixed cost explicitly but it could easily be added to the analysis. In both ca."les, I 
will examine how trade costs affect the incentives to engage in cooperative trade 
policy. 
As with the case of unilateral trade policy, the setting of cooperative trade 
policy can be considered a."l a two-stage game: in the first stage governments 
jointly set tariffs, and in the second the two finns choose Cournot out.put levels 
in, respectively, the Home and Foreign market. The two countries play this two-
stage game in every period an infinite number of times. A strategy is an infinite 
sequence of functions mapping the history of play into current actions. Let the 
cooperative tariffs be given as the pair (Tf, T7), such that the present discounted 
value of adhering to the agreement is: 
(2.21) 
I assume that if a country does not honour the trade agreement in any given period, 
the other country will punish it by reverting to the politically optimal ~ a s h h tariff 
forever as of the following period. The deviating country will, however, enjoy 
a short-run benefit from deviation by distorting the terms-of-trade in its favour 
and shifting profits towards the domestic firm. It is possible to find this OIlC-
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shot deviation payoff from the point of view of Home by substituting Home's 
non-cooperative Nash tariff from (2.11) into the expression for welfare: 
where the superscript D stands for deviation. Since the other country will punish 
the cheating nation by reverting to the ~ a s h h tariff forever as of the following 
period, the deviation payoff reduces to the following after one period: 
where the superscript P stands for punishment. The present discounted value of 
the deviation welfare in Home can thus be expressed as: 
(2.22) 
In order for a trade agreement to be self-enforceable, the welfare froIll honouring 
the trade agreement must be greater than or equal to the welfare from deviation. 
The discounted value of the welfare from cooperation can be obtained from (2.21), 
and together with (2.22) I can express the following self-enforcement constraint 
for Home: 
1 W.e (e e ) WD (N C ) 8 TUP (N N ) 1-8 h Th,Tf,D:h,D:f 2: h Th,Tf,ah,af + 1_8Hh Th,Tf,Ct/t,Ctf . 
(2.23) 
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2.5.1 Optimal self-enforceable tariffs: explaining gradual-
ism in trade liberalisation 
The efficient tariffs obtained in Section 2.4 may not be supported in an agreement 
which is subject to a self-enforcement constraint for all discount factors. It may 
be that higher tariffs can be agreed-upon, however, which can be sustained by 
repeated interaction. In this subsection, I define an optimal self-enforceable tariff 
and examine the relationship between this tariff and natural trade costs. For the 
purposes of this subsection I assume that trade costs are symmetric such that 
(th = (tf = (t. Before proceeding, however, it will be useful to calculate the level 
of patience required to sustain the internationally efficient tariffs in (2.18). This 
can be done by solving (2.23) for a critical discount factor, 6e , above which an 
agreement stipulating that Home and Foreign adhere to the efficient tariffs, 7 ~ ~
and 77, respectively, is self-enforceable: 
(2.24) 
~ o t i c e e that the numerator of (2.24), wf - wf, is the short-run benefit to Home 
from deviating from the internationally efficient tariff when Foreign cooperates. 
This is given as the short run benefit from switching the terms of trade in Home's 
favour, and shifting profits towards the domestic firm in the Home market relative 
to the efficient tariffs. The denominator of (2.24), We - W,;, is the long-run loss 
in welfare when Foreign, which was caught by surprise in the previous period, 
retaliates by reverting to the Nash tariff. The critical discount factor is thus given 
8.."i the ratio of the short-run gain from deviation to the long-run loss. In Appendix 
2.8.5, I demonstrate that this critical discount factor is given a."" 
(2.25) 
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Hence, for any discount factor greater than 6e the internationally efficient tariffs 
can be sustained. Notice that this discount factor is independent of n. When trade 
costs fall, the temptation to cheat on the agreement increases but so does the long-
run benefit of adhering to it, leaving the critical discount factor, tSe , unchanged. 
Notice further that 6e is weakly increasing in,,1O. When" is larger, the temptation 
to unilaterally deviate from an agreement by distorting terms of trade and shifting 
profits towards the domestic firm is larger raising the level of patience required to 
sustain the efficient tariffs. 
If the two countries discount the future at a level lower than 6e , however, is it 
then possible to find a tariff which improves welfare whilst keeping each country's 
inccntive to stay in the agreement? Let the optimal self-enforceable tariffs for 
Home and Foreign be given as the pair ( T ~ , , T1). To fix idea.<;, I rewrite the sdf-
enforcement constraint (2.23) for Home in the following convenient way: 
W D (N S ) UTe (S S ) < .. (WD (N .'> ) wP (N /Ii )) h Th,TI,a -Hh Th,TI,a _0 h Th,TI,a - h Th"f,n , 
(2.26) 
and symmetrically I can write the self-enforcemcnt constraint for Foreign by ex-
changing hand f as: 
Wf ( T J , T ~ , a ) ) - Wf ( T J , T ~ , C I . ) ) ~ ~ 6 (Wf ( T J , T ~ , C I . ) ) - Wr ( / J . / ~ . n ) ) . .
(2.27) 
Home and Foreign would jointly like to achieve the highest level of long-run welfare 
by maximising joint welfare (2.16). The requirement of self-enforceability, however, 
constrains the two countries by (2.26) and (2.27). The optimal self-enforceable 
IOThe derivative *" = ( 8 ~ ~ : ; l ) 2 2 2: 0 for,,) E [0; 1]. 
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tariff solves the following: 
1 
1 _ 8 (Wh (Th' TI, 0:) + WI (Th' TI, 0:)) 
s.t. (2.26) and (2.27). (2.28) 
If the discount factor 6 2 be, the constraints in (2.26) and (2.27) are not binding, 
and Home and Foreign will set import tariffs at their efficient levels given in (2.18). 
Otherwise they will set import tariffs at their minimum self-enforceable levels. In 
Appendix 2.8.5, I show that the minimum self-enforceable tariffs which solve (2.28) 
when (2.26) and (2.27) are binding, are given as: 
M M 0: (406 + 3'l - 12) - 406 - 3,2 + 12 + 248-y 
Th = T I = 3 (12 - 3,2 - 86) (2.29) 
Thus, the optimal self-enforceable tariffs for Home and Foreign, respectively, are: 
In order to get a feel for these tariffs, imagine two extreme worlds. The first world 
is characterised by extreme myopia, such that Home and Foreign care only about 
welfare in the current period (6 = 0). Setting 8 = 0 in (2.29) it is clear that in 
this case, the self-enforceable tariffs are equal to the Nash tariffs. If the world 
cares only about current-period welfare, no departures from the Nash tariffs are 
possible. In the second world the two countries are characterised by farsightedness 
with a discount factor in the range, 6 E [6e ; 1[. In this case, the two countries are 
patient enough to implement the efficient tariffs in (2.18). Thus, in an extremely 
myopic world, no agreement is possible since only the Nash tariffs are sustainable, 
but in a very farsighted world, the efficient tariffs can be implemented. But how 
about discount factors that lie in between these cases? Assume now that the world 
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discounts the future at the rate 8 EjO; 8e [. This is where the minimum cooperative 
tariffs (2.29) become important. These tariffs can be thought of as a weighted 
average of the Nash tariffs and the efficient tariffs. A property of the minimum 
tariffs which I prove in Appendix 2.8.5 is that, when tracie eosts increa."e towards 
the upper bound given in (2.12), they converge towards the Na."h tariffs: 
T ~ ~ = T ~ ~ and Ty = T7-
Q - + l - ~ " Y Y " ' - + l - ~ , ,
(2.30) 
This is due to the property that there is no conflict between unilateral and coop-
erative trade policy in the limit where import tariffs are prohibitive. Formally, I 
can find out the relationship between trade costs and trade policy by taking the 
derivative of (2.29) with respect to a. This yields: 
d T ~ ~ (408 + 3,2 - 12) 
da 3 (12 - 3,2 - 88) . 
Since the denominator of this derivative is positive, I can evaluate the sign by 
solving for 8 in the numerator. Hence, there is a positive relationship between T ~ I I
(and symmetrically for Tt) and a if and only if, 
8 > 12 - 3,2 
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(2.31) 
For convenience, I am going to define medium to high discount factors as any 
discount factor greater than the threshold given in (2.31). Any discount factor 
lower than or equal this threshold is defined as a low discount factor. With a 
slight abuse of terminology, I am going to say that the world is patient if the 
two countries have a medium to high discount factor, and impatient if they have 
low discount factors. Hence, if the countries are patient, and if they implement 
the tariffs, T ~ ~ and T1, respectively, they will set lower tariffs when trade costs 
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fall. If, on the other hand, countries are impatient, they may still find cooperative 
tariffs which can make them both better off. These cooperative tariffs, however, 
will need to be raised in response to falling trade costs. The reason for these 
relationships is as follows. As can be seen from (2.26) the greater is the discount 
factor, the greater the valuation the two countries will place on their welfare in 
the long run. This implies that for a patient world, the cooperative tariff must 
be closer to the efficient tariffs in (2.18), which are increasing in trade costs. In 
this patient world, therefore, the objective of Home and Foreign is mainly to use 
import tariffs jointly to minimise the transit losses associated with trade costs. 
In an impatient world, on the other hand, the cooperative tariffs must be closer 
to the Nash tariffs, which are decreasing in trade costs. In this case, if tariffs 
depart significantly from their Nash levels, the temptation to distort terms of 
trade and to shift profits towards the domestic firms is too large. Hence, in a 
patient world, trade liberalisation is deeper when natural trade costs fall. Provided 
WTO member countries have been sufficiently patient, this may help explaining 
gradualism in the trade liberalisation rounds under the GATT /WTO. Falling trade 
costs, 8..'> evidenced in Figure 2.1, may have facilitated deeper self-enforceable trade 
liberalisation over time. Impatient countries may also achieve trade liberalisation 
according to this theory, but stronger international law enforcement agencies are 
required to sustain welfare-enhancing trade liberalisation in response to falling 
trade costs. It should be added, however, that an implicit assumption is that 
falling trade costs are unanticipated, such that governments are not able to plan 
the optimal trade policy on a horizon in which falling trade costs an' anticipated. 
Such an analysis, while fruitful, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In Figure 2.3 I depict the optimal self-enforceable tariff in Home as a function of 
trade costs for various discount factors in the range, 6 EjO; 6e [. The two bold lincs 
are the efficient and Nash tariffs, respectively, reproduced from Figure 2.2. The 
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Figure 2.3: Optimal self-enforcable tariffs. h = 0.5). 
two dashed lines represent optimal self-enforceable tariffs for discount factors of 
0.2 and 0.5, respectively. When the discount factor is 0.2, short-run considerations 
are more important. In fact, in order to keep each country's incentive to stay in 
the agreement, tariffs need to be raised in response to falling trade costs. In other 
words, because the future is not important enough, tariffs must be raised in order 
to make sure each country does not fall for the temptation to distort the terms of 
trade in their favour, or shift profits towards their respective domestic industries 
when trade costs fall. On the other hand, when the world discounts the future at 
the rate 0.5, gradual trade liberalisation is made possible by falling natural trade 
costs. 
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2.6 The self-enforceability of a free trade agree-
ment 
In this subsection I will consider the sustainability of global free trade. This 
case is useful for at least two reasons: (i) many countries have signed FTAs in 
the post-war era, and (ii) a FTA involves giving up import tariffs as a policy 
instrument as opposed to the efficient tariffs which involve using import tariffs to 
reach the maximum level of joint welfare. If customs and border controls involve 
significant fixed costs, it may be that a FTA is more self-enforceable than any 
other agreement by removing import tariffs as a policy option. Global free trade, 
however, does not solve the problem of suboptimal quantities which is present 
under oligopolistic competition. Recall from Section 2.4 that the efficient tariffs 
in (2.18) may be positive for sufficiently high trade costs since the two countries 
jointly try to minimise traded quantities lost in transit. Hence, it will he the case 
that from a joint welfare-maximising perspective, free trade is far too deep a trade 
liberalisation if trade costs exceed that threshold (see Eq. (2.19)). In this case, 
therefore, the two countries would not choose to sign a FTA. 
Hence, the cooperative policy options available to Horne and Foreign are, rp-
spectively, the tariffs T(T = T:T = 0 provided T ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 and T;' ~ ~ o. It will he 
convenient to express the self-enforcement constraint (2.23) in terms of a critical 
discount factor, <5e , above which the FTA is self-enforceable: 
(2.32) 
As with (2.24) the numerator of (2.32), Wf - WE, is the short-run heIH'fit from 
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deviating from the FTA when the other country cooperates. This is given as 
the short run benefit from switching the terms of trade in Home's favour, and 
shifting profits towards the domestic firm in the Home market relative to free 
trade. This gain depends only on trade costs incurred by exporting to Home, 
a,,, and it is independent of af. The denominator of (2.32), wf - wt, is the 
long-run loss in welfare when the other country, which was caught by surprise in 
the previous period, retaliates by reverting to the Nash tariff. This loss depends 
on natural trade costs incurred by exporting to Foreign, af, but is independent 
of ah. The critical discount factor is thus given as the ratio of the short-run gain 
from deviation to the long-run loss. 
The next step in the analysis is to examine how trade costs affect the critical 
discount factor (2.32) for zero cooperative tariffs, and I will first consider asym-
metric changes in trade costs. Suppose there is an exogenous change in trade costs 
incurred by exporting to Horne, ah, possibly due to changes in technology. The 
short-run gain from deviating from free trade, W f - wf, consists of a consumer 
and a producer gain. The total benefit to consumers from import protection rela-
tive to free trade, CSh ( T ~ , , ah) - CSh (Tf, ah) + TR" ( T ~ , , ah), depends on how 
Horne's natural trade costs affect the terms of trade gain and the volume of trade 
loss relative to free trade. Similarly, the producer gain, 7r "" ( T ~ , , a,,) -7r"" ( T ~ ' . . (1,,), 
depends on how Home's natural trade costs affect the degree to which the Nash 
tariff is able to shift profits towards the domestic firm relative to free trade. This 
producer gain is positive provided that firms interact strategically (r > 0). In 
Appendix 2.8.6, I show that there is a negative correlation between Home trade 
costs, ah, and the short-run benefit from deviation, wlJ - Wf. This implies that. 
when ah is low, the gain from unilaterally deviating from free trade is higher im-
plying that, ceteris paribus, a FTA becomes less self-enforceable when Home t.rade 
costs are lower. This is because when natural trade costs are lower, the natural 
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distortion of profits and consumer prices is lower, making import tariffs more ef-
fective at switching terms of trade in Home's favour, and shifting profits towards 
the domestic firm in the Home market relative to free trade. This feature of the 
model is different from Ludema's (2002) model of trade with multinational firms 
in which the short run gain from deviation is increasing in trade costs. The reason 
for this is that more multinationals increases the variety of goods not subjected to 
trade costs, such that the gain to consumers is lower when trade costs are lower. 
Suppose, now, there is an exogenous change in the natural trade costs in-
curred by exporting to Foreign, af. This affects the long-run loss in Home welfare 
when Foreign retaliates, WKR - Wr This loss consists of the difference between 
the Home firm's export profits under free trade trade and under protectionism, 
7r fh (T7, a f) - 1[" fh (T7, a f). In Appendix 2.8.6, I show that there is a negative 
correlation between Foreign trade costs and the long-run loss from deviation. The 
intuition for this result is the following: if trade costs incurred by exporting to 
Foreign are lower, profits are to a lesser extent naturally diverted away from the 
Home firm in Foreign's market, thus ensuring the Home firm's profits in Foreign's 
market are larger. This, however, makes retaliatory responses by Foreign larger. 
Thus, when Foreign's natural trade costs decline, a free trade agreement becomes 
more self-enforceable by lowering the critical discount factor, be. I summarise my 
findings in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2.2: If tmde costs incurred by exporting to Home decrease, a FTA 
becomes less self-enforceable since it mises the critical discount factor. =ddfJ < o. 
Oil 
If trade costs incurred by exporting to Foreign decrease, however, a FTA becomcs 
more self-enforceable, t;; > o. 
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix 2.8.6. One problelll 
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with having asymmetric trade costs is that in order for a trade agreement to be 
self-enforceable, it must be incentive-compatible for both countries. In the present 
model it will be the case that the country with the lower trade costs will be the 
one which finds it harder to sustain frec trade. This is because the one-time 
incentive for the country with the lower trade costs is higher since there is a lower 
degree of natural profit-shifting and consumer price manipulation. Moreover, the 
punishment it experiences in the long run is proportionally lower since higher trade 
costs naturally reduces its firm's market share in the other country. Hence, it is 
only necessary to focus on the self-enforcement constraint of the country with the 
lower trade costs, since this constraint defines the boundary of the sustainability 
of global free trade. 
It would be realistic to assume, however, that in the real world, there is not so 
much asymmetry in terms of trade costs, in particular between developed nations. 
In the following, therefore, an assumption of symmetry is imposed, that is, (\:" = 
0:: f = 0::, and equi-proportional changes in trade costs are examined. Notice that 
both the numerator and the denominator of (2.32) are decreasing in 0'. Hence, 
when 0:: decreases the short run gain from deviating from free trade will illcrea...,e a..., 
will the long run punishment. Hence, there are two forces in play: (a) when there 
is fall in 0::, the short-run gain from deviating from free trade increases, making the 
FTA less self-enforceable, and (b) when there is a fall in 0::, the long-run loss from 
deviating will decrease making the free trade agreement mor'e self-enforceable. 
Thus, I have to examine how the gain (numerator) and the loss (denominator) 
vary proportionally with trade costs. 
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To find the net effect I write up an expression for the critical discount factor ll : 
CSh (r;;, ex) - CSh (rrT, a) + T R" (r;;, a) + 7r'd, (rf., n) - 7r"" (7;;', n) 
7rIh (rfT,ex) -1fIh (77,0<) 
3(1-ex)(4-')'2) 
8 (5 (1 - ex) - 3')')" 
Taking the derivative with respect to 0< yields: 
On the basis of (2.34), I can propose the following: 
(2.33) 
(2.34) 
Proposition 2.3: Provided,), > 0 a FTA becomes more self-enforceable when 
trade costs between two countries decline, d t 5 ~ i C t ) ) > O. If 'Y = 0 there is no rda-
tionship between the self-enforceability of a FTA and trade costs. 
A proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix 2.8.6. Provided there 
is strategic interaction among firms it will be the ease that when trade costs 
decline, tariffs are more effective at distorting the terms of trade in H(lIne'S favour 
and at shifting profits towards the domestic firm. The long-run consequences of 
unilateral deviation are more severe when trade costs are lower, however, making 
the long-run benefit from trade cooperation higher. 
If there is no strategic interaction between firms b = 0), neither political trade 
costs nor natural trade costs are able to shift profits towards the domestic firm 
(see (2.6)), and it is possible to rewrite the critical discount factor (2.33) a.'i: 
C Sh (r;;, ex) - C Sh ( T ~ , , (10) + T RI! (7;;, n) 
Dc (ex) = (C) (N) 
1f Ih r;. ex - 7r Iii r I ' (t 
11 See Appendix 2.8.6 for t he steps behind this. 
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3 
10 (2.35) 
When , = 0, the effect of 0' on the gain to consumers from deviating is ex-
actly proportional to the loss in export profits. This is because when goods are 
independent of each other, the change in welfare from natural trade costs affects 
only traded goods. Thus, the change in the gain to consumers from deviating 
is proportional to the change in the loss inflicted upon the Foreign firm's export 
profits, and by symmetry this loss is equal to the Home firm's loss in the Foreign 
market. The critical discount factor is therefore independent of a and equal to a 
constant, in this model ,30 , 
When , increases the degree of strategic interaction between firms increa...,es, 
and profit-shifting becomes a more important motive in the setting of trade policy. 
Therefore, a trade agreement becomes less self-enforceable for every value of 0'. 
This can be seen by taking the derivative of (2.33) with respect to ,: 
d6c 3 (1 - a) (12 + 3,2 - 10, (1 - ex)) 
= >0 
8 (5 (1 - a) - 3 ~ f ) 2 2d, 
It can also be seen from (2.34) that the rciationship between 6" and 0: becomes 
steeper when, is higher. Taking the derivative of (2.34) with m'>pect to, yields, 
J2Jc (a) 3 (20 (1 - a) - 15,2 (1 - n) + 12, + 3: 2) 
----,:---''---'- = 3 > 0. 
dad, 8 (5 (1 - a) - 3,) 
In order to get a feel for the relationship between be and ex I draw them as a function 
of each other in Figure 2.4 for different values of ,'. From the diagram it is clear that 
for, = 0 the relationship is a flat line whereas when, illcrea...,cs the relationship 
between <5e and a becomes steeper. When the degree of strategic interaction 
between firms is higher, the profit-shifting motive for trade policy becomes greater, 
raising the critical discount factor for every value of ex. However, a higher 1 
will raise the critical discount factor less for lower trade costs. This is because 
the problem of profit-shifting is larger when trade costs are lower increa...,illg t 1 H ~ ~
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incentive to cooperate. One interpretation of this could be that, in this model, 
FTAs have a greater regional bias when the degree of strategic interaction among 
firms is higher. 
0.5 
)'=0 
o L-____________________________________________ ~ a ~ ~
o 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Figure 2.4: The critical discount factors as functions of trade cost. 
It is possible that trade costs exceed a threshold, a, above which a FTA is not 
self-enforceable at all. This threshold can be obtained from (2.33): 
Solving for a yields: 
6
c
(a) = 3(1-a)(4-"?) >l. 
8 (5 (1 - a) - 3,) -
When a is greater than this threshold, global free trade is too deep a trade liberali-
sation. From ajoint welfare-maximising perspective, too many units of production 
are lost in transit, and it would therefore be better to impose a positive import 
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tariff closer to the Nash tariffs. 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have analysed the nature of the relationship between trade costs 
and trade policy under oligopoly. I first showed the difference of objectives of 
unilateral and cooperative trade policy. First, unilateral trade policy maximises 
each country's domestic welfare with respect to an import tariff. The import tariff 
distorts the terms of trade and shifts profits towards each country's respective do-
mestic firms. This import tariff is more effective at accomplishing these aims when 
the degree of natural distortion through trade costs is lower. Hence, each country 
would like to set higher tariffs when trade costs are lower. Second, when the two 
countries set import tariffs cooperatively these externalities are neutralised, and 
the resulting internationally efficient tariffs are lower when trade costs fall since 
their objective is to minimise losses in transit. Hence, the objectives of cooperative 
and non-cooperative trade policy diverge when trade costs fall: acting unilater-
ally, the two countries would like to raise tariffs in response to falling trade costs, 
whereas the reverse is the case cooperatively. I then added a requirement that 
trade agreements be sustained under a reputational mechanism. I assumed that 
if either of the two countries defected from an agreement in any given period, the 
other would punish it by reverting to the politically optimal Nash tariff forever 
as of the following period. I analysed two types of such agreements. First, I 
considered the optimal self-enforceable tariff and demonstrated that provided the 
two countries care enough about the future, lower import tariffs can be supported 
when trade costs fall. If the world was too impatient, however, tariffs needed to be 
raised in response to falling trade costs to keep each country's incentive to remain 
in the agreement. This is because impatient countries would find it harder to 
resist the increased short-runs gains from deviation when trade costs fall. Second, 
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I considered a FTA, and looked at how changes in trade costs affected the sus-
tainability of such an agreement. When trade costs fall, the onc-shot benefit from 
deviating from a FTA increased, but so did the long run benefit from cooperation. 
This is because the international externalities which unilateral deviation imposes, 
lowers the incentives to deviate. 
The model could be extended in several interesting ways. First, I have ignored 
potential and interesting asymmetries between countries. Imagine, for example, 
that each country hosts more than one firm, and that the number of firms is larger 
in one country than the other. In this case the country with fewer firms will suffer 
less when the other country retaliates by reducing market access. It may then be 
that the small country will be less likely to honour a FTA than the larger country. 
Second, the model could be extended to include several countries, who sign up 
for mutually beneficial tariff reductions. In this case, consider one home country 
and n - 1 other countries. I could allow trade costs between Home and each of 
the n - 1 countries to differ. Imagine that all of the countries come together 
in a GATT jWTO framework to sign a FTA. Provided that trade costs between 
Home and each of the n - 1 members are not so high that a FTA is not optimal 
from a joint welfare-maximising perspective, such a scenario would yield the same 
results as in the present two country framework. If one country is so remote (in 
terms of trade costs) that free trade is not optimal, however, higher tariffs would 
need to be negotiated with this country in order to ensure sustainability. Third, 
consider a three-country version of this model, where two of the three countries 
decide to sign a trade agreement without the third one. Such an agreement would 
not necessarily be welfare improving if substantial trade is diverted away frolll the 
third country. This would have consequences for both the short-run incentives to 
deviate and the long run benefits from cooperation. It would be interesting to see 
how the results of the present model would extend to such a s<'tting. 
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2 
2.8.1 Derivation of Eq. (2.10) and Eq. (2.14) 
Substituting (2.7) and (2.8) into (2.9) yields: 
1 1 
= 2" (a - Phh) qhh + 2" (a - PhI) qhI + Th%! (2.36) 
+ (Phh - c) qhh + (PIh - c - T! - a I) qIh· 
Taking the derivative wrt. Th I obtain: 
(2.37) 
Notice that markets are segmented such that production decisions in Foreign are 
independent of those in Home, or ddP[h = 0, ddq[h = 0 and '.::2.Ld
dT 
= O. I next substitute 
Th Th Th 
the demand functions in (2.2) into (2.37) which, after some algebraic manipula-
tions, reduces (2.37) to: 
Defining the net-of-tariff price of the Foreign good sold in the Home market <1.'> 
PhI = PhI -Th, I obtain the expression in (2.10). By writing up demand functions, 
Cournot quantities, and the expression for total welfare in Foreign's market, I could 
carry out the exact same steps for Foreign and derive the analogous decomposition 
of the welfare effects in that country. q.e.d. 
To find the effect of the Foreign tariff on Home welfare I take the d('rivative of 
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(2.36) wrt. Tf. This yields: 
(2.38) 
Defining the net-of-tariff price of the Home good sold in the Foreign market as 
Pjh = Pfh - T f I obtain the expression in the (2.14). q.e.d. 
2.8.2 Derivation of Eq. (2.11), Eq. (2.13) and Eq. (2.15) 
Substituting the inverse demand functions in (2.2) and the Cournot quantities in 
(2.5) into (2.10), yields the following expression: 
(2.39) 
Setting this expression equal to zero and rearranging I obtain: 
Solving for Th yields the expression in (2.11). By writing up demand functions, 
Cournot quantities, and the expression for total welfare in Foreign's market, I 
could carry out the exact same steps for Foreign and obtain the optimal tariff 
for that country as well. Taking the derivative of (2.39) wrt. 0:/" I obtain the 
expression in (2.13). q.e.d. 
By writing up expressions for the inverse demand functions and Cournot quan-
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titics in the Foreign market, an expression for (2.38) can be found as: 
f{0,-y)-2(Tf+O'f) 4 
f(0,-y)f(2,-y) f(0,-y)f(2,-y)" (2.40) 
Substituting the Foreign Nash tariff from (2.11) into (2.40) yields the expression 
in (2.15). q.e.d. 
2.8.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1 
I need to show that the imported quantity in Home is positive when Home irnple-
ments the Nash tariff in (2.11). In other words, it is sufficient to show that (from 
(2.5)): 
Substituting the Nash tariff from (2.11) yields: 
f(O,,) - 2 ( ~ + + Cloh) 
f(O,')')f(2,')') > O. 
Solving for Cloh gives the expression in the proposition. By expressing the imported 
Cournot quantity in the Foreign market I could find the equivalent condit.ion for 
the Foreign market.. q.e.d. 
2.8.4 Derivation of Eq. (2.11), Eq. (2.18) and Eq. (2.20) 
The joint welfare of Home and Foreign is given as: 
The expression for welfare in Home is obtained by substituting (2.7) and (2.8) 
int.o the expression for Home welfare (2.9). The equivalent expression for For-
eign welfare is easily obtained by exchanging hand f in (2.9). Substit.uting the 
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expressions for Home and Foreign welfare into (2.41) yields: 
+CSf (Tf' af) + TRh (Tf,af) + II f (Th' Tf, nh, af) 
1 1 2 (a - Phh) qhh + 2 (a - Phf) qhf + Thq"f 
+ (Phh - c) qhh + (p fh - C - T f - ()' f) qfh 
1 1 
+2 (a - Pff) qff + 2 (a - Pfh) qfh + Tfqfh 
+ (Pff - c) qff + (Phf - c - Th - (}Ih) qhf· (2.42) 
Differentiating (2.42) with respect to Th yields 
(2.43) 
Substituting the inverse demand functions (2.2) and the equivalent demand func-
tions for Foreign into (2.43), and performing several algebraic steps reduces (2.43) 
to: 
(2.44) 
which is the expression in (2.17). Substituting the inverse demand functions (2.2) 
and the Cournot quantities (2.5) and the equivalent functions for Fordgn into 
(2.44) yields: 
J (Th' Tf' ah, af) -2r (0,,) r (0,,) + (ah + af)(4 + ,2) - Th (8 - 6,2) 
dTh (r(0,'Y)r(2,,))2 
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Solving for Th yields: 
(2.45) 
I could carry out the same steps to find TJ, in which case I would find, by sym-
metry, that it is the same as Tf. 
For symmetric trade costs Cl:h = CI: f = CI: it is easy to show that, in the limit, 
the efficient tariffs and the Nash tariffs are equal. Setting (2.45) equal to (2.11) I 
obtain: 
-f (O, ')') f (O, ')') + a (4 + ')'2) 
(4 - 3,2) 
I-a 
3 
Solving for a yields a = 1 - ~ ' ) ' , , which is the upper bound proposed in (2.19). 
q.e.d. 
2.8.5 Derivation of Eq. (2.25), Eq. (2.29) and Eq. (2.30) 
In order to derive the level of patience required for an agreement based on the 
efficient tariffs in (2.18) to be sustained for Home (and sYIllIlletrically for Foreign), 
I need to evaluate Home's welfare in the three cases where: (i) both countries 
cooperate, (ii) both play Nash, and (iii) Home deviates by playing ~ a . ' i h h while 
Foreign cooperates. I can find the expressions for Home welfare by substituting 
the inverse demand functions (2.2) and the Cournot quantities (2.5) into (2.9), and 
then evaluate them at the various tariff levels. Thus, after substantial algebraic 
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manipulations, I obtain: 
wf ( T ~ , , T7, a) 7 + 40:2 - 80: - 6, (1 - 0:) 2 (4 - 3,2) 
188 - 2 1 ~ ( 2 2 + (18,3 - 120,) (1 - a) 
18(2 - ,)2 (2 + ,)2 
(80 - 12,2) 0:2 + (24,2 - 160) 0: 
+ . 
18(2 - ,)2 (2 + ,)2 ' 
(288,3 - 54,2 - 672,) (1 - a) - 720:,1 
6 (4 - 3,2)2 (4 - ,2) 
360:2,4 + 63,4 - 192,2 (1 + 0:2) 
+ - - - - - - - - ~ - . , - ~ ~ - - ~ ~
6 (4 - 3,2)2 (4 _,2) 
384"?0: + 4480'2 + 592 - 8960: 
+ 2 6(4-3,2) (4_,2) 
Substituting these expressions into (2.24) yields (2.25). q.e.d. 
The minimum self-enforceable tariffs ( T ~ f , , T ~ / ) ) can be found by solving (2.28). 
Recall that the minimum self-enforceable tariffs will be chosen when the sclf-
enforcement constraints bind. I first define the following expressions: 
Next, I solve (2.28) using the Lagrange method: 
1 
= max--", (Wh (Th, TI, 0:) + WI (T", TI' 0)) 
Th,Tfl-u 
+..\1 [<1>1 (Th, T I, T ~ , , T7)] 
+..\2 [<1>2 ( T h , T I , T ~ , T 7 ) ] , ,
where Al and A2, respectively, are the Lagrange multipliers of Home's and Foreign's 
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self-enforcement constraints. Differentiating wrt. Th, T J, >'1 and A2 yields: 
d\lJ -4 - Al "'?0:6 + 8A26 - 4)'1 + 4..\ln6 + A02J 
= 
dTh (1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
2 2 2 AI' 0: + 4A28, + 4A28 , + 8..\28u + 8A28 a 
(1 + 6)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
4A10: - 4AI8 + An2 + 8A282 - 4Th + 4, + 4u + - - - - - - ~ - - ~ ~ - - ~ - - ~ ~ - - ~ - -(1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 + ~ f ) 2 2
,2 _ ,20: + 3An2Th8 - 12A1 Th 8 + 3AI ,2Th 
(1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 +,)2 
2 2 3, Th + 12A1Th - 8A28 Th + . (1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 ' 
d\lJ -4 - 4"\28 - "\2,20:8 - 4"\2 - 8AI(\:'8 + 4A280: 
dTJ (1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 +,)2 
4A18, + 4A 182, + 8A 182(\:' - A2/26 + A2,2(\:' 
(1 + 6)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
2 .2 8"\16 + 8A18 + 4A20: + "\:n - 4Tf + 4, 
+ (1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
40: - 62 + 620: + 3,2TJ - 8..\16Tf - 8..\162Tf 
+ (1 + 8)(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
12A28T f - 3A2,2T f + 12A2T f - 3..\2'Y2T f8 . 
+ (1 + 6)(2 - ,)2(2 + IV ' 
d\lJ -408 + 12 + 800:8 + 24,15 + 12a2 - ~ h 2 0 : 2 2
= d"\l 18(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
4080:2 + 248,0: + 72Th + 240: + 3,2 - 6,2(l 
18(2 - ,)2(2 +,)2 
2 7 , 2 T ~ ~ - 72ThCt - 108Th - 1448T f + 728T1 
18(2 - ,)2(2 +,)2 
18,2Th - 18'Y20:Th - 728,'7 J - 144t5nTf 
+ 18(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 ; 
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d'iJ! -408 + 12 + 80a8 + 24,8 + 12a2 - 3,2n 2 
d).,2 18(2 - ') )2(2 + ,)2 
408a2 + 248,a + 72T f + 24a + 3')2 - 6,2(} 
18(2 - ,)2(2 + ,)2 
27,2T} - 72T fa - 108T f - 1448T f + 7 2 8 T ~ ~
18(2 - ,)2(2 +,)2 
18,2Tf - 18,2aTf - 72J,Th - 1448nTh 
+ 18(2-,)2(2+,)2 ; 
Solving these four equations in the four unknowns Th, T f' ).,1 and ).,2 yields: 
1M + 3"(2 - 6,28 - 12 
).,1 ).,2 = 8 (1 + 8) (12 - 88 - 3"(2); 
0: (408 + 3,2 - 12) - 408 - 3,2 + 12 + 248, 
Th = Tf = 3(12 - 3,2 - 88) (2.46) 
It is easy to show that the minimum enforceable tariffs are equal to the ~ a s h h
tariffs in the limit. Setting (2.46) equal to (2.11) yields: 
0: (408 + 3,2 - 12) - 408 - 3"(2 + 12 + 248, __ 1 _-_a 
3 (12 - 3,2 - 88) 3 
Solving for a yields a = 1 - ~ " " which is the upper bound proposed in (2.12). 
q.e.d. 
2.8.6 Effects of trade costs on 6c 
I will begin by showing that the effect of C'ih on the short-run gain by deviating from 
(2.7) and (2.8) into (2.9) yields an expression for Home welfare. Evaluating this 
when Home plays Nash by imposing the Nash tariff in (2.11), and whell Foreigll 
cooperates by choosing free trade, I have an expression for Wl) (T;;, TI', nil, no f) . 
Evaluating Home welfare when both set tariffs to :zero gives an expression for 
Wf ( T ~ , , Tj?, O:h. 0: f). Using the inverse demand functions (2.2) awl the COllfllot 
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quantities (2.5), it is possible to obtain, after substantial algebraic steps, the fol-
lowing: 
Differentiating wrt. D:h yields: 
2(1-D:h)D:h 
6(2--y)(2+-y) <0. 
(2.47) 
Since this derivative is negative I can deduce that =dd8 < 0, which was claimed in 
°h 
Proposition 2.2. Kext I show that the effect of ('t f on the long-run loss from not 
adhering to the FTA is also negative. Following a similar procedure I obtain: 
Differentiating wrt. D: f yields: 
Similarly, since this derivative is negative I can deduce that -:if:; > 0, which was 
also claimed in Proposition 2.2. 
Setting O:h = O:f = 0: and dividing (2.47) by (2.48) yields an expression for the 
critical discount factor for symmetric trade costs: 
which is the expression in (2.33). Taking the derivative wrt. n: yields: 
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It is clear that when 'Y = 0 this derivative is zero, and when 'Y > 0 it is strictly 
positive. This is what Proposition 2.3 claims. q.e.d. 
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Chapter 3 
Political Pressure, Bargaining 
Power and the Self-enforceability 
of Trade Liberalisation 
3.1 Introduction 
The post-war era has witnessed substantial liberalisation of political barriers to 
trade, either through multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the 
GATT /WTO or through the signing of a countless number of bilateral and re-
gional trade agreements. Central to the debate on trade policy lies the desire to 
understand the nature and causes of this development. 
A promising yet under-researched strand of literature focuses on problems of 
time inconsistency in the domestic political arena as a distinct rea.,)OIl for countries 
to join trade agreements. According to these models, international trade agrpe--
ments provide governments with valuable commitment vis-a.-vis domestic economic 
agents to ensure that governments adhere to trade policies that are in their long-
term interest. Fundamentally, time inconsistency involves the notion that the best 
plan for some future period is not optimal once the future period actually arriV<'s. 
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In the present framework, I assume that physical capital is fixed in the short run, 
that is in any given period, but allowed to be freely reallocated after one period 
has passed. This assumption brings about a conflict of interest between the gov-
ernment's short-run interests, or the incentives to impose trade policy when the 
private sector has sunk capital, and its long-run interests where capital is allocated 
according to a condition that equalises returns across sectors. 
Another prominent motive for signing a trade agreement, which has been 
analysed extensively in the literature, is the desire on the part of governments 
to escape a so-called terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma. The idea behind 
this motive is the notion that a country as a whole has market power on interna-
tional markets, and is thus able to use trade policy to distort its terms of trade 
at the expense of trading partners. Acting in this manner, however, is likely to 
be reciprocated and the end result is that countries get caught in a prisoner's 
dilemma leaving everyone worse off. 
In this chapter, I construct a model with two countries called Home and For-
eign with an infinity of time periods. The model combines time-inconsistency and 
terms-of-trade distortions to produce two powerful motives for a government to 
liberalise trade. More specifically, this framework allows me to analyse the sustain-
ability of unilateral trade liberalisation, where the time inconsistency problem is 
solved domestically, and bilateral trade liberalisation where the two countries can 
also escape a terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma by inducing international 
cooperation. 
Trade policy is determined in a framework where domestic lobbies, represent-
ing owners of capital in the economy's import-competing sector, offer political 
campaign contributions, or bribes, to the government in exchange for protection, 
as in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995). In each country and in every period, 
the government and the lobby come together to bargain efficiently over import 
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tariffs and contributions. The government's welfare consists of a weighted average 
of overall social welfare, or the utility of the representative agent, and political 
bribes, where the weight on the latter is a parameter which determines the ex-
tent of politics. The optimal political tariff maximises the joint welfare of the 
government and the lobby. 
A key parameter of the model is the bargaining power of the government vis-
a-vis the lobby. If the government has all the bargaining power, it will extract all 
the rents from protection. On the other hand, if the lobby has all the bargaining 
power, the government is paid exactly the amount which makes it indifferent 
between inducing the politically optimal tariff or the socially optimal tariff, the 
latter being the tariff that optimally exploits a country's monopoly power over its 
terms of trade. 
The government faces a problem of dynamic inconsistency: the optimal trade 
policy is not time-consistent. In any given period when capital is sunk, the gov-
ernment has an incentive to set the tariff that maximises its current welfare by 
accepting a bribe from the lobby and setting the import tariff at the politically 
optimal level. This high level of the tariff will encourage capital reallocation from 
the numeraire sector towards the import-competing sector, and the bribes that 
the government receives from the lobby may not compensate it for this long-run 
misallocation of capital if its bargaining power is low. From a unilateral perspec-
tive, the government may have an incentive to announce that it will not accept 
bribes, and set the tariff at its socially optimal level in the following period. Once 
that period arrives and capital is sunk, however, the government will be tempted 
to renege on its announcement and set the tariff at the politically optimal level, 
accepting bribes. 
The behaviour of owners of capital is not invariant to expectations of future 
trade policy, however, and if the government capitulates to protectionist pressures 
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in the current period, it is unlikely the private sector will believe the governmcnt's 
promise of a lower tariff in the next period. Hence, capital owncrs rationally 
allocate capital to the import-competing sector in expectation that the governrrwnt. 
will not be able to resist protectionist pressures. The economy thus ends up in an 
undesirable long-run political equilibrium where an excessive amount of resources 
is allocated to the import-competing sector. 
I first analyse a scenario in which the government gets an opportunity to com-
mit to any announced trade policy it wishes for which ever reason. Provided the 
government's bargaining power is not too large, the Home government would uni-
laterally announce that it would no longer accept bribes, and thus set the import 
tariff at the socially optimal level. Since it is able to commit, capital owners 
will believe this and allocate capital in expectation of that. In this situation the 
dynamic inconsistency problem is solved by giving the government a first-mover 
advantage in the setting of trade policy. Unilateral trade liberalisation, however, 
does not solve the international terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma, and a 
trade agreement is thus needed to ensure international cooperation. If the two 
countries sign a trade agreement, it will allow the government of each country to: 
(i) credibly commit vis-a.-vis their respective private sectors, and (ii) internalisc 
the international terms-of-trade distortion. The joint welfare-maximising tariff 
involves free trade. 
I then go on to analyse a situation where any departures from the politically 
optimal tariffs must be sustained by a reputational mechanism l. This implies that 
in order for the private sector in a country, or the government of the other country, 
to believe that the government is committed to dynamically efficicnt policies, the 
I In the introduction to Chapter 2. I argued that this view of trade policy cooperation is 
a fair reflection of reality since the world is currently not equipped with an inkrnational law 
enforcement agency capable of sanctioning nations that do not honour international agreeIrwnts. 
Enforcement under the WTO is ensured through a number of rules such as Articil' 22.3 of thp 
Cnderstanding on Rule::; and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputps. alld a limitpd 
punishment rule by the GATT Article XXVIII. 
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government must have demonstrated commitment in the past. Thus, assuming 
the government decides to unilaterally liberalise trade by setting the import tariff 
at the socially optimal level, it must over time convince the private sector that 
it can sustain it. If at any point the government deviates, it will enjoy short-run 
benefits in the form of a bribes, but in the following period and in every period that 
follows forever after, the private sector will no longer find the government credible 
and allocate capital in expectation that the government cannot resist capitulating 
to political pressures. If the government decides to sign a trade agreement with 
the other country, on the other hand, the short-run benefits from deviation are 
two-fold: (i) it can enjoy a bribe from the lobby, and (ii) it can distort its terms 
of trade in its favour when the other country cooperates. In the following period, 
however, the private sector will no longer find the government credible and it will 
never trust the government again. In addition to this, the government of the other 
country will punish it by reverting to the politically optimal tariff forever a." of the 
following period. 
The sustainability of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation depends on 
two key parameters: the government's bargaining power vis-a.-vis the lobby, and 
the government's discount factor. I define a critical discount factor above which 
trade liberalisation is self-enforceable. I first analyse the sustainability of unilat-
eral trade liberalisation. If the government has no bargaining power, contributions 
are just enough to make the government indifferent between imposing the politi-
cally optimal tariff and the socially optimal one in any given period. In this ca."e 
the government is not compensated for the long-run misallocation of capital. Be-
cause of this, unilateral trade liberalisation can be supported for every discount 
factor. As the government's bargaining position increa.'ies, however, the degree to 
which it is compensated for the long-run misallocation of capital incrca."es. When 
the bargaining power exceeds a critical threshold, the government is more than 
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compensated for this misallocation, and no discount factor can support unilateral 
trade liberalisation. The critical discount factor is increasing in the bargaining 
power, which implies that the degree of patience required to sustain trade liberal-
isation is increasing in the amount of rents the government can extract from the 
political negotiation with the lobby. 
I then analyse the sustainability of a trade agreement. In this case, the short-
run benefits from deviation are larger than in the case of unilateral deviation, since 
such benefits now also include distorting the terms of trade in a country's favour 
when the other country was lured into cooperating. In the following period, how-
ever, the deviating country forever loses the private sector's trust, and the other 
country will punish it by reverting to the politically optimal tariff forever after. 
Hence, both the short-run temptation to deviate is higher, but also the long-run 
loss. I prove that because of the increased threat of punishment, a trade agreement 
can be supported for every level of the government's bargaining power provided 
the government is sufficiently patient. However, the degree of patience required 
to sustain a trade agreement is higher the greater the government's bargaining 
power, just as in the as in the case of unilateral trade liberalisation. I also find 
that when the government has no bargaining power, the critical discount factor to 
sustain a trade agreement is strictly positive, unlike unilateral trade liberalisatioll. 
This is because in the case of unilateral trade liberalisation there is no short-run 
benefit from deviation when the government's bargaining power is zero, but with 
at trade agreement, the deviating country benefits from a terms of trade distortion 
when the other country cooperates. 
Unilateral trade liberalisation can then be compared to that of bilateral trade 
liberalisation. I demonstrate that for low levels of the government's bargaining 
power unilateral trade liberalisation can be sustained for a larger range of bargain-
ing powers. When the government's bargaining power is sufficiently high, however, 
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a trade agreement is needed to sustain trade liberalisation. 
I do not attempt to model the factors underlying the relative bargaining power 
of the government, but as argued in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), it could 
be the case that such a bargaining position is weaker in countries with more 
open parliamentarian systems. For example, it could reasonably be expected that 
in a political system which is based on several different coalitions, lobbies are 
in a greater position to extract rent. This is because lobbies may have greater 
opportunities to offer different contribution schedules to several agents within a 
political system where the decision-making process is more decentralised. On the 
other hand, in an autocratic system in which power is highly concentrated, it could 
be argued that the government has the upper hand in the negotiation process. 
Interpreted in this way, both unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation arc 
more likely to be sustained in more decentralised political systems where the gov-
ernment's bargaining power is lower. This could explain why trade liheraiisatioll 
has been more biased towards developed and democratic natiolls: trade liberal-
isation is simply harder to sustain in autocratic systems. In addition to this, I 
believe this theory is able to contribute to our understanding of nOll-reciprocal 
trade liberalisation, usually between a developed nation and several developing 
countries, which has been a common occurrence in the last few decades:!. The 
theory may be able to explain why mostly democratic nations can sustain such 
arrangements, and why their less democratic trading partners do not reciprocate. 
Time inconsistency is a common economic phenomenon, and widely applied 
in a variety of areas of economics such as behavioural economics, macroeconomics 
and monetary economics. In their seminal papers, Kydland and P r e ~ i C o t t t (1977) 
and Fischer (1980) deal with a variety of such issues, for example wit.hin central 
bank policy and taxation. Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Tornell (1991) are 
2For example. the 2000 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) between tllp CS and 
several African sub-Saharan countries. 
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amongst the first to introduce time inconsistency issues into the setting of trade 
policy. In Staiger and Tabellini (1987) the government is driven to increase tariffs 
by a desire to redistribute income from individuals with a low marginal utility of 
income to individuals with a high marginal utility. This trade policy, howevcr, 
must reach the private sector by surprise since if the policy is anticipated the free 
movement of labour will equalise returns such that the redistributive impact of 
the tariff is substantially smaller. 
Tornell (1991) considers the time inconsistency of protectionist programmes 
designed to be temporary. He argues that if authorities capitulate to protectionist 
pressures in the present they are unlikely to resist them in the future. The inability 
to pre-commit to the unconditional elimination of protection in the future, in 
turn, generates a trade-off for a firm receiving protection. If it does not invest 
sufficiently in cost reductions, it gains from a renewal of protection while saving 
the opportunity cost of capital. However, it loses the benefits from cost reductions 
and the resulting increase in competitiveness. If the gains from not investing 
in cost reductions outweigh the gains from cost reductions, clearly a firm will 
not invest sufficiently and the temporary protectionist programme becomes time 
inconsistent. 
The paper which is perhaps closest related to the present framework is Maggi 
and Rodriguez-Clare (1998). They construct a model of a small open economy, 
with the same elements of time inconsistency as the present framework. They find 
that when the government's bargaining power exceeds a critical threshold, the 
government of the small country will obtain a lower utility by committing to free 
trade. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), however, do not consider an cnviron-
ment where trade liberalisation must be sustained by a reputational mechanism, 
and because they restrict themselves to a framework with one small cOllntry which 
takes the world prices as given, they are not able to analyse the sllstainability of 
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reciprocal trade liberalisation. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first 
to consider an infinitely repeated game structure with politically organised lobbies 
in the trade literature. 
Conconi and Perroni (2009) analyse the sustainability of international policy 
coordination in a framework where there are dynamic inconsistencies. They find 
that internationally efficient policies are more likely to be sustained whenever 
domestic policy commitment is not feasible. Moreover, international cooperation 
is more likely to be sustained whenever international. externalities from domestic 
policies are greater. 
In a model which is very similar to the present, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 
(2007) consider an environment where countries can sign perfectly binding agree-
ments. Two countries, which are initially stuck in a time-consistent but subopti-
mal political equilibrium, get an opportunity to sign a perfectly enforceable free 
trade agreement. They find that the speed by which capital can exit the import-
competing sector, determines the speed of trade liberalisation. That model is 
presented in much more detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis, which also puts its main 
predictions to the data. 
Terms-of-trade manipulations as a motive to grant import-protection and a.'l 
a motive to sign trade agreements figure prominently in the trade literature, and 
it was first identified by Johnson (1953). The idea is further developed in Gross-
man and Helpman (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002). In fact, ill those 
papers, terms-of-trade manipulations form the sole ba.'>is for signing trade agree-
ments. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the basic ingredients 
of the model, before characterising the nature of the time inconsistency problem ill 
Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, I consider an environment where unilateral or bilateral 
trade liberalisation, respectively, are perfectly enforceable, and in Section 3.5, I add 
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a requirement of self-enforceability to either type of trade liberalisatioll. Section 
3.6 compares the sustainability of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation, and 
finally, Section 3.7 concludes with some remarks. 
3.2 The model 
I assume a world with an infinite number of discrete time periods. There are 
two large countries which I call Home (H) and Foreign (F) each producing three 
goods: two manufacturing goods (Ml and M2 ) and one numeraire good (N). 
Preferences for the three goods are identical across the two countries and they can 
be represented by the following quasi-linear utility function in each period:!: 
where x N denotes consumption of the numeraire good, and Xi denotes consulllI}-
tion of the manufacturing goods. One of the advantages of a quasi-linear utility 
function is that it eliminates income effects as well as cross-price effects 011 de-
mand4 • This is essentially breaking up a general equilibrium model iIlto partial 
equilibria and, by implication, consumers' welfare can then be mca.'lured ill terms 
of surplus derived from the manufacturing sectors. In order to make the model 
2 
tractable, I specify u (-) = VXi - ~ ~ (where v is a positive parameter) such that 
the demand for the manufacturing goods can be represented by the simple linear 
function d (Pi) = v - Pi in each period. The per-period surplus from consuming 
:11 obmit time subscripts whenever it does not cause any confusion. 
lIn order to see this. set up the Lagrangian for the consumer·s optimisation problpm: L = 
XN + 2:;=1 U (Xi) + >. [I - XN - 2:;=1 PiXi]' The first order condition for XN implies i t : c ~ ~ = 
1- >. = 0 ==} >. = 1. Since the marginal utility of income is l. I ('an derive the demand flln('tions 
for the manufacturing goods as Pi = U' (x;). 
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each of the manufacturing goods is: 
(3.1) 
The model has two types of capital called type 1 and type 2. One unit of type 
1 capital produces one unit of Ml whereas one unit of type 2 capital produces 
one unit of Ah. It is assumed that Hand F are endowed with one unit of each 
type of capital. The technology to produce the numeraire good differs in the two 
countries. In H the numeraire is produced on a one-to-one basis using type 1 
capital whereas in F the numeraire is produced one-to-one with type 2 capital. 
H(F) will employ its endowment of type 2 (type 1) capital in the M2-sector (AlI-
sector), and split its endowment of type 1 (type 2) capital between the All-sector 
and the numeraire (the M2-sector and the numeraire) depending on demand. The 
implication of this technological structure is that H is a natural importer of All 
and F is a natural importer of M2 • The amount of capital allocated to a given 
sector is fixed in any given period but is allowed to be freely re-allocated after one 
period according to an equal-returns condition to be specified below. I denot.e by 
klH (k2F ) the amount of capital allocated to the Ml-sector (M2-sector) in H (F) in 
any given period. Xote that mobility of capital is relevant only between the two 
countries' respective importing sectors and their respective numeraire sectors. 
The governments in Hand F may choose to implement a trade policy in their 
respective importing sectors. It is assumed that such a trade policy comes in thc 
form of a specific import tariff T1H in Hand T2F in F. I assumc that the two 
governments decide not to implement any trade policies in the numeraire sector, 
or in their respective exporting sectors. Hence, TUI = TIF = TNIf = TNF = o. 
If tariffs are not prohibitive the domestic price of Afl in H is PIH = PIF + TIll 
and the domestic price of M2 in F is P2F = P2H + T2F. I aSSllllle t.hat international 
markets clear such that d (PlH) + d (PI F) = 1 + klH and d (P2Ii) + d (P2/,') = 1 + k2/,'. 
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Using these conditions I can derive convenient exprcssions for the prices in Hand 
F. Thus, the home and foreign prices, respectively, of Nfl expressed a.'l a function 
of the tariff and capital allocation are: 
PlH (TlH' k lH ) 
1 
- v - 2 (1 + kw - Tud ; (3.2) 
1 
v - 2 (1 + klH + TII/) , 
and similarly, the home and foreign prices, respectively, of M2 are: 
1 
= v - 2 (1 + k2F + T2F) ; (3.3) 
1 
= v - 2 (1 + k21.' - T2F) • 
The total welfare (that is, the utility of the representative agcnt) is given by 
consumer surplus, tariff revenue and factor income. Hence, I can express total 
welfare of Hand F in each period, respectively, as: 
H(F), and Sij is consumer surplus of good i = 1,2 in country j = H, F. Notice 
the additive separability between the two manufacturing sectors, Ml and M2 • In 
particular, notice that the welfare in H can be decomposed into two terms: the 
first one, PlHklH + 1 - klH + TllImlH + SIH, depends only 011 the home variables, 
TlH and k 1H , and the second, P2H + S2H, depends only on t.he foreign variables, 
T2F and k2F . This argument applies analogously to country F. I call t . h e r d ( ) r < ~ ~
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express the welfare of the two countries in terms of the home variables: 
PIF + SIF + [.j, (3.4) 
where the terms in [.J depend on the foreign variables, T2F and k2F . 
Since all variables are symmetric, it suffices to focus on one country, as the 
analysis of the other country will be its mirror imagine. For that reason, I simply 
refer to the home country, and drop country subscripts whenever it does not cause 
confusion. Hence, the relevant welfare function, expressed as a function of tariffs 
and capital allocations, is: 
(3.5) 
Using the expressions in respectively, (3.2) and (3.3), for the prices of country 
H's imported good, M I , and its exported good, AJ2 , and the expression for COll-
sumer surplus (3.1), I can derive the following convenient expression for welfare 
in country H: 
(3.6) 
The political side of this framework is modelled in a similar way a.<; Grossman and 
Helpman (1994,1995). I assume that capital owners in the manufacturing sector 
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are able to solve the free-rider problem and organise as a political lobby to curry 
favour with the government; it does so by offering political bribes in exchange for 
protection which it collects from all of its members in proportion to the amount of 
capital they have invested. I denote by C the total amount of contributions, and 
by c = ~ ~ the amount of contributions per unit of capital of the importing sector. 
I also assume that owners of capital in the exporting sector and in the numeraire 
sector do not organise as a lobby. The political structure across the two countries 
is symmetric, allowing me to focus on the home country. In every period, the 
lobby seeks to maximise total returns to capital in the importing sector net of 
contributions, 
(3.7) 
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994,1995), the government's per-period 
objective function is a weighted average of social welfare in (3.6) and political 
contributions, 
(3.8) 
The parameter a captures the importance of contributions relative to social w e l f a f ( ~ ~
such that when a is higher, politics is more important. 
Before characterising the political equilibrium it will be useful to consider the 
equilibrium under free trade. In this equilibrium, arbitrage ensures that returns 
across the numeraire and the ~ 1 \ 1 1 - s e c t o r r are equalised for zero tariffs. This implies 
that the returns per unit of capital in the M1-sector must be equal to one. Hence, 
I can solve for the allocation of capital from the following condition, PI (0, k l ) = 1. 
!iI assume that capital owners can allocate capital to at most one sector in th(' ('('() 110 Illy. If 
(l is the fraction of population that owns some capital in the MI-scctor. the lobby's objectiV<' is 
(PI - c) kl + (l [Tlml + 81 + 82]' If I further assume that oWllership of capital ill that s('('tor is 
very concentrated. 0 is negligible. 
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Using (3.2), this can be solved as: 
k{t = 2v - 3. (3.9) 
For a positive allocation of capital to both the numeraire and the AIl-sector, kt 
must be greater than zero and less than one. To ensure this I impose, throughout 
the rest of this chapter, the following condition on the demand parameter v: 
3 2 < v < 2. (3.10) 
3.3 The political equilibrium 
A property of the present model is the notion that without commitment capital 
owners have a first mover-advantage. The setting of unilateral trade policy can 
thus be seen as a two-stage game. In the first stage, owners of capital make their 
investment decisions, and in the second, the government and the lobby bargain 
efficiently over tariffs and contributions. The bargaining process is modelled <l.'i 
a standard Xash bargaining game in which the government's bargaining power 
is given by the parameter (3 E [0; 1], such that the lobby's bargaining power is 
(1 - (3). 
The equilibrium of the game can be found by backward induction, so I will first 
determine the equilibrium tariff and the level of contributions in the second stage 
of the game, given the fixed allocation of capital determined in the first stage. 
This can also be seen as the short-run equilibrium. 
The private sector uses the bribe as an instrument to affect the government's 
tariff choice. Its payoff increases if either the tariff illcrea.'ies, ~ ~ : ' ' > 0, or if til(' 
bribe it has to pay decreases, d f ~ ' ' < 0 The government's utility, on the other haud, 
is increasing in contributions or when the tariff, T\, approaches its socially optimal 
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level. The threat point is the status quo where t.he lobby cont.ribut.es nothing and 
t.he government. implements the socially optimal tariff. In such a case, there is no 
bribe (C = 0), t.he government. sets 71 = TiD, where so stands for soeially optimal, 
and both the government and the lobby obtain their reservation payoffs. To obtain 
efficiency in the bargaining process fix the private sector's payoff at the value U L • 
Then using (3.7), rewrite (3.8) as UG(TI,UL) = W(7d +a[pI(TI,kl)k l - Ul'j. 
Efficiency is obtained when the tariff maximises this expression, or equivalently, 
when it satisfies: 
max] (TI' kJ) = UG + aUL = W (TI' k l ) + api (TI' kd k l • (3.11 ) 
TJ 
Hence, the optimal tariff maximises the joint welfare of the government. and the 
lobby. Notice that due to the additive separability, the government and the lobby 
cannot influence t.he foreign variables, 72 and k2 • Solving (3.11) yields a solution 
for the politically optimal (po) tariff: 
po (k ) _ (1 - kl + 2akd TI I - 3 . (3.12) 
This tariff consist.s of t.wo components. The first, I-;kl, captures the incentive to 
distort t.he terms of trade. When the supply difference between t.he Ilumeraire and 
t.he .MI-sector is larger, t.he volume of t.rade is larger, and hence the incentive to 
dist.ort the terms of t.rade is higher. The second component, 2 ~ ; 1 , , represents the 
influence exert.ed by politics. When the size of the sector is larger, and when the 
weight the government attaches to contributions is larger, this effect is higher. If 
the government did not value political contribut.ions it would choose a tariff to 
maximise social welfare (so): 
SO(k)-l' PO(k) (l-kd 7 I I = 1m T I 'I = . 
a--+O 3 (3.13) 
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The contribution paid to the government is an average of the welfare loss from 
protection and the lobby's willingness to pay for protection weighted by the relative 
bargaining powers of the two players. The contribution per unit of capital for 
inducing the tariff, TI, can be expressed as a function of the import tariff and 
capital allocation: 
C (TI' kd = (1 _ 13) a [W (T1°, kd - W (TI' kdJ 
kl kl 
+13 [PdTI, kd - p d T ~ o , , kdJ 
(1 - 13) ( ~ k k) (TI - T10 f + 1 3 ~ ~ (TI - Tn· 
8a I 2 
(3.14) 
Notice that if the government has no bargaining power, that is if f{j = 0, cOlltri-
but ions are just enough to compensate the government for the welfare distortion 
associated with protection. On the other hand, if fj = 1 the government extracts 
all the rents derived by capitalists from protection. Plugging the tariffs (3.12) 
and (3.13) into (3.14) yields a convenient expression for contributions paid to the 
government for inducing Tr': 
c (k ) = C (kd = (1 + 8) ak 
I kl 6 I· (3.15) 
It is now possible to move back to the first stage of the game and solve for the 
optimal capital allocation. The conditions characterising the long-rull political 
equilibrium are: 
(3.16) 
(3.17) 
The first condition stipulates that the chosen tariff is the one that maximises t1w 
joint welfare of the government and the lobby, and the second requires that th(' 
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return to capital in the import-competing sector net of contributions is equal to 
the return to capital in the numeraire. The second condition draws on the notion 
that capital owners are unable to coordinate their investment decisions, and choose 
allocations strategically. This equal-returns condition implicitly defines a curve ill 
(T}, k}}-space which I label Tr (k}). Solving the system (3.16}-(3.17) yields specific 
solutions for the long-run allocation of capital and for the long-run tariW: 
4 - a (1 - /3) + 2 (2a - I) (3v - 4) 
3 [4 - a (1 - 13)] 
2 (3v - 4) 
4 - a (1 - /3)" 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
I can similarly solve for the tariff/capital allocation pair that would obtain in the 
absence of lobbying, (Tr', kr'), which yields: 
2-v 
lim1'1 = -2-; 
a-+O 
~ ~ (3v - 4) 
= limkl = 2 
a-+O 
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
In order for the tariffs to be non-prohibitive I impose, throughout the rest of the 
chapter, the following condition on a: 
6 (2 - v) 
a< . 
6v -7 
(3.22) 
In Appendix 3.8.1 I prove the following: 
Proposition 3.1: If a < 6 ~ ~ = ~ ) ) there exists a unique long-run equihbrillm for' all 
values of 8. In this equilibrium Hand F impose a positive bllt non-pmhibitil'(, 
tariff equal to 1'1' 
(iSee Appendix 3.8.1 for the steps behind this derivation. 
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In Figure 3.1, I illustrate the equilibrium without commitment for the special 
case where the lobby has all the bargaining power (1 = o. I depict the tar-
iffs in (3.12) and (3.13) as functions of the capital allocation together with the 
equal-returns curve T ~ r r (kif. The long-run equilibrium is given a.'l the intersec-
tion between the Tr (kd-curve and the equal-returns curve. Notice the difference 
between the equilibrium with lobbying and that which maximises social welfare. 
In particular, notice that the Ml-sector is larger when there is lobbying kl > k ~ l · . .
This difference represents an over-investment problem which the government is 
not compensated for when (3 = O. In this case the lobby offers a contribution 
which is just enough to make the government indifferent between setting the tariff 
at Tfo (kd relative to Tr' (kd. But this only compensates the government for the 
short-run distortion associated with import protection (a consumption distortion), 
and not for the long-run misallocation of capital. 
It will also be useful for illustrative purposes to draw the equilibriulll for the 
case where the government has all the bargaining power, and this is done in Figure 
3.2. In this case, the equal-returns curve becomes vertical for any tariff TI ;:::: T ~ \ · . .
Since the government extracts all rents from the political game, capital owners do 
not increase profits when tariffs increase. For that rea.'lon, the import-competing 
sector is not subject to an over-investment problem. Hence, it will be the ca.'le 
that kl = kr'. 
Unilateral trade policy is inefficient: not only does the government face a 
commitment problem vis-a.-vis its domestic importing sector, the terms-of-trade 
distortion imposes externalities on the other country. The two countries will find 
themselves in a terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma, and they may be better 
off obtaining a commitment device to ensure a higher level of welfare from a long-
run perspective. 
7The lobby would not pay the government to set a tariff below what it would set 011 its OWII 
so for any 71 :::; 7\"" the equal-returns curve simply becomes PI (71, kll = 1. I do not draw this 
part of 7j' (kll in t he figure. 
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Figure 3.1: The long-run equilibrium without commitment for ,t) = o. 
k W-k-
.l - .l 
Figure 3.2: Long-run equilibrium without commitment for :1 = 1. 
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3.4 Trade liberalisation with commitment 
In this section, I assume that the two countries are able to obtain some form of 
commitment device which is able to free them from this implicit contractual re-
lationship with the lobby. This commitment device could take many forms. For 
example, the two countries could sign a trade agreement which could credibly dis-
tance each government from the pressure exerted by the lobbies in their respective 
countries. Alternatively, each government could unilaterally delegate the respon-
sibility for the setting of trade policy to an institution which is insulated from 
political pressures. Either way, a commitment technology reverses the order of 
moves of the game, and gives the government a first mover advantage. Formally, 
this implies that the optimal tariffs are first selected by the governments in a first 
stage followed by capital owners in a second stage choosing how much capital to 
allocate to the import-competing sector subject to the tariffs choscn by the gov-
ernment in the first stage. In the next two subsections, I will consider both types 
of commitment device. 
3.4.1 Unilateral commitment 
Suppose the government of country H has solved its commitment problem in 
its domestic importing sector by for example delegating the setting of trade pol-
icy to an independent institution which is not subjected to political prcssures. 
The setting of trade policy thus takes into account the 'long-run' movement of 
capital between the importing sector and the numeraire. In this ca.<;e, the gov-
ernment maximises social welfare, and forgoes contributions from the lobby. The 
government's objective function thus becomes UG = W. Since the government 
has devised a mechanism which enables it to commit to all future policy actions, 
the private sector will ba.<;e its capital allocation decisions on the trade policy 
announced by the government. This capital allocation can be derived frolll the 
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requirement that returns are equalised across the importing- and the nUlIwraire 
sector, PI (Tl' k l ) = 1. Hence, the government maximises its objective fun('tion 
with respect to Tl, subject to the equal-returns constraint: 
(3.23) 
In Appendix 3.8.2, I demonstrate that the solution to this optimisation problem 
yields the following two convenient expressions for the capital allocation and the 
tariff which obtains when the government is able to unilaterally commit: 
TV 
2-v 
T W . (3.24) 1 1 = -2-' 
k V k W -
(3v - 4) (3.25 ) 1 1 - 2 
The tariff/capital allocation pair (Tf, kf) is the same as ( T ~ ' , , k ~ 1 ' ) ) from (3.20)-
(3.21). Notice, however, that the pair (Tr', kr?) was derived by finding the optimal 
tariff for any capital allocation and then substituting the equal-returns condition to 
find the actual capital allocation. The pair ( T ~ J , , kif), on the other hand, was found 
by endogenising the capital allocation in the optimisation problem. The fact that 
I obtain the same result implies that there is no conflict between the government'8 
short-run and long-run objectives, and hence, the government does not suffer froIll 
a commitment problem with respect to the trade policies it wishes to select on 
its own. In other words, the equal-returns constraint in the optimisation problem 
(3.23) is not binding, and the welfare function W (71" ( J , ~ d d , J , ~ I ) ) has a Iwak at 
k - k W 1- I· 
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3.4.2 Bilateral commitment 
Suppose that at some point in time, country Hand F get an opportunity to sign a 
trade agreement. Such an agreement serves two purposes: (i) it ensures that both 
governments can commit vis-a.-vis their respective import-competing sectors, and 
(ii) since it maximises joint welfare it solves the terms-of-trade driven prisoner's 
dilemma. The lobby is not willing to pay the government for signing a trade 
agreement so contributions drop out of the government's objective function in 
both countries. Hence, the objective functions become ufi = W H and Up, = W F • 
Since it is assumed that the trade agreement is binding, it allows the government to 
set tariffs before the capital allocations are selected. A trade agreement maximises 
the following: 
(3.26) 
Since the two countries are symmetric, the equilibrium tariff and capital allocation 
in the two countries will be the same. Hence, in Appendix 3.8.3, I demonstrat.e 
that the tariff and the capital allocation in country H, which solve (3.26), are: 
rT 
1 o· , 
ki = kIt = 2v - 3. 
(3.27) 
(3.28) 
When the governments can commit and when they solve for their joint welfare, 
they would sign a free trade agreement. 
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3.5 Trade liberalisation without commitment 
In this section, I consider a scenario in which any import tariff that differs from 
the political optimal one in (3.12) has to be sustained through a reputational 
mechanism. This implies that the present discounted value of adhering to a pre-
announced trade policy has to be greater than or equal to the present discounted 
value from deviation. I assume that in period t the government finds itself in the 
long run equilibrium where the tariff equals 71 and where the capital allocation 
is kl' respectively, as given in (3.18) and (3.19). For which ever rea.'lon, the gov-
ernment decides to alter its long-run trade policies in order to reach a higher level 
of welfare. I model this as a conventional infinitely repeated game with trigger 
strategies. Let Tt be the tariff which the government announces that it will im-
plement in the future. When setting this tariff the private sector is not willing to 
pay any bribes. I assume that the private sector believes this announcement and 
it will consequently choose the capital allocation, k ~ , , which solves PI (T}l, k;l) = 1, 
or in words, capital will be allocated across sectors such as to equalise returns. 
The present discounted value of honouring this tariff for count.ry H as of period 
t + 1 and forever thereafter is given as: 
1 A ( A (A) A) 1 ( A (A) A ) 
--s:U Tl kl ,kl,r/J = --s:W TI kl ,kl,r/J . 1-u 1-u (3.29) 
where r/J = (T2, k2 ) represents the foreign tariff and capital allocation which, for 
now, are unspecified. The function UA represents the government's per-period 
utility form adhering to an announced policy. The private sector will form ex-
pectations about the credibility of government action based on past decisions. In 
other words, if the government announces that it will commit to a particular trade 
policy, the private sector will believe it provided the government has demonstratpd 
that it can sustain this tariff in the pa.'lt. If the government deviates from this 
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tariff in say period s, the private sector will no longer find the governmcnt crcdible, 
and it will base its investment decisions on that as of period s + 1. In period 8, 
however, the private sector is caught by surprise. I assume that if the government 
deviates it does so by re-engaging with the politically organised lobby, accepting a 
bribe and setting the tariff at Tr' (kt) as given in (3.12).The government achieves 
short-run benefits from such deviation in the form of a bribe from the import-
competing sector, and possibly also a short-run terms-of-trade improvement if it 
had signed a trade agreement with the other country. It is assumed that the gov-
ernment's decision to deviate catches the private sector by surprise such that the 
capital allocation is stuck at k ~ ~ in period s. The government's one-shot benefit 
from deviation (provided there is no change in country F's trade policies) in any 
given period is: 
U D ( T ~ O O ( k ~ ) ) , k ~ ~ , ¢) = W ( Tr' ( k ~ ) ) , k ~ ~ , ¢) + aC (Tr;' (k;\) ,k1\' ¢) , 
where the superscript D stands for deviation. In the following period (that is, the 
period after defection) where capital is perfectly mobile, the economy will return 
to the long-run political equilibrium: 
where the superscript P stands for punishment. The present discounted value of 
welfare from deviation is thus given as: 
(3.30) 
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Hence, I can express a self-enforcement constraint using (3.29) and (3.30) 11.<.;: 
It will prove convenient to write this constraint in terms of a critical discount factor 
above which trade liberalisation is self-enforceable. Hence, trade liberalisation is 
self-enforceable if and only if: 
(3.31 ) 
Notice the numerator of this equation is the short-run gain from deviating from the 
announced trade policy and accepting a bribe from the import-competing sector 
when the private sector was caught by surprise. The denominator is the long-run 
loss from deviation, or more specifically, the difference in welfare of deviating from 
the announced trade policy in the short-run where the private sector W11.<.; caught. 
by surprise and in the long-run where deviation is anticipated. Hence, the critical 
discount factor is given as the ratio of the short-run gain from deviatioll to the 
long run loss. 
3.5.1 The sustainability of unilateral trade liberalisation 
Suppose the government decides to delegate the responsibility for setting trade pol-
icy to an institution designed to distance itself from the political lobby, but suppose 
also that there is no constitutional arrangement which precludes the government 
from taking back responsibility for trade policy in any given period. For that rea-
son, in order to convince the private sector that the government will adlH're to the 
arrangement, it must demonstrate commitment over time. I 11.'isume that tlwre is 
no change in country F's trade policies such that the foreign tariff and capital al-
location are ¢ = (72 , k2 ). Hence, the tariff and capital allocation in, respeetivdy 
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country Hand F, that emerge under such arrangement are (T'IO ( k t ~ ' ) ) ,kil') and 
<p which implies that the per-period utility the government obtains by honour-
ing the unilateral liberalisation is UA (T80 (kW) kW;7.) = W (T'<O (kH') iiI\' ;';) 1 1 'I' f/ 1 1 "I" ' 
If the government chooses to deviate in, say period s, it will re-engage with the 
lobby and set the tariff at Tr (kr). Recall that when the government. deviat.es 
the capital allocation is stuck at kr since the private sector is caught by sur-
prise. Thus, the utility the government achieves in this first. period of deviation 
is UD (Tr' (kr) , k r , ~ ) ) = W (Tr' (kr) , k r , ~ ) ) + aC (Tr' (kr) ,krl One pe-
riod after defection, however, the private sector will no longer believe the govern-
ment's abilit.y to keep the tariff at its socially optimal level, and rationally expect 
that the government will re-engage with politics; t.he economy will t.hus end up 
in the long-run political equilibrium where the government yields utility ('qual 
to uP (1'1, k l ' ~ ) ) = W (1'1, kI) + aC (1'1, kl). Given all this information, I can 
define a critical discount factor above which unilateral trade liberalisation is self-
enforceable. Hence, using (3.31) unilateral trade liberalisation is self-enforceable 
if and only if: 
(3.32) 
The next step is to examine how the government's bargaining power affects the 
critical discount factor in (3.32). In order to gain intuition for the results that fol-
low consider the numerator of (3.32). Notice that it consists of two terms: (i) tIl(' 
difference in government welfare under the two tariff regimes, W (Tr' (Af) , ktl') -
W (T't (kr) ,kr), and (ii) the contributions paid to the government to deviate 
from the socially optimal tariff, aC (Tr (kt) ,kr} Using the politically opti-
mal tariff in (3.12), the socially optimal tariff in (3.13), and the expression for 
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contributions in (3.15), I can write up useful expressions for these two terms: 
W (rr (kr') ,kr') - W (rfO (kr') ,kr') 
aC (rr (kr') , k ~ ' ) )
The first expression is in absolute terms the government's reservation utility: the 
minimum amount needed to induce the government to pick the politically optimal 
tariff, and the second is the actual contribution. Subtracting the two terms from 
each other yields: 
uD (rr (kr') ,kr', ¢) - UA (r1° (kr') ,kr', ¢) = ( ~ ) ) a2 (kW)2 (3.33) 
21/1a2 (3v - 4)2 , 
where the second line uses k W = (3V;4), from (3.21). The numerator of (3.32) 
can thus be seen as the excess of contributions over the government's reservation 
utility. If the lobby has all the bargaining power, B = 0, contributions are just 
enough to make the government indifferent between the two tariff regimes in the 
short run such that there is no short-run gain from deviation. As {j increases, 
however, the temptation to accept bribes increases, since the government is able 
to extract larger rents from the political bargaining process. Also, the higher the 
weight attached to political contributions, a, the higher the incentive to deviate. 
Hence, when (3 = 0, unilateral deviation can be supported for every discount 
factor in the range <5 EjO; 1[ since in this case the government has no incentive to 
unilaterally deviate. 
Unilateral trade liberalisation can be supported for some range of ciiscount 
factors as long as <5u is strictly less than one. From (3.32) it is dear that this is 
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the case whenever: 
(3.34) 
Hence, unilateral trade liberalisation can be sustained for some range of discount 
factors provided the government's utility from adhering to the announced trade 
policy is strictly greater than its utility in the long-run political equilibrium. It 
will be convenient to rewrite (3.34) in the following wayll: 
There are two cases to consider: 
Case 1: f3 = O. When the government has no bargaining power, it is only com-
pensated for the short-run distortion from protection and not for the long-run mis-
allocation of capital. Since the function W (TID (kJ) , kJ) ha.'l a peak at k ~ ' ' it follows 
that W(Tfo(kr'),kr') > W(Tfo(k1),k1) such that UA(rjO(kr'),kt'.,¢) > 
U 1\,k1,¢>. p ( ~ ~ ) )
Case 2: f3 = 1. In this case, the equilibrium level of capital is the same in the 
political equilibrium as it is when the government adheres to the announced trade 
policy, kr' = kl for (3 = 1. The only difference is that in the long-run political 
equilibrium the government receives contributions, implying that the governlllent 
must be better off in the political equilibrium. Hence, the inequality ill (3.34) is 
XTosee this note that Tl = rfo(kl)' Hence. uP (Tl,kl,;f;) = W(rfo(kl).k l) + 
aC (rfo (kl) , k1). Contributions are paid to induce the government to iJllplerrwnt rr'. \1111-
tiplying the expression for contributions in (3.15) by the capital allocation kl y i e l d ~ ~ an ex-
pression for total contributions times a, aC(rfo(kl),kl) = e ~ : ; ) a : . ! ( k l f . . l\'oticp that 
the government's reservation utility for implementing rfo is given by W ( r ' ~ " " (kl) .1.: 1) -
W (rfo (kl) ,kl). Csing (3.12) and (3.13) this can be written as ( ~ ) a : . ! ! (kIf. Addillg alld 
subtracting W (rio (kl) , kl) from uP (T,. k,. ¢) thus yields W ( r ~ o o (kl) . kl) + (-if) a:.! (I.:I):.!' 
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not satisfied, and it is the case that UA (TiD (kt"') ,kt"', ¢;) < UI' (TI' k" ¢;). 
Since UA (TiD (kt"') , kt"', 3) does not depend on f3, I can analyse the inter-
mediate case of 0 < f3 < 1 by considering the derivative of uP (T I, kl , ¢) with 
respect to f3. The latter is monotonically increasing in f3 for two re8.'lons: first, 
because uP (Tl' kl' 3) is directly increasing in f3 and, second, because the capital 
allocation kl is decreasing in f3. This argument is proven formally in Appendix 
3.8.4, along with the proof of the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.2: there exists a level of the government's bargaining power· .B. 
{3, such that UA (Ti O (kr'),kr',3) > uP (Tl,k1,3) if and only if (3 < li = 
5 - 2V6 ~ ~ 0.101. 
This implies that whenever J3 ~ ~ {3 unilateral trade liberalisation cannot hI' 
supported for any discount factors. If, on the other hand, the government's bar-
gaining power lies in the range f3 EjO; /3[, there is a range of discount factors which 
can support trade liberalisation. Since the government extracts larger rellb; when 
(3 increases, it will be the case that the level of patience required to sustain track 
liberalisation is strictly increasing in f3 when f3 EjO; i3[. This result can be formally 
stated in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3.3: The critical discount factor above which unilateral trade lib-
eralisation can be sustained by repeated interaction is strictly i r u ~ r e a 8 i n g g in thl' 
governments' bargaining power, ;3, in the range given as B EjO; 3[. pnwidrd poli-
tics matter, a > O. Hence ~ ~ > 0 for a > 0 and f3 EjO; {3[. 
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix 3.8.5. In Figure 3.3, I 
have depicted the critical discount factor, 6u , 8.') a function of d. It is c h ~ a r r that 
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when the government has no bargaining power, unilateral trade liberalisat.ion can 
be support.ed for every discount factor, but as /3 increa'les, the level of pat.ience 
required to sustain the announced departure from the t.ime-consist.ent political 
t.ariffs increases. When the government's bargaining power exceeds t.he crit.ical 
level /3, the government is better off in the political equilibrium where it can enjoy 
bribes from capital-owners in the importing sector. In this case, bribes more than 
compensate the government for the long-run misallocation of capital. 
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Figure 3.3: The discount factor, bu, as a function of 3. (a = 0.5 and II = 1.6). 
3.5.2 The sustainability of a trade agreement 
Suppose the governments in the two countries are able to sign a trade agreelllent 
to maximise their joint welfare. Suppose also, however, that due to the absellc(' 
of a world supranational power to enforce such an agreement, both cOlllltries call 
deviate from the agreement in any period. The governments annollnce as of !>('-
riod t that in period t + 1, they will sign a free trade agreement, and that th<',V 
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will no longer accept bribes. If the private sectors in the two counties believe 
that the governments will in fact go ahead with this, they will allocate capital 
in expectation of those tariffs. In this case, the tariff-capital allocation pair that 
emerges under such arrangement is (T f, kC) in country Hand (Tf, k ~ t ) ) ill coun-
try F yielding per-period utility of UA ( T f , k { t , T r , k ~ t ) ) = W (T{,kt.TLk£I). 
If the government in H chooses to deviate in, say period s, it will re-engage 
with the lobby and set the tariff at Tf (k{t). It is assumed that the govern-
ment is able to catch both the private sector in its own country and the gov-
ernment in the other country by surprise, such that the domestic capital all(}-
cation is stuck at k{t and that the trade policy in the foreign country is based 
on an expectation of cooperation. Deviation will thus yield per-period utility of 
UD ( po (kIt) kIt T kIt) W ( po (kIt) kIt T kIt) C ( po (, II) Ifl) TIl '1' T 2' 2 = TIl' l' T 2' 2 + a T 1 ,,; 1 , "'1 . 
One period after defection, however, the private sector in country H will no 
longer believe its government's ability to honour the trade agreement, and ra-
tionally expect that it will set tariffs at their politically optimal levels. Moreover, 
since country H defected on the agreement, country F will punish it by reverting 
to the politically optimal tariff one period after the defection. The p r i v a t ( ~ ~ sec-
tors in both countries will rationally expect that the governments will re-engage 
in politics, and the economy thus returns to the long-run political equilibrium 
where the tariff and capital allocation are (7\, kd in country Hand (1'2, k2) in 
country F. The government's per-period utility in this long-run equilibriulll is 
uP (1'1, kl' 1'2, k2) = W (1'1, kl' 1'2, k2) +aC (1'1, k1). Using this information, I can 
define a critical discount factor above which a trade agreement is self-enforceabl('. 
Thus, using (3.31) a trade agreement is self-enforceable if and only if: 
(3.35 ) 
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Unlike unilateral trade liberalisation, when the two countries sign a trade agreo-
ment with each other they are also solving the international terms-of-trade exter-
nality. This implies that there is an additional welfare gain in the trade agreement 
equilibrium: in addition to the governments' in the two countries being able to 
commit vis-a.-vis their respective import-competing sectors, they arc also able to 
solve the international prisoner's dilemma. What this also implies is that when 
any country deviates the punishment is higher, since not only has the government 
lost its credibility to conduct welfare-improving trade policies vis-a.-vis domestic 
capital owners, the other country punishes it by distorting the terms-of-trade to 
its disadvantage. This has implications for both the short-run temptation to devi-
D ( po (It) It T It) A (T T '1' II) ate from the trade agreement, U TI kl , kl , T 2 , k2 - U TI , kl . T 2 , k2 , 
and for the long-run loss, UD (Tr (kr) ,k{t,Tf,ktt) - uP (7\,kl,T2,k2). In 
fact, both the short-run temptation to deviate and the long-run loss are greater. 
It turns out, however, that due to the added incentive to stay in the agreement 
that comes about by the threat of punishment on the part of the other country, 
a trade agreement can be supported for any level of the government's bargain-
ing power ;3, provided the government is sufficiently patient. This result can be 
formalised in the following proposition which is proved in Appendix 3.8.6: 
Proposition 3.4: 8'1' < 1 for all values of (3. 
While this is true, a higher bargaining power of the two governments increases 
the level of patience required to sustain a trade agreement provided politics matter, 
a > o. The intuition behind this finding is the following. When [J is higher, the 
government is able to reap a larger share of the revenue from deviation in the 
form of bribes, when the other country cooperates and when the private sector is 
caught by surprise, ag; > o. The government's per-period utility in the long-run 
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Figure 3.4: The discount, 1ST , as a function of ,B. (a = 0.5 and 11 = 1.6). 
political equilibrium is also higher when f3 is higher for two rea.<;ons. First, bribes 
are larger, and the capital allocation is closer to the socially optimallevei k'J. ---- k ~ \ ' '
for f3 ---- 1. This implies 8J/; > O. The government's per-period utility in the ca.<;p 
where it sticks to the agreement is unchanged 8ffjA = O. In Appendix 3.8.7 I prove 
the following: 
Proposition 3.5: The critical discount factor above which a trude agreement 
can be sustained by repeated interaction is strictly increasing in the gOllcl"nrncnt8' 
bargaining power, ;3, provided politics matter, a > O. Hence ~ ~ > 0 for a > O. 
The relationship between the critical discount factor and /3 is depicted in Figure 
3.4. 
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3.6 Unilateral versus global trade liberalisation: 
a comparison 
The relative sustainability of unilateral trade liberalisation can now be compared 
and contrasted with the signing of a global free trade agreement. In Section 
3.5.1, I established that unilateral trade liberalisation can be supported for every 
discount factor when (3 = O. When (3 increases, however, the government reaps an 
increasingly larger share of the revenue from import protection, raising the level of 
patience required to sustain unilateral trade liberalisation. As (3 exceeds a critical 
threshold, /3, the government's benefit, in the form of contributions from the lobby, 
is so high that commitment to foreclose contributions from the lobby would leave 
it worse off. Signing a trade agreement with the other country, however, changes 
both the short-run benefits from deviation as well as the long-run loss. The fact 
that deviation will be punished by the other country imposes greater sanctions on 
the governments for high levels of /3. 
There are two cases to consider: 
Case 1: (3 = O. When the government has no bargaining power, it is tl\(' 
case that flu = 0 whereas flr > o. The latter is strictly positive since even if the 
government's bargaining power is zero, there is still a benefit from distorting the 
terms of trade in a country's favour when the other cooperates. 
Case 2: (3 2: /3. In this case, unilateral trade liberalisation cannot be sup-
ported for any discount factor in the range 0 < fl < 1. Proposition 3.4, howeV<'r, 
established that I5r < 1 for all values of (3. 
I depict the relationship between flu and br, respectively, and /1 in Figure 3.5 
for specific parameter values of a and v. It is clear from the figure that unilateral 
trade liberalisation can be supported for a larger range of discount factors for low 
bargaining powers, whereas when (3 gets sufficiently large, a trade agreenlPnt is 
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Figure 3.5: The discount factors, 8u and 8r , as functions of /3. (a = 0.5 and 
v = 1.6). 
needed to liberalise trade. 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
The present chapter contributes to our understanding of the broader area of the 
political economy of trade liberalisation by analysing the sustainability of unilat-
eral and bilateral commitment strategies, when governments are unable to commit 
to dynamically efficient trade policies. 
In the present framework the demand for trade liberalisation is driven by the 
desire to commit vis-a.-vis domestic interest groups as well as solving an illter-
national terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma. Unilateral trade liheralisatioll 
solves the problem of time inconsistency in the domestic political arena, whereas 
a trade agreement solves both types of problems. 
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Central to the argument is the government's bargaining power vis-a.-vis the 
lobby. The self-enforceability of both unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation 
is increasing in the ability of the government to extract rents from the Na..,h 
bargaining process. I would expect that the bargaining power of a government 
is weaker in an open democratic system, where the power of government is less 
centralised. This gives lobbies greater opportunities to offer bribes to several 
constellations within the government. My results thus indicate that countries 
with open and democratic political systems are more likely to be able to sign 
trade agreements with each or unilaterally liberalise trade. 
The present model could be extended in several interesting ways. First, an 
assumption of symmetry between the two countries has been imposed. This has 
allowed to keep the analyses simple yet informative. The simplification, however, 
is not in line with the current economic landscape in which we live, and it would 
be interesting to see to what extent asymmetries would change the ba..,cline re-
sults. It would be interesting to study the sustainability of an agreement between 
a country where the government's bargaining power is low, and one in which the 
bargaining power is high. There could be a country with a very decentralised 
political system (3 = 0) which could be considered as a more democratic country 
(giving the interpretation in the introduction of this chapter), and one wheT<' the 
government has all the power (13 = 1), possibly a very autocratic country. The 
autocracy has a much greater short-run incentive to deviate from the a g T < ~ m e n t t
since its government can extract all the rents from the bargaining process with 
the lobby. The government of the democracy, on the other hand, ollly achieves 
more favourable terms of trade in one period when the other country WetS induced 
to cooperate. The punishments the two countries incur are also different. TlH' 
autocracy will experience a harder punishment since the long-rull political equi-
librium in the democracy will be characterised by overinvestnl<'nt ill the protect('d 
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sector, which reduces the profits of capital owners producing the ( ~ x p o r t i n g g good 
in the autocracy. By the reverse reasoning it can be deduced that the democracy 
will experience a smaller punishment. Since the democracy would experience a 
smaller short-run gain, and a smaller punishment, and the autocracy will expe-
rience a larger short-run gain and a larger punishment, it is less dear how that 
affects the sustainability of an agreement. It is certain, however that the democ-
racy will be able to sustain unilateral liberalisation. The theory can thus explain 
the emergence of non-reciprocal trade agreements between democratic developed 
nations and less democratic nations. 
Second, I have ignored analysing potential trade diverting effects of a regional 
trade agreement. Imagine, for example, introducing a third country to the model. 
In that case, there might be further welfare effects of the distortions resulting froIll 
the short-run effects of tariffs imposed on the country outside the agreement, and 
the long-run effects of capital allocations. If it is a..'lsumed that trade agreements 
are signed between natural trading partners, the problem of trade diversion lIlay 
not be very large. Moreover, it may also be argued that a lot of cooperation over 
trade policy takes place in multilateral negotiations under the WTO. 
3.8 Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 
Using the expression for the price of country H's imported good in (3.2), and 
the expression for contributions in (3.14), I can write the equal-returns condition 
(3.17) as: 
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Setting TI = Tr' (kd from (3.12) and solving for kl yields, after substantial algo-
braic manipulations, an expression for the unique capital allocation in the long-fIln 
political equilibrium: 
~ ~ _ 2 (3v - 4) 
kl = kl = ((3) . 4 - a 1- (3.36) 
Substituting kl back into (3.12) yields the unique expression for the tariff in the 
long-run political equilibrium: 
~ ~ 4-a(I-(3)+2(2a-l)(3v-4) 
TI = TI == 3 [4 - a (1 - (3)] 
Notice that the condition (3.22) implies that a < ~ , , and hence the denominator of 
(3.36) is positive. The numerator is also positive given that I have H.'iSullled that 
v > ~ ~ in (3.10). Hence, in equilibrium a positive amount of capital is allocated 
to the M1-sector. It is similarly possible to show that 1.,1 < 1 Ilsing the conditions 
imposed on a and v. q.e.d. 
3.8.2 Derivation of Eq. (3.24) and Eq. (3.25) 
I solve the optimisation problem in (3.23) using the method of Lagrange. Using 
(3.6) and the expression for the price of country H'fl imported good in (3.2), I can 
rewrite (3.23) in the following way: 
maxW (Tl' kd + A [PI (TI' kJ) - 1] 
TI,kl 
max (v - ~ ~ (1 + kl - Td) kl + 1 - kl + TI (-21 (1 - kl - Td) 
TI,k l 2 
+ ~ ~ ( ~ ( 1 1 + kl - TI)) 2 + (v - ~ ~ (1 + k2 + T2)) 
+ ~ ~ ( ~ ~ (1 + k2 + T 2) ) 2 + A [ (v - ~ ~ (1 + A: 1 - T d) - 1] , 
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where A is the Lagrange multiplier for this optimisation problem. Differentiating 
WU (TI' kl' A) for Til kl and A yield the following three equations: 
awU (TI,kl,A) 
aTI 
awu (TI,kl,A) 
ak l 
awU (TI' kJ, .x) 
a.x 
= 
= 
2A + 1 - kl - 3TI 
4 
4v - 3k l - 5 - TI - 2A 
4 
2v - 3 - kl - TI 
2 
Solving these equations in the three unknowns yields one unique solution: 
u _ 2 - v. kU _ 3v - 4 . .x - 0 
Tl - 2 ' I - 2 ' - . 
q.e.d. 
3.8.3 Derivation of Eq. (3.27) and Eq. (3.28) 
I solve the optimisation problem in (3.26) using the method of Lagrange. Eq. (3.4) 
gives an expression for the part of country F's welfare which does not depelld on 
the home variables, Tl and k 1• Using the expression for the price of A/I in country 
F from (3.2), and the expression for the consumer surplus (3.1), the wPifare in 
country F can be written as: 
{3.37} 
where the term [.J does not depend on TI and k l • Hence, using (3.6) and (3.37), 
and the equal-returns constraint, PI (TI' kt} = 1, I can write up th(' following 
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optimisation problem in TI and k l : 
= 
where ..\ is the Lagrange multiplier for this optimisation problem. Differentiating 
\}:fA (T1' k}, ..\) wrt. 7}, k} and), gives the following three equations: 
awA (TI' k}, ).) 
aT} 
aw A (TI' kl' ..\) 
ak} 
a\}:fA (Tl' k l • ..\) 
a). 
= 
= 
). - 71 
--
2 
2v - 3 - ). - kl 
2 
2v - 3 - kl + 71 
2 
Solving these equations in the three unknowns yields one unique solution: 
T ~ ~ = 0; k ~ ~ = 2v - 3; ). = o. 
It is also possible to carry out this optimisation problem for the foreign variables, 
72 and k2 , yielding the same results due to symmetry. q.e.d. 
3.8.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2 
I begin by deriving expressions for UA (TID ( k ~ V ) ) ,kp",;;;) and UI' (71, kl,;P). Sub-
stituting the socially optimal tariff (3.13) into (3.6) and rearranging yields: 
(3.3H) 
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where the term in [.J depends only on the foreign variables which are fixed at 
~ ~ = (1'2, k2) Similarly, substituting the politically optimal tariff in (3.12) into 
(3.6), and adding the contributions from (3.15) at the capital allocation, kh yields 
after substantial rearranging: 
p ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ) (3V - 4) ( ~ ~ ) (2 - !3a2) ( ~ ) 2 2 7 U Tj,kj,c/J = -3- kj - 6 k j + 6 + [.J. (3.39) 
Although the foreign variables are not independent of /i they cancel out when 
taking the difference between UA (TiD (kf) , k f , ~ ) ) and uP (1'),k),;P). Using 
the expression for kl in (3.19), and for kf in (3.21), I can write up an explicit 
expression for the difference: 
= ! ((3V-4))2 _ ( 2(3v-4)2 ) 
3 2 3(4-(1(1-8)) (3.40) 
+ (2-!3a2 ) ( 2(3v-4) )2 
6 4-a(1-a) 
Setting this expression equal to zero and solving the resulting second degre(' poly-
nomial for j3 yields two solutions: 
(3=5±2v6. 
It is clear that only one of these solutions lie within the permitted range for 3, 
and that solution is the critical value given in the proposition, B = 5 - 2J6. 
l'\ext by setting (3 = 0 in (3.40), I obtain: 
2 '. 2 
A ( so (H') H' '"":") P ( ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ) ) I (1 (3/J - 4) UTI kl , kl ,¢ - U Tl, kl' ¢ = 2 > O. 
3=0 12 (4 - (/) 
The sign of this expression can be established using the condition in (3.10). Sdting 
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(3 = 1 in (3.40) yields: 
where again the condition in (3.10) can be used to assess the sign. Hence, whenever 
,8 < {j, UA (r1° ( k ~ V ) ) , k ~ , ~ ) ) > uP (TIl kl' 1). q.e.d. 
3.8.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3 
The derivative of (3.32) can be expressed as: 
86u a(u:;uA ) (uD _ UP) _ a(u:;u P ) (uJ) - UA ) 
8(3 (UD _ UP )2 
Noting that a ( ~ ~ A ) ) = 0 this can be rewritten as: 
85u 
8(3 
In Appendix 3.8.4 I proved that U A - uP > 0 if and only if 1'1 < H. As can 1)(, 
seen from (3.33), the sign of UD - UA , is clearly positive. Thus, what is ldt to 
a(lJD ) a(u P ) a(r:/)) 
show is that 83 > 0 and 8(3 > o. To evaluate the sign of iJ3 note first 
that since the capital allocations in k ~ ~ is independent of (3 as well as the tariff, 
ri (kr'), social welfare is independent of (3. It thus suffices to considf'r the ('ffeet 
of j3 on the level of contributions. From (3.15) I have: 
Taking the derivative and substituting for kr' from (3.21) yield: 
a2 (3v - 4)2 
24 > o. 
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Finally, to find an expression for 8 ( ~ ; ) ) , I can usc the fact that the tariff in the long-
run political equilibrium can be expressed as 7] = Tr' (k]). Hence, suhstituting 
(3.12) into (3.6), and adding contributions from (3.15) evaluated at k] yields!): 
U T] k] - -- kr - k] + -p ( ~ ~ ~ ) ) _ (3V - 4) ~ ~ (2 - a213 ) ( ~ ) 2 2 7 
, 3 6 6' 
Using (3.19), I can write up the following derivatives: 
= 
2 (3v - 4) a . 
( 2' 4 - a (1 - 13)) 
8(3v-4)2a 
(4-a(1-j3))3' 
(3.41 ) 
(3.42) 
(3.43) 
~ ~ ( ~ ) 2 2Taking the derivative of (3.41) wrt. kl and kl and plugging in (3.42) and (3.43) 
yield: 
_ (3V-4) ( 2(3v-4)a 2) + (2-a2j3 ) ( 8(311-4)2(1'1) 
3 (4-a(1-f3)) 6 (4-a(l-i1))' 
( (3v - 4)2 a 3) [4 (2 - a2f3) - 2 (4 - a (1 - (1))] 3(4-a(1-j3)) 
= ( (3v - 4)2 a2 ) 2 1 _ _ 4a 
3(4-a(1-f3))3 [( 13) 13]. 
Hence, 8 ~ ; ; > 0 if and only if ,8 < 112a' Since a cannot exceed ~ ~ (see (3.22) and 
(3.10)), it is clear that 8%: > 0 for the relevant range of B E]O; 13[. With this 
information it can be confirmed that ~ ~ > 0 for /3 E]O; /3[. q.e.d. 
3.8.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4 
First note that 6T < 1 implies UA (Tf, k{t, Tr,k£t) > UI' (71,k1,72.k2) for a.ll 
values of!3 E [0;1]. I will begin by showing that uP (7],k1,72.k2) is 1ll011oton-
9Since there is no change in foreign variables. k2 and TZ. I can igllort' t1ws(', 
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ically increasing in (3. The tariffs in the long-run political equilibrium call be 
expressed as 7\ = Tr (kl) and 72 = Tr (k2) 10. Hence, substituting (3.12) into 
(3.6), and adding contributions from (3.15) evaluated at k\ yields: 
(3.44) 
Due to the assumed symmetry of the model, it is the ca.'ie that k\ = k2 . Using 
(3.19), I can write up the following derivatives: 
2 (3v - 4) a . 
(4-a(1-(3))2' 
2 8 (3v - 4) a 
(4 - a (1 - (3))3' 
(3.45) 
(3.46) 
Taking the derivative of (3.44) wrt. k}, (kl f, k2 and (k2 r, and plugging in 
(3.45) and (3.46) yields: 
2 (9v - a - 13) (3v - 4) a 4 (5 - 2a - a2 - 3a2 (1) (3v - 4)2 (l 
-- + - 'J 
9 (4-a(1-(3))2 9 (4-a(1-(1))' 
6 (3v - 4)2 a2 
+ - ----''-----'-------;< 
9(4-a(1-(3))2 
_2......:..( 3_v_-_4-,-) a---;;- [ (a + 1) (4 - a (1 - /1)) 1 
9(4-a(1-(3))3 
+ (8a - 2 - 5a2 - 3a2 /J + 3a (1 - fJ)) (31,' - 4) 
(3.47) 
Using (3.10) the sign of 2 (311 - 4) a can be established to be nOll-ll('gative. l\lof('-
over, it is clear the denominator is positive. Hence, the sign of (3.47) ('all })(' 
JODue to the assumption of symmetry. the foreign tariff will mirror that of til!' hOIlI(' tariff. 
Hence. it will be set according to T ~ o o (k2) = (l-k'j2ak,). 
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evaluated from the term in [.J. First, it is clear that the first term is strictly 
positive, whereas the sign of the second term can be both positive or negative de-
pending on the parameter a. The first term is monotonically increasing in ti, and 
the second is monotonically decreasing. Hence, I will make the positive term a." 
small as possible by setting (3 = 0, such that the first term becomes (a + 1) (4 - a). 
In addition, I will make the potentially negative terms as Iowa." possible by setting 
(3 = 1 such that the second term becomes (8a - 2 - 5a2 - 3a2 ) (3v - 4). Hence, if 
8 ~ ; ; > 0 it must be the case that: 
(a + 1) (4 - a) + (8a - 2 - 5a2 - 3a2 ) (3v - 4) > o. (3.48) 
Notice that the term (3v - 4) is monotonically increasing in v. The condition on 
the political parameter a in (3.22) implies that v < ~ f a + : : ) . . Substituting this into 
(3.48) it is easy to show that 8 ~ ; ; > 0 for a > o. 
I proceed by finding an expression for UA (Tf, k{t, T ~ , , h:{t). Since then' are 
no contributions from the lobby in the case where the government commits to a 
free trade agreement, the utility of the government can be evaluated by setting 
tariffs to zero and plugging in the free trade allocation of capital (4.3) for thp two 
symmetric countries: 
UA ( T kIt T kIt) 2 2 3 7 1 , 1,72 , 2 = v - v + . 
This expression is obviously independent of the government's barga.ining power, 
since the government has 'freed' itself from politics. Since uP (71, kl' 72. k2) is 
monotonically increasing in (3 I can set (3 = 1 to obtain the highest value of tlw 
utility in the long-run political equilibrium. Substituting the capital allocatioll 
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from (3.19) into (3.44) and noting symmetry, kl = k2' I can express the following: 
3 2 8 2 5 72 
--v + -a + -(J, - -av + -v 
2 3 9 6 8 
1 2 1 22 4 2 5 +-av + -a 1) - -(1 v + -. 
4 2 3 2 
In order to prove the proposition I thus have to evaluate the following: 
uA (ri, k{t, rL k£t) - uP (r1,k1,T2,k2)llj=1 > 0 
¢::} 
1 2 18 2 5 121212242 
--v - -a + - - -a + -av + -v - -av - -(1 v + -a v > o. (3.49) 
2329684 2 3 
Differentiating this expression wrt. to a and solving yields a unique maximum: 
4(2-V) 
a ="3 3v - 4 . 
Using the condition on the demand parameter (3.10) it is dear this maxilllulIl lies 
. h· . f h . d so 4 (2-" ) 6(2-v) HIlI m t e mtenor 0 t e permltte range lor a, 3 3v-4 < 6v-7. ence, t Ie sllla ( ~ s t t
values of (3.49) lie on the exterior of the permitted range for (1. Substituting (J = () 
into (3.49) yields: 
1 1 1 2 
- -1) + - + -v > O. 
2 2 8 
It is direct to verify the sign of this expression using the condition on t.he demand 
parameter in (3.10). Substituting the upper bound for a into (3.49) yields: 
~ ~ (860V - 719v2 + 264v3
2 
- 36v4 - 380) > o. 
8 (6v - 7) 
The sign of this expression can also be readily verified using (3.10). q.e.d. 
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3.8.7 Proof of Proposition 3.5 
The derivative of (3.35) can be expressed as: 
86
T 
a ( u : ~ U A ) ) (UD _ UP) _ a ( u : ~ u l ' ) ) (UD _ UA ) 
8(3 (UD - UP)2 
Noting that a ( ~ 3 A ) ) = 0 this can be rewritten as: 
a(u l ') 
In Appendix 3.8.6 I showed that UA - uP > 0 for every value of a and iM > 0 
for a > O. It is also possible to show that UD - UA > O. This is because there 
are at least two gains from deviating from a zero tariff when the other country 
cooperates. First, setting the tariff at the socially optimal level, 7'l", distorts the 
terms of trade in country H's favour, and second, if (3 > 0 the governlllent can 
reap part of the surplus from protection. This can be proved formally by finding 
explicit expression for U D and U A. Substituting the expressions for Tr' ( k{I), k{l, 
Tr and k£t into UD , and the expressions for TT, k{t, T1' and k£1 into UA yields: 
(3.50) 
It is easy to show that (3.50) is monotonically increasing in .3. Hence, the value 
is lowest when (3 = O. Substituting (3 = 0 into (3.50) yields: 
2 2 1 2 
- - -v +-v 3 3 6' 
It is direct to verify that this is positive using (3.10). 
To evaluate the sign of a ( ~ : ) ) note first that since the capital allocations in, 
115 
respectively, country Hand F, kr and kt t , are independent of (:3" as well a.-. the 
tariffs, T ~ o o (k{t) and T ~ , , social welfare is independent of (:3. It thus suffices to 
consider the effect of ;3 on the level of contributions. From (3.15) I have: 
Taking the derivative and substituting for k{t from (4.3) yield: 
With this information it can be confirmed that ~ ~ > O. q.e.d. 
11 By symmetry. k{t = k[t = 2v - 3. 
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Chapter 4 
Inter-industry Capital Mobility 
and the Political Economy of 
Trade Liberalisation 
4.1 Introduction 
The liberalisation of political barriers to trade has been substantial in the post-war 
era. Average ad valorem tariffs have come down significantly under the auspices 
of the GATT /WTO, and economic integration has been further deepened by the 
signing of a countless number of bilateral and regional trade agreements. The 
present chapter differs from the previous two in that it focuses on the nature of 
trade liberalisation rather than the causes. It thus assumes that for whichever 
reason, two countries have made the decision to sign a trade agreement with each 
other to improve their welfare. Hence, in this chapter, I will analyse issues relating 
to the path of trade liberation in a trade agreement. 
The novel contribution which I make in this chapter lies entirely in the empirical 
part, and the theoretically framework which I will be using follows tl\(' f>olitical-
economy model in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007). In that Illodd, wry d('ar 
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and testable predictions are generated, and these can be taken to the data. The 
aim is to do just that and keep the empirical analyses as closely tied with the 
theory as possible. The theoretical model offers two Illotives to grant protection 
to a domestic importing industry. One is a government's desire to distort terms of 
trade in its favour by influencing world prices through trade policy, and the other 
is a domestic commitment problem which comes about through a game which the 
government plays with owners of capital which are organised in a lobby. In this 
sense, the model is identical to the one presented in the previous chapter. 
Two countries that do not cooperate and distort each other's terms of trade 
will end up in an undesirable terms-of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma, and if the 
two governments cooperate they will be able to increase their joint welfare. A 
trade agreement can serve this purpose by maximising the joint national welfare 
of the two countries. It is assumed that owners of physical capital in the private 
sector make investments which are sunk in the short run, that is, in a given period. 
However, unlike the model in Chapter 3, where capital was perfectly mobil(' after 
just one period, there may be frictions in the degree to which capital can move 
out of one sector and into another. The ease of entry and exit is referred to as 
inter-industry capital mobility, but it may be assumed that in the long run, that is 
allowing a sufficient amount of periods to pass capital will eventually be allocated 
to equalise returns. This creates a dynamic inconsistency in that the trade poli(,y 
which is optimal in the long-run where capital is, at least eventually, allocated to 
equalise returns may not coincide with what is optimal once capital is sunk. The 
government thus suffers from a time-inconsistency problem, and it will have an 
incentive to obtain a commitment device. It is a."lsumed that a trade agreement 
is perfectly enforceable internationally, and is able to ensure commitnwllt on the 
part of the government, and free itself from the protectionist pressures in the 
domestic political arena. Thus, this model does not consider issues of imperfect 
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enforcement of trade policy which formed the basis of the previous two chapt.ers. 
The t.rade agreement has two components: (i) one that solves the international 
terms-of-trade distortion, and (ii) one that ensures commitment on the part of the 
government to optimal long-run trade policies. 
A dynamic version of the model, which is strictly speaking the one I am test-
ing, predicts that when two countries sign a trade agreement with each other, an 
immediate tariff cut materialises, which solves the terms-of-trade distortion. This 
is followed by gradual trade liberalisation, the speed of which is determined by 
inter-industry mobility of capital. The intuition behind this result is that if fac-
tors of production are sunk, capital owners will experience economic losses when 
confronted with greater competition from a foreign trading partner. However, if 
factors of production can be reallocated to alternative uses in the economy, capital 
owners will not suffer losses and carryon employing their endowments of capital 
elsewhere. 
The case study which I have chosen is the free trade agreement signed between 
the US and Mexico in 1994 through the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The theoretical model considers a move from a tariff set in a framework 
in which two countries do not negotiate with each other over trade policy to a 
cooperative zero tariff. When choosing an empirical case-study it has therefore 
been important to find two countries that are suited for this theory. Tlw United 
States and Mexico experienced little cooperation over trade policy prior to signing 
a free trade agreement in 1994 and comparing the appropriate period including 
and after this year provides an excellent empirical ca.'ie-study. I choose the US 
as the home country, and consider tariff cuts on imports from Mexico sinc(\ the 
signing of NAFTA in 1994. The reason for this is that the data for the US is more 
complete for all of the empirical variables. 
I do not include Canada, which also joined NAFTA in 1994, Slllce the US 
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and Canada can trace their history of trade cooperation back to the Automotive 
Products Agreement in 1965 as well as through the GATT /WTO framework which 
is thought to be more favourable to developed countries. For this reason, I do not 
find US cuts on Canadian products empirically relevant. 
I use three variables to empirically capture inter-industry capital mobility. 
The first is persistence of profits as modelled in Mueller (1990). The idea is that 
greater persistence in profits is driven by imperfect mobility of capital. Hence, the 
variable essentially infers inter-industry capital mobility from observed economic 
behaviour. For that reason, the variable also captures the opportunity cost, which 
cannot be measure directly, of remaining in a particular industry. The second 
variable is capital-labour ratios. If it is assumed that capital represents sunk 
costs, and labour variable costs, it can be inferred that an industry is less mobile 
the larger is its capital requirements. This variable thus captures the explicit 
sunk costs of being active in an industry. The measure docs not come without 
problems, since it can be argued that many skilled workers arc not very mobile 
across industries, whereas many types of capital and machinery is. The third 
vdriable is the four-firm concentration ratio. It is argued that the larger is t 1 } ( ~ ~
share of total production of the four largest firms the greater is the sunk cost 
outlay of production. This may seem true at first, but it could also be argued 
that there is no guarantee that larger firms necessarily employ capital which is 
less mobile. 
Empirically, I follow Bagwell and Staiger (2006) by using the vdlue of net 
imports to measure the terms-of-trade component of trade liberalisatioll. The 
idea behind using this variable is that when net imports are larger, the degree to 
which countries can distort the terms of trade in their favour is larger. 
I find that persistence of profits and capital-labour ratios are statistically sig-
nificant in terms of explaining the speed of liberalisation of US tariffs on !l.lexican 
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imports. I employ several econometric models to cross-examinc the consistcncy of 
my findings, such as panel data methods and a tobit rcgrcssion. The third mea-
sure of inter-industry capital mobility, the four-firm conccntration ratio is unable 
to account for the speed of trade liberalisation. 
Net imports are not very successful in terms of accounting for thc tcrms-of-
trade component of trade liberalisation, although most specifications have the 
effect correctly signed and in some cases I obtain a significant effect. I do not 
necessarily take these results to refute the model's predictions regarding the terms-
of-trade component, as the net imports may not be the first best variable to 
capture terms-of-trade distortions. A measure of the elasticity of cxport supply 
would probably be more successful at accounting for the degree to which countries 
can manipulate their terms of trade as argued in Broda, Limao and Weinstein 
(2008), and it is only due to data constraints that I do not employ this variable. 
Time inconsistency problems are common in economics, and they trace their 
roots back to Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Fischer (1980). Staiger and 
Tabellini (1987) and Tornell (1991) are amongst the first to address issues of tiIll<' 
inconsistency into the setting of trade policy. Empirically, therc is relatively little 
evidence that time inconsistency problems matter in the setting of trade policy, 
although Staiger and Tabellini (1999) and Bagwell and Staiger (20(6) find sOllie 
evidence. 
In his insightful exposition, Hiscox (2002a) shows how the degrec of factor 
mobility determines political coalitions over trade policy in the 19th and 20th 
century. For the UK, France, Australia, Sweden, New Zcaland and Canada, pe-
riods of high factor mobility are associated with protectionist pressures frolll the 
political parties representing the scarce factors of production wherea.."i ill periocls 
of low factor mobility political coalitions over trade policy follow illdIlHt.rY-HIH·cific 
interests and there is larger disagreement over trade policy within political parties. 
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This is to be expected as when factors of production are more mobile the econ-
omy can to a larger extent be approximated by a Hechscher-Ohlin framework in 
which the scarce factor stands to lose from trade liberalisation (Stolper-Samuelsen 
effects). In periods of low factor mobility the Ricardo-Viner model (which models 
sector-specific factors) is more appropriate as a description of the economy, and 
coalitions should then be expected to follow industry lines. The periods which 
Hiscox (2002a) identifies as having low factor mobility are the early 19th century 
and the last half of the 20th century. Transport and communication costs were 
high in the early 19th century which inhibited factor mobility. Towards the end of 
the 19th century and early 20th century lower transport and communication costs 
facilitated mobility of factors. But towards the 1950s industries began to employ 
labour and capital which were more sector specific. 
Hiscox (2002b) tests whether industries with higher factor mobility have lower 
protection in a non-cooperative (Le. without a trade agreement) framework. As 
a measure of factor mobility he uses financing choices. If the financing of a firm is 
mainly by borrowing the sector is considered more mobile, but if a large part of the 
financing is by equity Hiscox (2002b) infers that there would be a larger interest 
premium for borrowing because the investment is more sector specific. I3ased on 
this measure he finds the opposite of what the model in Maggi and Rodrigucz-
Clare (2007) would predict: that firms with higher factor mobility receive higher 
protection. He concludes that this could be evidence for a home market effect: 
perhaps having higher factor mobility imposes a larger threat of exiting a country 
to produce somewhere else, and the government would then grant p r o t ( ~ c t i o n n to 
keep the firm in the home market. The novelty of the present framework, however, 
is the testing of a domestic commitment motive based on factor mobility in a co-
operative framework, Le. in a framework in which trade policy b set c o o p ( ~ r a t i v d y y
in an agreement. To the best of my knowledge, this prediction has not I)('('n tak('n 
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to the data as of yet. 
Terms-of-trade distortions figure prominently in theoretical economic models, 
Johnson (1953) being the first to identify the issue. The idea is further developed 
in Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001). Not 
until recently, however, has the empirical literature caught. up with the theoret.ical 
advances. Recent papers by Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008), Bagwell and 
Staiger (2006) and Ludema and Mayda (2010) provide strong evidence for tcrms-
of-trade manipulations in trade policy. This stands in contra"lt to the findings in 
the present chapter, which does not provide conclusive evidence for terms-of-trade 
manipulations. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 I present. the basic in-
gredients of the model. In Section 4.3, I present details of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium, before Section 4.4 describes equilibria with a trade agreement. In 
Section 4.5, I provide an intuitive discussion of a continuous-time extension of the 
model. In Section 4.6 I explain my empirical strategy for estimating the model, 
and Section 4.7 follows up with an account of the empirical variables mea.'iuring 
inter-industry capital mobility. Section 4.8 describes the data, and SectioIl 4.9 
provides the results. I conclude with some remarks in Section 4.10. 
4.2 The model 
The basic model in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) is set in two periods. 
Strictly speaking, it is not this simple two-period model which I am t('sting em-
pirically, but a full dynamic version. However, a'i the continuous time extension 
is more involved mathematically, I find it appropriate to pres(mt the two-period 
model analytically and the dynamic one intuitively. I refer the reader to t.he orig-
inal paper for an elaborate analytical exposition of the dynamic IlH)(h,1. TIl(' ba.sic 
ingredents of this model are similar to the model in the pn'vious chapt('r, hut sille<' 
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I am considering very different issues in the present chapter, I have changed Illost 
of the notation to make it more appropriate for the issues discussed here. 
In the basic two-period model, there are two large countries Home (H) and 
Foreign (F) which are able to influence world prices through trade policies. They 
each produce three goods: one freely traded numeraire good and two manufaet.ur-
ing goods (Ml and M2)' There are two types of capital, M} is produced one-for-one 
with type 1 capital and M2 is produced one-for-one with type 2 capital in each 
country. The technology to produce the numeraire good differs in the two coun-
tries: H uses type 1 capital one-for-one to produce this good and Fuses typ<' 
2 capital one-for-one. It is assumed that each country is endowed with one unit 
of each type of capital. Because of this, H (F) is not able to allocate any of its 
one-unit endowment of type 2 capital (type 1 capital) to other uses than to the 
production of M2(MJ) and its production possibilities frontier is then fixed at 1 
for this good. However, since H(F) can allocate its one-unit endowment. of type 
1 capital (type 2 capital) in both the numeraire sector and the All-sedor (AI'2-
sector) the production choice in (N, Md-space ((N, Al2)-space) will he determiw'd 
by demand conditions. This ensures that H is a natural importer of All ami F is a 
natural importer of M2 • Preferences are given as the following quasi-linear utility 
function l : 
2 
U = CN + L: U (Ci) , 
i=} 
where Ci denotes consumption of manufacturing good i. It is a.<;sumed that the 
2 
utility of each manufacturing good is U (Ci) = VCi - t which is the same across 
countries. Hence, demand of the manufacturing goods, which is derived from 
marginal utility, is d(pi) = v - Pi, and from this consumer surplus can h(' dpriwd 
I I argued in Chapter 3. that one of the advantages of a quasi-linear utility function is that 
it eliminates income effects as well as cross-price effects on demand, This is I'ssl'lItially Im·akin).?; 
up a general equilibrium model into partial equilibria and, by impli('atioll. ('()IlSUlllPr II'dfan' ('1111 
then be measured in terms of surplus derived from themallufadurillgsectors.This abo allow,. 
for an easy extension to multiple import-competing sectors as t hl'Y ('all he inciu<il'd addit i \,ply 
and separably, 
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simply as S (Pi) = U (d (pd) - Pid (pd. H imposes a specific tariff equal t.o T 
on imports of MI and F imposes a tariff equal to T* on imports of M'2 in F. 
The domestic prices of the two goods are then, respectively, PI = PI *+T awl 
P2*= P2 + T*. Hand F invest an amount k (k*) in the manufacturing sector 
MI (M2 ) and the remaining one unit endowment of type 1 capital (type 2 capita.l) 
is invested in the two countries' respective numeraire sectors. Because of the 
assumption of large countries the supply and demand conditions in one country will 
have an impact on world prices. Prices in Hand F of goods MI and M'}. are thus 
determined by international market-clearing conditions given by d (PI) + d (PI *) = 
k + 1 and d (P2) + d (P2 *) = k* + 1. Isolating prices in these condi tions provides neat 
expressions for prices in Hand F, respectively, of goods !v!1 and AI'}., respectively: 
PI (T,k) 1 v - "2 (k + 1 - T) ; (4.1 ) 
1 
= v - "2(k* + 1 + T*); 
PI * (T, k) 1 v - "2 (k + 1 + T) ; (4.2) 
1 
v - "2(k* + 1 - T*). 
~ o t i c e e that since H is a natural importer of MI the price of this good is 
increasing in the tariff it imposes, whereas the price of its exporting good, ;\I'}., 
is decreasing in the tariff which the foreign country imposes on this good. It is 
also possible to write imports as a function of the tariff and capital allocation 
by noting that imports are given by excess demand over domestic production, 
mi = d(pt} -k for Hand m2*= d*(p2*) - k* for F, which is 711 ( T, k) = ~ ~ ( 1 - ~ : : - T) 
and m*( T*, k*) = ~ ( 1 1 k*-T*), respectively. The welfare in the two cOllntries (or 
the utility of the representative agent) is given by capit.al incollH', tariff [('WllIlP 
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and consumer surplus which for Hand F, respectively, can be written as: 
W(T, k, T*, k*) [(1 - k)] + [Pl(r, k)k + rml(T, k) 
+Sl(T, k)] + [(P2(T*, k*) + S2(T*, k*)]; 
W*(T, k, T*, k*) = [(1 - k*)] + [P2*(T*, k*)k* + T*m2*(T*, k*) 
+S2*(T*,k*)] + [Pl*(T,k) + Sl*(T,k)]' 
where Si and Si* denote their respective consumer surplus from consuming manu-
facturing good i. In order to make the analysis simpler, notice from the expression 
for home welfare that the terms in the first two brackets depend only on the home 
tariff, T, and the home capital allocation, k, whereas the term in the last bracket. 
depends only on the foreign tariff, T*, and the foreign capital allocation, k*. This 
additive separability also applies to the expression for foreign welfare. Since it is 
assumed that preferences and the production structure are symmetric, this st'pa-
rability implies that it is possible to focus on the importing sector in H, that is 
sector 114" knowing that the analysis for the other sector will be its mirror imagl'. 
It is therefore possible to drop subscripts and focus on the equilibrium in the im-
porting sector M in the home country. I shall adopt this notation in the rest of 
this chapter. 
The welfare of Hand F can now be written as functions of the home tariff 
and capital allocation: 
W(T, k) = (1- k) + p(T, k)k + Tm(T, k) + S(T, k) + [.]; 
W*(T, k) = P*(T, k) + s*(r, k) + [.], 
where the terms in brackets do not depend on T and k. 
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The political side of the model follows closely that of Grossman and Helpman 
(1994). Capital owners in the import-competing sector are organised as a lobby 
and effectively buy protection in exchange of political contributions to the incum-
bent government. It is assumed that the political structure is symmetric across 
the two countries. Total contributions from the lobby to the government are de-
noted C and contributions per-unit of capital are denoted c, such that C = d:. 
The utility of the home government depends on welfare of the home country and 
contributions from the lobby. The government attaches weight of a to welfare so 
the total utility of the government becomes UG = aW(T, k)+C. The utility of the 
lobby depends negatively on contributions so UL = p( T, k)k - C. The tariffs and 
contributions which obtain will depend on whether the home country engages in 
independent trade policies or choose to set trade policy in a cooperative manner 
with the foreign government. 
Before characterising the non-cooperative equilibrium, it will be useful to con-
sider the equilibrium under free trade. In this equilibrium arbitrage ensures that. 
returns across the numeraire and the M-sector are equalised for zero tariffs. This 
implies that the returns per unit of capital in the Al -sector must be <,qual to 
one. Hence, I can solve for the allocation of capital from the following condition, 
PI (0, k l ) = 1. Using (4.1) evaluated at T = 0, this can be solved Il."l: 
kIt = 2v - 3. ( 4.3) 
For a positive allocation of capital to both the numeraire and the M-sector, kIt 
must be greater than zero and less than one. To ensure this I impose, throughout 
the rest of this chapter, the following condition on the demand parallletpr I': 
3 2 < v < 2. (,1.4 ) 
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In the next subsection I shall outline the case of non-cooperative trade policies, 
and then proceed to trade policies set in a perfectly enforceable agreement. 
4.3 The non-cooperative equilibrium 
4.3.1 The short run 
If the two countries choose not to cooperate over trade policy they end up in an 
undesirable non-cooperative equilibrium which will be discussed in detail in this 
section. The tariff which is chosen maximises the joint surplus of the government 
and the lobby taking the capital allocation as given. In the long run, however, the 
capital allocation is endogenously given by expectations of future protection. This 
gives rise to a commitment problem which comes about because the goverllInent 
and the lobby make decisions about tariffs and capital allocations simultaneously. 
If the government had a first-mover advantage the commitment prohlem would 
not arise. The situation can be seen as a simultaneous-move gamc set in t.wo 
stages. In the first stage, investors allocate their capital given the ('XIH'ctations of 
future protection, and in the second stage the government and the lobby hargain 
efficiently over an import tariff and a level of contributions. The solution can he 
found by backward induction, so I begin the analysis by solving for the tariff in 
the second stage of the game, which defines the short-run equilibrium. The ta.riff 
maximises the joint welfare of the government and the lobby: 
JSR = aW(T, k) + p(T, k)k. (4.G) 
Solving yields: 
CUi) 
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(4.6) can be split into two terms, 13k and ~ ~ . . The first is a tenns-of-trade motive 
for imposing a tariff. As it is assumed that the two countries are large, the hOllw 
country is able to pass-through some of the cost of protection by manipulating 
world prices. The larger the supply difference of the manufacturing good:!, 1 - k, 
the higher the incentive to do so as the volume of imports is larger in that casco 
The other term is weighted by the inverse of a, implying that. it. captum-; the 
political influence of the lobby. This political motive for imposing the tariff is 
larger when the sector is larger (larger k) and when the inverse of a is larger. 
The national welfare-maximising tariff is obtained when the government places 110 
weight on the welfare of the lobby. Hence: 
( 1 -3 k) T W (k) = lim T J (k) == a ..... 00 (4.7) 
4.3.2 The long run 
It is now possible to move one step back in the backward induction ana.lysis to 
find the allocation of capital and the tariff in the long-run equilibrium. Unlike the 
model in Chapter 3, it is assumed that the lobby has all the barga.ining power ill 
the model so the contributions necessary to induce the government to choose a 
particular trade policy should just compensate the government for the distortion 
caused by the policy. Since in the absence of lobbying the government would set 
the tariff at TW(k) in (4.7), the total contribution should equal the welfare loss 
which the government incurs from deviating from the national welfare-maximising 
tariff and setting the tariff at TJ(k) from (4.6) instead. Thus, the contribution 
per-unit of capital is given by: 
2Recall the foreign supply is fixed at 1. 
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C ( T, k) ( ) a [W (TW (k), k) - W ( T, k) ) ( : ~ a ) ) ,'2 
--'-:----'- = C T k = = - (T - T U (k)) k' k 8k . (4.8) 
It is not necessary to define this function where T is less than TH" because the 
lobby is not willing to pay the government for a tariff lower than what would he 
chosen in the absence of lobbying. It is now possible to determine the long-run 
equilibrium. In the long run, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) the tariff is 
set at TJ(k) from (4.6), and (ii) the return to the manufacturing sector net of 
contributions must equal the return to capital in the numeraire sector which is 1. 
Thus, 
(4.9) 
p(T, k) - C(T, k) = 1. (4.10) 
( 4.10) is an implicit function in (T, k )-space and it can conveniently be denoted a.'" 
ker (T). The long-run equilibrium is given as the intersection between r' (k) alld 
ker ( T). Let the capital allocation and tariff at this intersection be denoted (k. T). 
It will also be useful to consider the point of intersection of kpr ( T) and T I\" (k ) 
and I will denote this by (kW, TW). This is the tariff which obtains if tlw hmlll' 
government could free itself from the pressure exerted by t.he lobby (a first.-Illover 
advantage or a commitment strategy) unilaterally:l. The equilibrium is illustrated 
in Figure 4.1. In order to ensure that the long-run equilibrium exists and t.hat it 
is unique, I impose the following condition on the parameter a: 
6v -7 
a> ( . 62 - v) (4.11 ) 
:!Cnilateral trade liberalisation was analysed in Chapter 3. ill a frallH'work wla'n' d Y l l a l l l i ( , l \ l I ~ ' '
efficient trade policy had to be sustained by a reputational mechanism. 
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In Appendix 4.11.1, I prove the following proposition: 
Proposition 4.1: If a > 6 ~ ~ = ~ ) ) there exists a unique long-r1m equilibrium, when' 
each country imposes a positive but non-prohibitive tariff equal to T. 
The shape of the keT ( T )-curve is such that it is increasing in k below T aud 
decreasing in k above it: since entry into the M-sector reduces the return to 
capital, there will be a unique optimal allocation of capital at the intersection 
with the TJ(k)-curve. The free trade allocation of capital is chosen such that it 
coincides with the origin of the diagram. If the government was able to set a tariff 
only to maximise national welfare it would choose (kW, TW) but the pressure of 
the lobby forces the equilibrium to the point (k, r). The tariff-capital pair (J::, r) 
lies above (kW,TW), which lies above (kIt, 0). The difference between (J::,1') aud 
(kW, TW) can be thought of as the part of the tariff which is politically motivatpd, 
and the difference between (kW, TW) and (kIt, 0) is the part of the tariff motivaU'd 
by the government's desire to switch the terms of trade in its favour. 
4.4 Equilibria with a free trade agreement 
From the preceding analysis it is clear that when the government and the lobby 
maximise their joint surplus with respect to T the government fails to take into 
account the endogeneity of k. The result is an overinvestment problem which de-
rives from the government's lack of ability to credibly commit not to engage in 
this implicit contractual relation with the lobby. The government is fully COIll()('II-
sated for the short-run trade distortion associated with protection, but because 
of the long-run capital allocation distortion the governmcllt ha.o..; all illcclltiV<' t.o 
obtain a commitment strategy. If a free trade agreement is ahle to impos(' a 
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Figure 4.1: The non-cooperative equilibrium. 
binding contractual commitment which can free the government frolll t.1l(' polit.-
ical pressure exerted by the lobby, the government has an incent.ive to take this 
opportunit.y. I assume that a free trade agreement is indeed perfectly cllfor('eahk, 
and that the government is then able to use a free trade agreement to int.erIlalise 
the externalities of independent and non-cooperative trade policies. 
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) consider agreements that specify exact t.ar-
iffs and agreements that specify tariff ceilings. The difference between tit!' two 
cases lies in the fact that if agreements specify exact tariffs there will h(' no ('x-
post lobbying as the tariff is fixed at the level set by the agreement. If agf(\(\IIH'nt.s 
specify ceilings, on the other hand, there is a case for ex-post. cont.rihutions. Th!'y 
argue that tariff ceilings are weakly preferred to exact tariffs 8.'i ex-post. lohhying 
contributions mitigate the overinvestment problem by lowering t.he J'(\t.llfn to tit!' 
import-competing sector. In the present exposition of th(' llIodd, I shall fO(,lIs 011 
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tariff ceilings such that if T is the tariff ceiling set by the agrccment, the chosen 
tariff in the home country will have to be T ~ ~ T, and symmetrically for the foreign 
country. 
The trade agreement is analysed in a two-period framework, and in period 
the government gets an opportunity to sign a free trade agreement. It is assumed 
that the agreement is unanticipated, so the behaviour of the lobby and the gov-
ernment in the post-agreement stage is similar to the non-cooperative equilibriulIl. 
After the agreement is signed the lobby will reallocate capital in expectation of 
future protection, but the difference is that protection is now constrained by tIl<' 
agreement. The ability to reallocate capital may not be perfect, however, and 
a key parameter of the model is the degree to which capital can mow' frolll the 
manufacturing sector to the numeraire sector. In the continuous-time version of 
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) they also consider agreements that are antic-
ipated which implies that some capital reallocation can occur before the signing 
of the agreement. I abstract from this possibility in the present chapt.er. The 
fact that the agreement is unanticipated is an assumption which ensures simple 
yet informative results in the two-period model. In order to consider anticipated 
agreements it would be necessary to construct a full dynamic version of the model. 
I refer the interested reader to Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) for an <tnalysti-
cal exposition of this extension, but I will comment on how the results of that. 
model differ from the two-period model below. 
If capital can be perfectly reallocated in period 2, the lobby does not derive 
any rents from protection. However, if capital is entirely fixed, capital owners have 
an incentive to lobby for some protection in the agreement.. The tracie agn'ellwnt 
maximises the welfare of the lobbies and the two govenUllents. I aSSUIll<' that 
owners of capital in the foreign country do not influence the formation of the the 
tariff in country H and vice-versa (recall that the production of the manufacturing 
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good in the foreign country is fixed at 1 as is also the ca.'ic in H's exporting sector 
by symmetry). The trade agreement will maximise the following objeetive with 
respect to a tariff ceiling 7': 
(4.12) 
This can be viewed as a game with the following timing: 
(i) the agreement is selected, 
(ii) if feasible capital is reallocated in expectation of future proteetion (constrained 
by the agreement), and 
(iii) the government and the lobby in the home country choose a tariff in the 
import-competing sector subject to the constraints set hy the agreement (and 
symmetrically in the foreign import-competing sector). 
I will solve for the equilibrium tariff by backward induetion and, thus, i)('gin 
the analysis in the final stage of the game and work hack to tlw first stag('. Thus, 
I will first find the equilibrium tariff and contributions expressed, respectively, as 
functions of the tariff ceiling and capital allocation, 7(7', k) and c(7', k). Thm I 
can move one step back in the backward induction analysis to the second stag<, 
in order to find the optimal capital allocation as a function of the t.ariff ceiling, 
ker(7'). Finally, I end up in the first stage of the game where the ohjectiw of the 
agreement, (4.12), can be expressed as a function of the tariff ceiling, which <"an 
then he solved for. 
Stage (iii) 
Prior to the agreement the home country finds itself in the long-rllli equilihrium 
with capital given by k and tariff equal to T, and symmetrically for the fon'ign 
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country. It is assumed that after the agreement is signed in period 1, capital 
owners are able to exit the import-competing sector in period 2 with probability 
z. If z = 1 all capital is able to exit but if z = 0 all capital is stuck. Regardless 
of the value of z, capital is fixed in period 1 and as such capital mobility refers to 
long-run mobility. The more realistic case 0 < z < 1 refers to imperfect mobility 
of capital. If capital is fixed the amount of capital in period 2 is unchanged at 
k, but if capital is imperfectly mobile, the period 2 capital allocation is stuck at 
kz = (1 - z )k. The objective of the free trade agreement (4.12) can be written as: 
W(T, k) = aW(T, k) + aW*(T, k) + kp(T, k) + k - k. ( 4.13) 
The first two terms on the right-hand-side capture the welfare of the governments 
of Hand F, the third is the welfare of the lobby, and the last captures the 
rents of those capital owners in the import-competing sector that mow to th<' 
numeraire sector. Compared with (4.5), only two terms are added: foreign w('lfaw, 
aW*( T, k), takes account of the terms-of-trade externality, and k - k takes account 
of the welfare of those capital owners that are able to switch to the n l l l l l e r a i n ~ ~
sector. This last term is added because a trade agreemeut gives the gov<mlllwnt 
a first-mover advantage. The government gets an opportunity to choos(' a tariff 
(jointly with the lobby and the foreign government) which maximises joint. welfaw, 
and because the agreement is set before capital is reallocated the commitment 
problem is internalised. 
If the tariff ceiling is greater than TJ(k) in (4.6), then it is not binding and 
thus redundant. Because if the constraint of the agreemput is gwat.er t.han tlw 
tariff set non-cooperatively, this amounts to no constraint at all, and the OUt.COIlI(' 
of the post-agreement lobbying will be to choose the tariff T./ (k), as in t.11I' non-
cooperative equilibrium. However, if T < T J (k) the bargaining t.hat. t.akes plaC!' 
between the governments and the lobby will be subject to a bill<iing constraint. 
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Thus, the chosen tariff will be T(T, k) = min{T, TJ(k)). I restrict the analysis to 
the case where T ~ ~ 7J (k). If the tariff ceiling is less than 7W'(k) there will be 
no contributions, as capital owners will not pay the government for imposing a 
tariff lower than what would be chosen in the absence of lobbying. However, if 
T 2: TW(k) contributions will be similar to (4.8), the only differcnce being that 
tariffs are constrained by the ceiling set by the agreement: 
(3a) 2 C(T, k) = 8k (T - TW{k)) . 
Stage (ii) 
It is now possible to move one step back to the second stage of the game to 
solve for the optimal capital allocation in period 2. If capital is not fixed, a.nd a 
sufficient amount of capital is mobile, the allocation is determined by the cqual-
returns condition (4.14), which is now given as: 
p{T, k) - C{T, k) = 1. {4.14} 
Let ker (T) denote the solution to this implicit function. Notke that k"" (T) is a 
curve with slope equal to 1 for T < T W (k) as no political contributions are paid 
in that case (in this region it is defined by p(T, k) = 1). If a sufficient amount. of 
capital is stuck, however, the solution to the problem may not lie on k"r(T), as 
will be clear below. 
Stage (i) 
I continue the backward induction analysis and go one step back to the first 
stage of the game. To do so, I rewrite (4.13) more cOllveniently by adding and 
subtracting total contributions ck = C, noting that net contributions to capital 
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equal 1: 
(4.15 ) 
Ifr ~ ~ T W (k) contributions are positive and since the lobby pays contributiolls that 
just compensate the government for the distortion a.'lsociated with protection, I 
can substitute 
into (4.15). If r < T W (k) contributions will be zero and the objective of til<' t r a ( h ~ ~
agreement will just be the one given in {4.15} with total contributions set ('qual 
to zero. Summarising: 
{ 
aW(TW (ker{r), ker(r)} + aW*(T, ker(r)) + k for r ~ ~ Til" } 
w(r,ker(T)) = 
aW(T, ker(r)) + aW*(T, keT(r)) + k for r < TIl' 
(4.Hi) 
In Appendix 4.11.2, I show that (4.16) is decrea.'ling in T, which will bf' iIll-
port ant for the analysis below. It is possible to decompose the optimal agn'PIlH'nt 
into its terms-of-trade and political components. If, say the home goveflllllcIlt, for 
some reason was able to obtain a first-mover advantage and was able to cOIllmit 
vis-a.-vis the home lobby it would not need a trade agreemcIlt to solve tIl(' political 
distortions in the domestic arena. In this case the only Illotive for signing a trade 
agreement would be to rid the distortions due to the two coulltries' opt.imally 
exploiting their monopoly power over terml;; of trade. The uuilateral tariff t.hat 
would be chosen in this ca.'le would maximise the following: 
JDC(r, k) = aW(T, k) + kp(T, k) + k - k. (4.17) 
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The only difference between (4.13) and (4.17) is that the home government does 
not negotiate with the foreign government and terms-of-trade externalities are 
neglected. Following the same three-stage procedure that took me from (4.12) to 
(4.16), I can rewrite (4.17) as: 
{ 
aW(TW(ker(T),ker(T)) + k for l' ~ ~ TW } 
\11(1', ker(T)) = 
aW(T, ker(T)) + k for l' < T W 
(4.18) 
The next thing to do is to determine how these optimal agreements depend on the 
degree of mobility of capital. I begin by analysing the two polar cases of perfectly 
mobile capital (z = 1) and fixed capital (z = 0), and finish up with the more 
realistic case of imperfectly mobile capital. 
4.4.1 Perfectly mobile capital 
When capital is perfectly mobile any excess rents obtained from protection will 
be eroded by the optimal reallocation of capital. Because of this capital owners 
are not willing to pay the government for any protection in period 2. With t.his 
in mind, I can proceed by maximising (4.16) taking into account that k is dd.('f-
mined by the equal-returns condition. The tariff ceiling set by the agrecment then 
becomes: 
-A 0 T = , 
that is, free trade regardless of the value of a. It is possible to decolllpose this 
tariff cut into its terms-of-trade and political components. If tlw hOIll(' cOllnt.ry 
was somehow able to commit vis-a.-vis the lobby it would d l O O S ( ~ ~ the tariff TI\" 
which maximises national welfare without negotiating with th(' fordgu go\'('rn-
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ment. Hence, it would maximise (4.18), and the tariff becomes: 
W V 
T = 1- 2. 
The case of perfect mobility of capital is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Tlw eqllal-
returns curve, k er ("7), coincides with ker (T) in Figure 4.1 anywhere above tlw 
T W (k)-curve, and below it, it is a straight line with slope equal to one. The trade 
agreement involves a zero tariff and capital is given by its free trade allocation, 
kIt. The political part of the agreement is simply the difference between the tariff-
capital pair (7', k) in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and the tariff-capital pair 
which maximises national welfare (TW, kW). However, if the maximisation problem 
also involves foreign welfare, the equilibrium is given as capital-tariff pair (kIt, 0). 
This pair rids all externalities of protection, both domestically and internationally. 
T 
k 
k 
Figure 4.2: The trade agreement when capital is perfectly lIlohiit'. 
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4.4.2 Fixed capital 
The case of fixed capital is particularly simple as no capital can exit the import-
competing sector, and the amount of capital is then given 11.<; thc level set in the 
non-cooperative equilibrium k. Thus, it suffices to maximise (4.13) taking k a.'i 
given. This yields: 
k 
rlll(k) = arg miJX'l1(r,k) =-. 
T a 
{4.19} 
In the case of fixed capital I can also decompose the tariff cut into its terms-of-
trade and political components. If it is assumed that the home country gets a 
commitment strategy that enables it to internalise the political externality, then 
it will be able to set a tariff that maximises national welfare. In this C11.<;c it just 
maximises (4.17). Since k is fixed at k the remaining terms are the same as in 
(4.5). The tariff will then be T = rJ(k), just as if there was no agreemcnt at all. 
Thus, if capital is fixed, a domestic commitment mechanism will not achieve any 
tariff reductions, and the only motive for entering a tradc agrcement is to rid til(' 
distortions due to the two countries' exploiting their monopoly power ovef t(,flllS 
of trade in the non-cooperative equilibrium. 
4.4.3 Imperfectly mobile capital 
The case of imperfectly mobile capital connects the dots betwecn the extreme ca.'iC 
of perfectly mobile capital and that of fixed capital. The proportioJl of capital 
which is able to exit is z E [0; 1]. As in the case of perfect capital mobility I 
maximise the objective of the agreement in (4.16) with respect to r, noting that 
only a proportion of k z = (1- z)k is able to leave the importing sector. If enough 
capital is able to exit the import-competing sector to equalise returns bdwe('11 
that sector and the numeraire sector, the capital allocation will be k,·r(r) dpfived 
from (4.14), but if this is not the case the capital allocation will he fix('d at k:. 
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Thus, I can define the equilibrium capital allocation as k"rCT) =: max{k,·r(1'), kJ. 
It is now possible to connect the two extreme cases of perfect capit.al mobilit.y 
and fixed capital. Let 1'er(k) denote the inverse of ker(1'). The fact that (4.16) 
is decreasing in 1', which is proved in Appendix 4.11.2, is important for the tariff 
which obtains since this implies that the tariff will be the smaller of 1','r ( ~ : ) ) and 
TW(k) where the latter is defined by (4.19). Therefore, I can sUIIlmarise the t.ariff 
for the case of imperfect capital mobility as: 
Thus, if z is small and not enough capital can exit the import-competing sector 
to equalise returns, the tariff will be given by: 
( 4.20) 
(4.20) is clearly decreasing in z. However, if a sufficient amount of capit.al can ('xit. 
to equalise returns the tariff-capital pair will lie somewhere on the eq\lal-ret\lrIls 
curve, 1'er (k). Using the expression for the price of the importing good ill country 
H (4.1) and the contribution function (4.8) in (4.14) this is given by: 
{
V - ! (1 + k - 1') - (3a) (1' - TW(k))2 - 1 for l' > TI\'; } 
-rr{k) = 2 8k 
v - ~ ~ (1 + k - 1') - 1 for l' 5 Tn'. 
(4.21 ) 
Setting k = kz = (1 - z)k it can be verified that rr(k) is also decreasing ill .:. 
In Figure 4.3, I depict the tariff-capital line TW(k) given by (4.20) (\.'i well as 
the Ter(k)-curve in (4.21). As z increa.,>es from 0 (fixed) t.o 1 (perf('ct.ly JlIobil('), 
t.he tariff-capital pair travels from point A on the T'" (k )-eurve to t.11(' point of 
int.ersection between the TW(k)-curve and the Ter(k)-curve lalwlled point /3, and 
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then down the T eT (k )-curve until the free trade point is reached. COllsider the 
capital allocation k ~ . . In this case the tariff lies on the T'" (k )-curve a.'i the allocation 
k ~ ~ is not sufficient to equalise returns across the two sectors. This is not tllP ca.'i!' 
for the point k ~ ~ which lies on the equal-returns curve. Hence, the model makes 
the following prediction: 
Proposition 4.2: trade liberalisation is deeper when capital is rrwrc mobile as 
summarised by the parameter z. 
In the case of imperfectly mobile capital it is also possible to decompose the 
effects of the terms-of-trade and the political components of trade liberalisation. 
Recall that when capital is perfectly mobile the optimal tariff-capital pair wiwll 
the home government is able to commit unilaterally is (T W , k W ), but if capit.al is 
fixed it is the same as the non-cooperative pair (r, k). When capital is imp('rf('ctiy 
mobile the unilateral tariff with domestic commitment just travels from (r. k) to 
(TW, kW) along the equal-returns curve with the parameter :;i. Thus, along til!' 
segment of the Tilt (k )-curve which lies below the T eT (k )-curve, tllP diff('f('!)('(' h(,-
tween these curves is the terms-of-trade component of trade liberalisat.ioll, wh('r('cl.'i 
the political component takes the tariff from r to the appropriate point 011 thp 
T eT (k )-curve. On this last point it is important to bear in mind that for small :; 
(i.e. when TIlt(k) lies below TeT(k)) the terms-of-trade component of thp t n u l < ~ ~
agreement is also decreasing in z as the gap between T'" (k) alld T"T (k) b('COIllPS 
smaller as z increases from O. So when z is small the degree of capital llIobility 
may also have an effect on the terms-of-trade component. 
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T 
k " ~ ~ k' ~ ~ k 
,'i' (k) 
k 
Figure 4.3: The trade agreement when capital is imperfectly mobile. 
4.5 Extension to dynamic setting 
The basic two-period model in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) is a n'dllc('<i-
form of a full dynamic model. The full dynamic model is essentially th(' Illo(h'l 
which I am testing in the empirical part of this chapter. For full ddails of this 
extension I refer to the original paper, but I shall here describe it without tilt' IlS(, of 
math. The major difference between the two versions is that the dynamic versioll 
makes a prediction regarding the speed rather than extent of trade liheralisation. 
Consider Figure 4.3. If at some point in time, the home government siglls a trade 
agreement with the foreign government there will be an instantaneolls drop ill 
the tariff from the non-cooperative level T to point A which lies 011 til<' T " ' ( ~ ' ) )
curve. This instantaneous drop is due to the terms-of-trade compOIH'nt of tnul(' 
liberalisation. After this there will be two phases of gradual tra<ip iii>('ralisat iOIl. 
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In the first phase the tariff travels along from point A on the T"'(k)-curve until it 
reaches point B. Then the tariff will travel along the equal-returns curve until tlH' 
free trade allocation is reached. The free trade allocation is reached because ill tht' 
very long run, capital is perfectly mobile. However, it may take a long time until 
enough capital can exit to reach the free trade allocation. This dynamic lIlodd 
thus makes a clear prediction: 
The speed of trade liberalisation increases with the degree of capital mobility as 
summarised by the parameter z. 
It is exactly this prediction ofthe model which I am going to take to the data. If 
capital is very mobile trade liberalisation will be fast whereas if capital is relatively 
immobile trade liberalisation will be slower. The fact that the free tnuiP allocation 
is eventually reached assumes that capital can be perfectly reallocated in very long 
run. This may be appropriate for a free trade area such as the EuroP('aJl Union 
or the NAFTA. 
One advantage of the full dynamic model is that anticipated agn'enHmts can 1)(' 
considered. From a real-world perspective it would be expected that agn'('lw'llts 
are anticipated so this may be considered the more realistic case. ~ l a A A i i awl 
Rodriguez-Clare (2007) show that the results carryover to a fraulPwork in which 
the private sector can anticipate agreements - the only difference being that some 
capital reallocation will necessarily occur prior to the agreement s i n C l ~ ~ til<' r('f,urtl 
to the protected sectors will be lower. In Section 4.8 I briefly COnlllH'llt on my 
results when allowing mobility effects to take place prior to til<' Y('ar of signing tIl<' 
agreement. 
The prediction which I am going to test is whether the speed of t.ra<l(' lil)('rali-
sation depends on the degree of inter-industry capital mohility. In til<' rpal world, 
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tariffs are not observed in continuous time but at yearly intervals so one could 
argue that I am testing a discrete multi-period version of the model. 
4.6 Empirical strategy 
In this section, I will outline my empirical strategy for estimating the model. I will 
aim to keep the empirical estimations as closely tied with the theory as possible. 
The model makes a clear prediction regarding the speed of trade liberalisation 
when countries enter trade agreements. Industries with highly mobile factors of 
production are expected to experience faster trade liberalisation than indw;tries 
that rely on more fixed investments. The distortions in the non-cooperative equi-
librium are two-fold: (i) the governments' lack of commitment vis-a.-vis domestic 
lobbies and (ii) the prisoner's dilemma scenario brought about by lack of int.er-
national cooperation. Hence, trade liberalisation reflects the governments solving 
these problems by signing a trade agreement. Since it may take time for investors 
to adjust that capital investment between sectors, trade liberalisation thus has two 
components: (i) one determined by the degree of mobility across sectors of capital, 
and (ii) one which reflects the international terms-of-trade distortion prior to sign-
ing an agreement. More specifically, the model predicts an instantaneous drop in 
tariffs which reflects the tariff cut that internalises the terms-of-t.rade dh.,t.ort.ion, 
and a gradual phase of trade liberalisation, the speed of which is d e t . e r l l l i n ( ~ d d by 
inter-industry capital mobility. Let Ti be the tariff imposed in the noncooperat.iV(' 
equilibrium for industry i and Tt the post-agreement tariff, such that an elllPirical 
estimating relation could take the following form: 
(4.22) 
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where Zi is some measure of inter-industry capital mobility of industry i, ToTi is 
some variable which captures the terms-of-trade component of the trade liberal-
isation, and the (3s are estimating coefficients. The full dynamic specification of 
the model suggests a time path for the tariff rates, and it will therefore be appro-
priate to specify a dynamic version of the estimating equation (4.22): all equation 
which considers how yearly tariff cuts depend on inter-industry capital mobility 
and terms-of-trade manipulations. The yearly tariff cuts can be interpreted as 
the slope of a time path from the pre-agreement nOll-cooperatively set tariff to 
the final tariff which, in this model, is free trade. Thus, I introduce (yearly) tin\(' 
subscripts, t, and express the following estimating equation: 
(4.23) 
It is a challenging task to obtain reliable measures of both capital mobility 
and terms-of-trade distortions, but the present model, however, offers SOJll(' chws. 
According to (4.6), the degree of terms-of-trade distortions in the n o n - c o o p ( ~ r a t i v e e
equilibrium is equal to the difference between foreign and domestic supply of th(' 
import-competing good. This variable, in turn, is related to the size of imports: 
hence, the larger the imports, the greater the incentive to distort terms of tradp. 
The variable which I am going to employ to capture the terms-of-trade compOlH'nt. 
is, thus, the value of net-imports (Net _ impit). I fecI this is justified since this 
variable is also used in Bagwell and Staiger (2006) to measure the samc thing. I 
do realise, however, that the use of this variable is most probably not the optiJllal 
measure of the true terms-of-trade distortion. The best Variable is, in my vi('w, 
export supply elasticities of a trading partner, as this would provid(' the corrl'ct. 
measure of the extent to which trade policy can influence foreign pric('s. TI\(' 
reason for the neglect of the use of this superior measure is pUf<'ly dill' to <Iat a 
limitations for the countries in the sample (sec below). 
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Recall that the model predicts an immediate tariff reduction due to solving 
the terms-of-trade distortion. In a discrete multi-period version of the model for 
estimation, I thus assume that this reduction due to the terms-of-trade compolwnt, 
if it exists, takes place in the year of signing the agreement. Let the agreement h<' 
signed in year s, and let Ds be a dummy variable which takes the v"d,luc 1 in year 
s and zero otherwise. I can thus re-write the estimating equation in the following 
way: 
(30 + (31zi + (32(Net_impit * D .• ) 
+(33(Net_impit * (1 - Ds)) + Dt , 
(4.24) 
where D t is a time dummy for year t. If the theory is correct, trade liberalisation 
should be faster when industries are more mobile, (31 > 0, the cut in the year of 
the signing the agreement should be explained by net imports in that year /'2 > 0, 
and net imports should have no explanatory power in subsequent years, 3:1 = o. I 
also allow for the possibility that the component of the trade liheralisation which is 
due to terms-of-trade distortions is gradual, and I will thus estimate th<' fol\owin!!;, 
C1.25) 
in addition to (4.24). 
I shall restrict attention to a particular trade agreement, namely :,\AFTA 
signed by the US, Canada and Mexico. It could also be extended to a WTO fran\('-
work by considering MFN tariff cuts, but since the dynamic mod!'l in l\htMi and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2007) predicts a time path for tariffs from the non-cooperati\'('ly 
set tariffs to free trade a case study of one agreement, such as tI\(' ~ ~AFT A, would 
be more interesting. WTO tariff cuts are perhaps determined in a mOf(' p r o l ( ) n ~ ! p d d
negotiation framework which is not what the model has in mind. I furtiH'1' r<'st.rkt 
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attention to the manufacturing sector as more data is aVdilable for this industry. 
What I also find particularly appealing about the NAFTA 8.'i a c8.'ie-study is that 
each country in this free trade area is the other's most important. trading partlH'r, 
which implies that trade flows are larger. For this re8.'ion, the countries Illay not 
be price-takers and terms-of-trade considerations may be important, although this 
is far from guaranteed. 
Recall that the model is able to explain gradual reductions after countries have 
signed a trade agreement, where trade policies prior to thc agrecment were entin'ly 
non-cooperative. One concern is, thus, that the high degree of cooperation over 
trade policy between the US and Canada prior to NAFTA would render tariff 
cuts between these countries after 1994 inappropriate to explain the theory. US-
Canadian trade cooperation traces its roots all the way back to the Automotiw 
Products Agreement between the two countries which was signed in 196G. Thp 
US-Canadian free trade agreement was signed in 1987, and in a.ddition the two 
countries have also experienced substantial MFN tariff cuts under the allspic<'s of 
the GATT jWT04 • I shall therefore restrict attention to the US and l \ 1 < ~ x i c o , , a.'i 
these countries experienced little trade policy cooperation prior to th!' signing of 
NAFTA in 1994. I have chosen to focus on the US 8..., the home country <I.'" this is 
the country with the most complete data for the variables which I intend to Wi('. 
Thus, the tariff cuts which I will be looking at are those imposed by the US on 
products imported from Mexico. The next section will discuss iSSl1('S related to 
measuring inter-industry capital mobility. 
lIn an earlier version of this chapter I had included results of CS tariff ('uts on Canadian 
imports. with results that were not consistent with the theory. These results an' avail"l!' IIpOIl 
request. I do not take this as evidence to refute the theory for at least two n'asolls: (i) I was 
not able to obtain tariff data as far back as 1987, when the trade agret'lllt'nt WHS sigrll'd l)('tw(,(,11 
the two countries. since product codes of tariffs were not consistent with data on int('r-indllstry 
capital mobility. and (ii) CS-Canadian trade policy cooperation Illaterialist'd ()\'('f IIIl1ny d('('adp". 
and as such there were no clear pre- and post agreement phast's. 
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4.7 Measures of inter-industry capital mobility 
The most challenging part of this research is to find an empirical measure for inter-
industry capital mobility. One issue is the level of aggregation. I would exped 
that the degree of capital mobility increases with the degree of disaggregation. 
The closer the products are related to one another the easier it is for a firm to 
switch production between them. The measures of capital mobility which I am 
going to employ come at the 4-digit SIC level in the US manufacturing industries. 
There are many candidates for measuring capital mobility and the challenge 
is to find the one which comes closest to what the theoretical model has in mind. 
In the model, trade liberalisation should depend on the ca.'ie with which firms 
can exit in response to increased competitive pressures from trading partners ill 
an agreement. A potential candidate is thus one which reflects the explicit costs 
of adjustment such as capital-labour ratios. One could assume, as ill Grossman 
and Helpman (1994,1995) that capital represents the fixed factor alld labour til<' 
mobile factor. If an industry employs a large amount of capital p<'r work<'f it 
would then be assumed that the capital this industry employs is mort' imlIlohilt'. 
However, there is a great degree of heterogeneity of capital and labour and 01\(' 
cannot be sure that capital is, in fact, less mobile than labour. With all adv<lll('('d 
production technology there is more reliance on skilled workers, which are thought 
to be more sector specific, used in the production process. Moreover, a large part 
of capital can be either rented or sold on, and where this is tlw case ca.pital could 
be thought of as less sector specific. Marcus (1967) regresses firm exit rates Oil 
the capital-output ratio, and although it has the expected sign it is sta.tistically 
insignificant in most of his econometric specifications. One reason for this could 
be that the capital-labour ratio measures only explidt costs of <'xit and !H'g!<'ds 
the opportunity cost, which I will say more about below. 
The four-firm concentration ratio measures the market share of th .. four largt'st. 
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firms in the industry. It is expected that if this ratio is larger, there are greater 
benefits from economies of scale, and one could reasonably conjecture that this 
has to do with a larger amount of sunk costs in production. Hence, an illcreas(' 
in the four-firm concentration ratio corresponds to less inter-industry mobility. 
However, this is far from guaranteed since even if large firms in an industry use 
a large amount of sunk cost, it does not follow that these sunk costs necessarily 
represent investments in capital which is relatively immobile. 
A very good potential variable for measuring inter-industry capital mobility 
would be one which is able to infer the degree of mobility from observed economic 
behaviour. Economic agents in the economy respond to incentives in their ellvi-
ronment and maximise profit. The profit an agent earns is the difference betweell 
the revenue of a particular asset minus total opportunity costs. It is the theory 
that these economic profits converge to zero in the long run, but the speed of 
convergence may differ substantially across sectors. It would be i n a p p r o p r i a t ( ~ ~ to 
exclusively consider the movements of factors of production (labour alld capital) 
across sectors because the mere fact that some sectors will see a higher labour 
turnover or switches of capital uses does not properly reflect the incentiws that 
agents face, in particular the opportunity costs of alternative uses of capital or 
labour. For example, a worker may move from one sector to another evml if il, is 
very costly, simply because this worker's marginal contribution is much gn'ater in 
a different sector. Moreover, if capital markets are close to perfect then even if til<' 
sunk costs are high, agents will still be able to borrow for investment purposes. 
In response to trade liberalisation I would expect that the return to capit.al d<,-
creases in the import-competing sectors. This means that the opportunity cost. of 
this capital rises which facilitates exit. Therefore, capital owners will not exit til<' 
import-competing sectors only because they have made large sunk inV<'stllH'nts, 
they will also do so when the opportunity cost of remaining ill th(' sector h(,("()IIH's 
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too high. Thus, a variable which I am particularly interested in is the degree of 
persistence of profits and the speed of adjustments to the long-run competitive 
level of profits. 
Hiscox (2002a) uses profit differentials as his preferred measure of inter-industry 
capital mobility. Profit differentials not only reflect the accounting costs of moving 
(such as capital-labour ratios) but also the opportunity cost. It is the opportunity 
cost which matters when economic agents make decisions. My preferred V'ariable 
exploits this fact by constructing a variable which determines the speed of adjust-
ment to long-run profits as modelled in Mueller (1990), and I shall review this in 
the next subsection. Mueller (1990) suggests that this variable may be related to 
other industry characteristics such as the number of firms in an industry and the 
degree of industry concentration. He notes, however, that the degree of externa.l 
competition (Le. the threat of entry from outside firms) may be equally import.ant 
to the determination of profit persistence. 
In this research I will use persistence of profits as a measure of int.er-industry 
capital mobility along with capital-labour ratios and four-firm concentration ratios. 
In the next section I will show how to derive a measure of persist.ence of profit.s 
using Mueller's (1990) approach. 
4.7.1 Measuring the persistence of profits 
If capital markets are perfect and an industry will eventually be profitahl(' th('n a 
high fixed costs of production should not necessarily imply that an industry <'IlI-
ploys less mobile capital as it only reflects the accounting cost of switching ratlH'r 
than the opportunity cost which is what determines economic decision making. 
Profits are usually defined as either economic or accounting profits. Account.ing 
profits are simply the difference between total revenue and t.ot.al explicit cost.s, 
whereas economic profits refer to the difference between total r('v('nll<' awl t.otal 
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implicit and explicit costs, where implicit costs are the yield a particular economic 
activity would earn in its best alternative use. It is the theory that these economic 
profits converge to zero in the long run in a competitive environment, and if this 
occurs slowly for a particular industry, then it may be concluded that this industry 
uses less mobile factors of production which delays the convergence of profits. If 
factors of production are industry-specific they are difficult to convert into alterna-
tive uses, which in turn will lower the opportunity cost. It may be possible to infer 
capital mobility from observed economic behaviour. By observing the convergence 
of profits over a period of time I am able to obtain a measure of the degree of 
mobility of various industries. The approach does not come without problems, 
however, as supernormal profits may persist even in the loug run for reasons other 
than the degree of mobility. This will be the case if the riskiness across various 
industries differs: if economic agents are risk averse, they will dema.nd a. pn'mium 
for investing in sectors that carry a higher risk. This could translate into a lowl'r 
price-to-earnings ratio on share markets. Another problem is r e J a t ( ~ d d to dw in-
vestment motives of economic investors. If some ecollomic agents invest for ot.iwr 
than profit-maximising motives and if this proportioll of non-profit lIlaXilllisl'rs 
differs substantially across industries the model will he biased. In this thesis I 
shall abstract from such issues, however. 
The model which I use is the one employed in Mueller (1990) and I will present 
it here. Profits can be thought of as having a permanent component (iT,,,) for 
industry i, which reflects the rents of those factors which stay constant owr time, 
and a transitory component Xit which reflects short-run conditions: 
(4 .2()) 
The permanent component can be split into a competitive rPi,urn ((.), and a I)('r-
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manent industry-specific rent (ri): 
( 4.27) 
The competitive rent is the same across industries and Mueller (1990) argups that 
one can think of it as the yield on save assets such as government bonds w l l P [ ( ~ a s s
the industry specific return reflects the level of supernormal profits earned by a 
particular industry, and this is determined by the ea.'ie with which firms ca.n cntPr 
or exit the industry in the very long run. However, in this model it is a.'isumed that 
this long-run industry-specific profit takes so long to converge that for the purposes 
of estimation it can be thought of as a permanent industry-specific return. The 
importance here is that I am able to capture the speed by which industries are 
able to bid down short-term transitory rents. It should be noted that this may also 
imply that the measure I obtain also takes account of the speed of within-industry 
adjustment as well as between-industry adjustment. 
It is possible that the time span t to erode short-term reuts is so fa.'il that t1)('y 
would be eliminated within a year. Since time is measured in years this would 
imply that corr(xit, Xit-d = o. If it takes more time than a year to erode short-
term rents then it is more reasonable to assume corr(xit,:Eif_l) =1= o. In this cII.';e 
it can be assumed that Xit follows a first-order autoregressive process given hy: 
( 4.28) 
It is assumed that the fit are independently and identically distributed random 
variables with zero mean and constant variance. For stationarity of the short-
term rents it is required I>'il < 1. In order to get an estimating equation, I l a . ~ ~ tilt' 
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expression in (4.26) one period and plug in (4.27) and (4.28). This yields: 
which can be written in autoregressive form as: 
7rit = 0i + Ai7rit-l + fit, i = 1,2, ... , N, t = 1,2, ... , T (4.29) 
where 0'; = (1 - Ai)(C + ri) := (1 - Ai)7rip' Mueller (1990) estimates this auto-
regressive model for the period 1967-82 for all US manufacturing industries. The 
speed of adjustment to long run profits is simply given as 1 - Ai, and this is the 
measure which I intend to use as a measure of capital mobility. If 1 - Ai is high thc 
speed of adjustment to long run profits is fast and from this I would infer that this 
sector employs relatively mobile capital. If it is low, however, it can he deduced 
that the industry employs less mobile capital. One particular attractiv(' f('atme 
about this variable is that it lies between zero and one for industries whos(' profit.s 
are not exploding. This allows for a very convenient interpretation of tIl<' results: 
If 1- Ai is 0, the industry's profits are perfectly persistent or, in other words, it call 
be inferred that the industry employs fixed capital. This would correspond to thl' 
case of fixed capital in the theoretical model. If, on the other hand, 1 - Ai is 1 all 
transitory rents are eroded after one period (in this case one year) awl this would 
correspond to the other benchmark of perfectly mobile capital. When I us(' th(' 
1 - AiS from (4.29) for estimation, I can conveniently interpret the co('fficil'lIt <1.-; 
the difference between a perfectly mobile industry and an industry which ('lIlp!oys 
fixed capital. Some industries have values of 1 - Ai which are h ~ s s s thall z('ro 
implying exploding profits. I do not exclude them on those grounds sill("(' all 
industry with exploding profits over the period under consideration, would haw 
an even lower opportunity cost, and it would then be expected that til(' ill("('lIt iw 
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to delay protection would be even higher for such an industry. 
The true interpretation of 1- Ai is the speed of erosion of short-term transitory 
rents and as such it does not measure the speed of adjustment of industry-specific 
rents to a common competitive rate. For that reason it is not certain whether it is 
within-industry mobility or between industry mobility that is being captured by 
this measure. This may at first seem as though it does not properly capture the 
idea of inter-industry capital mobility as modelled by Maggi and Rodriguez-Clan' 
(2007). I do not find that this is a shortcoming of the measure for two rea.<.;ons. 
First, in the theoretical model the idea is that capital owners in the import-
competing sectors exit and invest in the numeraire sector in response to trade 
liberalisation, and the numeraire sector can be given a broad interpretation of an 
opportunity cost of remaining in the import-competing sector. Since in the real 
world, the opportunity cost of each industry differs and because the opportunity 
cost may lie within the industry because of the aggregation, this part of the model 
can be considered too simple5 • My empirical V"driable for inter-industry capital 
mobility thus goes beyond the basic model but I believe this is more realistic for 
the purposes of empirical examination. Second, what I am trying t.o infer from 
the persistence of profits is capital mobility, but one could rea.,>onably argue that 
the persistence of profits over the short term may actually be what Maggi and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2007) attempt to infer from capital mobilityti. 
The fact that some industries may be able to achieve rents over a short tillH' 
period for whichever reason may provide them with an incentive to lohby for 
some protection in a trade agreement as more rents can be achieved from such 
protection. So while the persistence of profits may not always originate in th(' 
degree of inter-industry capital mobility, it provides the same incentives to lobby 
"1 would imagine that extending the model to a setting with mobility hetw(,1'1l III II It ipl(' 
industries is involved. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) use this simplp strlleturp b(,(,I1I1"p il 
captures the main idea. 
(il thank Professor Rod Falvey of Bond Cniversity in Australia for poilltillg this 0111. 
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for protection as if the persistence of profits did indeed originate in capital mobility. 
It could reflect the reluctance of some capital owners to move capital to different 
activities even if they were capable of doing so simply because the opportunity 
cost of lobbying for protection is very low. 
4.8 Data and estimation 
I measure tariff cuts as the ad valorem or ad valorem equivalent of specific tar-
iffs aggregated to the 4-digit SIC level, and these are taken from the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for the period 1989 to 2001. The tariffs 
are weighted by their trade share at the HS8 level so one can see the variable a.'i 
an index of trade resistance. I multiply the tariffs by 100 to allow for an ea.<;ier 
interpretation. I do not use any non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping duties 
because I am concerned that there is too much non-cooperation in these duties. 
I exclude industries for which there are missing values for some of the tariffs at 
the Harmonised System (HS) 8 level. The data for net imports is also taken from 
the ~ B E R R for the period 1989 to 2001, and it is measured in billions of US$. To 
re-capitulate, I use the following three measures of inter-industry capital mobility 
for industry i: 
Persistence of profits (PoPi ), 
Capital-labour ratios (C / L i ), 
Four-firm concentration ratio (C4 i ), 
Profits are measured as the total value added minus payroll divided by the 
value of industry sales at the four-digit SIC level. One could argue that I should 
divide by total depreciable assets instead of sales, but since these are only available 
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in five year intervals, sales are used as a substitute. I have gathered data from 
the 1992 US Census of Manufacturers and the Annual Surveys of Manufacturers 
(1993-1996) to estimate (4.29), and then collect the 1- Ai-values for each industry 
to use them in (4.24) and (4.25). Many industries were reclassified in the 1987 
Census of Manufacturers so it is very difficult to construct longer time series for 
a large number of industries. One solution to this is to aggregate those industries 
that were reclassified or to find more disaggregated data to construct the relevant 
profit measures at the 4-digit SIC level. However, this may cause measurement 
problems so instead, I have chosen a particular time period for the estimation of 
the AjS across industries, namely the period for which there are no missing values. 
This period is from 1987 to 1996. The short coming of using this period is that 
since the A;S may reasonably change over time, it would be more appropriate for 
the estimation to use estimates of the AjS where the chosen time period is the 
ten-year period prior to the year of the tariff cuts. In that way I could m a k ( ~ ~
the mobility measure vary over time and use panel data techniques such as fixed 
effects. However, in this thesis I will stick with a mobility V'ariable which d ( ) ( ~ ~ not 
vary over time. 
The data for the last two variables are taken from the 1992 Census of manu-
facturers. Capital-labour ratios are measured as the value (in millions of $US) of 
depreciable assets divided by the number of production workers. I do not divide 
by the total number of employees as I am concerned that skilled labour does not 
reflect a variable cost of production, unlike production workers. The four-firm 
concentration ratio is the percentage share of total revenue by the largest four 
firms in an industry, and the last variable is. I divide the four-firm concentration 
ratio by 100 such that the interpretation of the coefficient in the regression is tlw 
increase/decrea.'ie in the tariffs when the four-firm concentration ratio incre:·l.',es 
from zero to 100 per cent. All measures of inter-industry capital mobility an' 
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time-invariant, due to data constraints7 • 
I restrict attention to US import-competing sectors as the theory is developed 
to explain tariff cuts in import-competing sectors. I define an import-competing 
industry to be one which was an importer on net in the three years prior to 
signing NAFTA (1991-1993). Hence, it is possible that some industries become 
net exporters at some point in my sample, but since I would like to monitor 
the same industries throughout, I do not exclude them in later years. I would 
obviously exclude industries once they reach free trade which for some industries 
happen fa.'iter than others. In Table 4.1-4.3, I provide descriptive statistics for all 
my variables. From Table 4.1, it can be seen that the weighted average tariff which 
the US imposed on Mexican products have been declining throughout the whole 
period (1989-2001), but that the decline is faster after the signing of NAFTA in 
1994. I also provide descriptive statistics for net imports throughout the sample 
period in Table 4.2, and it can be noted that these do not change much over the 
period. The variables for inter-industry capital mobility are summarised in Table 
4.3. 
Table 4.1: \Veighted US tariffs on Mexican products - summary statiHticH 
Year ObservatioruMean (%) Std. dey. Min Max 
1989 130 3.90 6.10 0.00 25.00 
1990 130 3.52 6.05 0.00 25.28 
1991 130 3.50 6.47 0.00 26.73 
1992 130 3.18 6.12 0.00 25.38 
1993 130 2.26 4.75 0.00 20.02 
1994 130 1.32 3.64 0.00 14.39 
1995 130 1.12 2.94 0.00 15.28 
1996 130 0.83 2.10 0.00 13.95 
1997 130 0.46 1.46 0.00 12.64 
1998 130 0.17 1.03 0.00 10.13 
1999 130 0.21 1.07 0.00 10.13 
2000 130 0.12 0.83 0.00 8.83 
2001 130 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7Capital-labour ratios and four firm concentration ratios are only provided in five-ypar iuter-
vals. 
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Table 4.2: N"et imports (billions of US$) from Mexico - summary statistics 
Year ObservatioruMean {%} Std. dev. Min Max 
1989 130 0.899 2.735 0.000 23.655 
1990 130 0.924 2.738 0.000 23.655 
1991 130 0.881 2.705 0.000 23.655 
1992 130 0.894 2.724 0.000 23.655 
1993 130 0.895 2.713 0.000 23.655 
1994 130 0.888 2.704 0.000 23.655 
1995 130 0.870 2.709 0.000 23.655 
1996 130 0.907 2.733 0.000 23.655 
1997 130 0.909 2.733 0.001 23.655 
1998 130 0.882 2.694 0.000 23.655 
1999 130 0.881 2.695 0.000 23.655 
2000 130 0.882 2.694 0.000 23.655 
2001 130 0.892 2.680 0.000 23.655 
Table 4.3: Measures of inter-industry capital mobility - summary statistics 
Years 1989-2001 Obs. Mean Std. Min Max 
Persistence of profits 
Capital-labour ratio (millions of 
US$) 
Four-firm concentration ratio (%) 
128 
128 
128 
(%) dev. 
0.63 0.31 0.02 
63.80 88.86 2.17 
41.43 20.54 9.00 
1.33 
726.10 
98.00 
One concern is the censoring of the tariff data: tariff cuts could lw bia."i('d as 
they are constrained by zero. Consider Figure 4.4. I plot a hypothetical tariff path 
from its non-cooperative level to zero. In this ca.'ie I have dra.wn a linear pat.h for 
the tariff. If the last tariff cut was not constrained by zero it would follow the 
dashed line to a negative value. Because of the zero constraint the speed of trade 
liberalisation may be underestimated. To overcome this problem I complement 
the estimation with a tobit regression. 
In order to control for industry effects, I specify two types of panPi data ('S-
timation procedures. These methods exploit both the cross-sectional variatiol\ 
(industries) and the time-series dimension of the data. The proceduw applh'd ill 
the present analysis comprises the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVO) ('sti-
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of a hypothetical tariff over time. 
matortl and the random effects (RE) estimator. The appeal of these estimators is 
that they control for unobserved industry-specific determinants, while facilitating 
the estimation of time-invariant variables. 
Another issue is the potential reverse causality betwecn tariff cuts and illt.er-
industry capital mobility. The model predicts that the degree of mobility causes 
tariff cuts, but as noted by Sachs and Warner (1995), tradc libcralisation is usually 
accompanied by market reforms to increase the mobility of factors of production. 
This would pose a particularly serious problem if the estimation was carried out 
in a cross-country setting. However, I believe the problem is less severe in a lllulti-
sector setting such as the present, since governments might have applied the saul<' 
policies to all industries within a country. I shall not pursue this point any furt.lH'r 
in this analysis. In the section that follows I pres{!llt Illy empirical findings. III 
my original tables, or the tables in the first draft of this paper, I had indu<it'd 
regressions where I allowed capital mobility effects 011 tariffs to take p l a ( ' ( ~ ~ prior 
"The FEVD estimator was introduced by Plumper and Troegpr (2007). 
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to the agreement in 1994. I have ommited them here since there is no evidence 
that there was any effect of mobility and trade liberalisation, thus contradicting 
the hypothesis that the l'AFTA agreement was anticipated. However, is should 
be noted that there was little variation in tariffs prior to this year in any case 
such that it would be hard for any variable to explain changes in tariffs prior to 
KAFTA. 
4.9 Results 
4.9.1 Persistence of profits as explanatory variable 
I first estimate (4.24) and (4.25) using persistence of profits, PoPi , as a measure 
of inter-industry capital mobility. The estimating equations are thus: 
and 
Bo + 3 1PoPi + (32(Net_impit * D1994 ) 
+B3(Net_impit * (1 - D 1994 )) + D t + O:i, 
( 4.30) 
(4.31) 
where the industry-specific effects, O:i, are included for the FEVD and RE estima-
tions. I report the results of estimating (4.30) and (4.31), respectively, in Table 
4.4 and Table 4.5. Recall that the measure for persistence of profits takes a value 
between zero and one, where a higher value corresponds to a more mobile indus-
try. In fact, the coefficient estimate can be interpreted as the difference between 
an industry that employs fixed capital (PoPi = 0) to one that is perfectly mobile 
(PoP; = 1). 
The first column of Table 4.4 reports the estimates for the pooled OLS re-
gression, which does not control for industry-specific effects. The coefficient on 
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Table 4.4: Persistence of profits regression 
Variable Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OL8 effects 
POPi 0.683*** 
(0.258) 
Net 
_impit * Dt 0.017 
(0.072) 
Net_impit * (1 - Dt) 0.087 
(0.080) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.12 
RM8E 1.20 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1 % 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
0.711 *** 0.760*** 
(0.233) (0.048) 
-0.007 0.376*** 
(0.071) (0.047) 
0.092 -0.000 
(0.070) (0.238) 
178 178 
0.05 0.78 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
1.025* 
(0.578) 
0.050 
(0.090) 
-0.170 
(0.112) 
178 
0.06 
POPi is equal to 0.683 and is highly significant. This implies that a perfectly 
mobile industry experienced a year tariff cut which W8.'l 0.683 percentage points 
larger than an industry employing fixed capital. The effect of the terms-of-trade 
distortion in the year of signing the agreement, measured by net imports inter-
acted by a 1994 year dummy, has the correct sign in the OLS regression, but 
fails to be statistically significant. The effect is also small since net imports are 
denominated in billions of $U8. Due to a concern that the distribution of tariffs is 
censored the second column reports the results of running a tobit regression. The 
coefficient estimate of persistence of profits remains large and highly significant. 
Notice also that the coefficient is larger than the OL8 coefficient, implying that 
the basic OLS regression might underestimate the effect. The last two columlls 
report the results of the fixed effects regressions where industry-specific effects are 
controlled for. The effects of persistence of profits Oil tariff cuts n ~ m a i n n large and 
statistically significant for both regressions, and the effect of the terllls-of-trade 
component of trade liberalisation in the year 1994 for the FEVD estimator is pos-
itive and significant. The last, finding lends support to the view that the tariff 
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Table 4.5: Persistence of profits regression - gradual ToT 
Variable/Year Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OLS effects 
POPi 0.769*** 
(0.261 ) 
Net 
_zmpit 0.053 
(0.054) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.11 
RMSE 1.19 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
0.698*** 0.815*** 
(0.233) (0.162) 
0.042 0.000 
(0.049) (0.033) 
178 178 
0.04 0.76 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
1.092* 
(0.582) 
-0.010 
(0.086) 
178 
0.10 
reduction that took place in 1994 can be partly explained by solving the terms-
of-trade driven prisoner's dilemma internationally. It should be said that none of 
the other regressions obtained a statistically significant effect. 
In Table 4.5, I report results from the estimation of (4.31), where it is assulllPd 
that the terms-of-trade component of trade Iiberalisation is gradual. The co<'ffi-
dent on persistence of profits remains positive and statistically significant in all 
regressions. However, the coefficient on net imports is statistically insignificant, 
and has the wrong sign in the random effects regression. This would suggest. that 
the terms-of-trade component, if it exists, is not gradual, and it cannot be us('d 
to explain yearly tariff cuts on Mexican imports to the US. 
4.9.2 Capital-labour ratios as explanatory variable 
I specify the following estimating equations with capital-labour ratios: 
(4.:i2) 
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and 
( 4.33) 
The results of running regressions (4.32) and (4.33), respectively, are presented in 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. The capital-labour ratio is meant to capture the degree 
of sunk to variable costs, such that an increase in this ratio implies larger fixed 
costs. This implies that an increase in this variable corresponds to a decrease in 
capital mobility, and thus, the effect of the capital-labour ratio on the tariff cut 
should be negative. In the first column of Table 4.6, I report the result of running 
a pooled OLS regression of (4.32). The coefficient on the capital-labour ratio has 
the expected sign, and is statistically significant at the 5% level. An increa."le in the 
capital-labour ratio of one million US dollars is expected to decrease the tariff cut 
by 1.594 percentage points. The result is robust to the use of a tobit model, which 
controls for the censoring of the tariff data, and even find the largest effect out of all 
of the estimating methods. The FEVD estimator puts the coefficient of the capital-
labour ratio to be significant. However, the standard errors of the random effects 
estimator are so large that it is not significant for that regression. The coefficient 
of the capital-labour ratio is significant in three out of four specifications. :'\otice 
that in the FEVD estimator, the coefficient on net imports in 1994 is positive and 
significant. 
The results are similar when estimating (4.33). All variables have the expected 
sign, although the estimates of the coefficients on net imports are very small and 
fail to be significant (see Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.6: Capital-labour ratio regression 
Variable Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OLS effects 
CILi -1.594** 
(0.618) 
Net 
_impit * Dt 0.034 
(0.075) 
Net_impit * (1 - Dt) 0.126 
(0.081) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.11 
RMSE 1.20 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
-1.804*** -1.597*** 
(0.556) (0.365) 
0.012 0.376*** 
(0.070) (0.048) 
0.126* -0.000 
(0.071) (0.048) 
178 178 
0.04 0.78 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
-1.466 
(1.640) 
0.062 
(0.091) 
-0.168 
(0.114) 
178 
0.04 
Table 4.7: Capital-labour ratio regression - gradual ToT 
Variable Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OLS effects 
CILi -1.537** 
(0.614) 
Net impit 0.076 
(0.055) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.10 
RMSE 1.20 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
-1.740*** -1.457*** 
(0.554) (0.377) 
0.068 0.000 
(0.050) (0.034) 
178 178 
0.05 0.05 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
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-1.534 
(1.657) 
0.000 
(0.088) 
178 
0.08 
4.9.3 Four-firm concentration ratios as explanatory vari-
able 
As with the previous two explanatory variables I specify the exact estimating 
equations: 
and 
Tit+l - Tit = f30 + f3 t C4i + f32(Net_impit * D1994 ) 
+f33(Net_impit * (1 - D 1994 )) + D t + (}:i, 
( 4.34) 
(4.35) 
I report the results of running (4.34) and (4.33), respectively, in Table 4.8 and 
Table 4.9. The four-firm concentration ratio measures the market share of the four 
largest firms in the industry. It is expected that if this ratio is larger, there are 
greater benefits from economies of scale, and one could reasonably conjecture that 
this has to do with a larger amount of sunk costs in production. Hence, an increase 
in the four-firm concentration ratio corresponds to less inter-industry mobility. 
Generally speaking, this variable is far less promising in terms of explaining the 
theoretical model. Most coefficients have the wrong sign and none of them are 
statistically significant. However, the coefficient on net imports interacted with 
the 1994 dummy is statistically significant in column three of Table 4.8 for the 
FEVD estimator. I conclude that the four-firm concentration is either an imperfect 
measure of inter-industry capital mobility, or it does a poor job in explaining the 
theory. This finding may not be surprising, since it is not guaranteed that, even if 
large firms in an industry use a large amount of sunk cost, that these sunk costs 
necessarily represent investments in capital which is relatively immobile. 
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Table 4.8: Four-firm concentration ratio regression 
Variable Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OLS effects 
C4 j 0.002 
(0.004) 
Net_impit * Dt 0.018 
(0.078) 
Net_impit * (1 - Dt ) 0.076 
(0.085) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.07 
RMSE 1.23 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
0.001 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.003) 
-0.003 0.376*** 
(0.075) (0.049) 
0.077 0.000 
(0.076) (0.050) 
178 178 
0.03 0.78 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.041 
(0.097) 
-0.191 
(0.118) 
178 
0.02 
Table 4.9: Four-firm concentration ratio regression - gradual ToT 
Variable Pooled Tobit FEVD Random 
OLS effects 
C4 i 0.002 
(0.004) 
Net_impit 0.044 
(0.059) 
Observations 178 
R2 0.07 
RMSE 1.22 
Time period for estimation is 1994-2001 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Pseudo R2 reported for tobit regression 
0.001 0.003 
(0.004) (0.003) 
0.036 0.000 
(0.054) (0.036) 
178 178 
0.03 0.76 
Constant terms as well as year dummies are not reported 
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0.004 
(0.010) 
-0.022 
(0.093) 
178 
0.05 
4.10 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have taken the political-economy model in Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare (2007) to the data, to examine whether it could stand up to empirical 
scrutiny. The model makes two simple predictions, namely that (i) trade liber-
alisation should be faster when factors of production are more mobile, and that 
(ii) the initial phase of trade liberalisation is characterised by an immediate tariff 
cut to solve an international terms-of-trade externality. Overall, with regards to 
two measures of inter-industry capital mobility, namely persistence of profits and 
capital-labour ratios, the estimates of the coefficients on inter-industry capital 
mobility showed large and statistically significant effects. Capital-labour ratios 
are meant to capture the value of sunk costs of production relative to variable 
costs, and they could therefore be said to measure the explicit cost of capital. The 
variable does not come without criticism, however, as it neglects to measure the 
opportunity cost of production, and it could also be said that it is not guaran-
teed that capital, as a production factor, is necessarily less mobile than labour. 
Persistence of profits goes one step further by incorporating a measure of the op-
portunity costs of production in addition to explicit costs: persistent profits are 
likely to imply that there is a high opportunity cost of production in a particular 
industry. The last variable which I tried to fit to the data, the four-finn concen-
tration ratio, failed to be able to explain tariff cuts. This may not be surprising 
since it is not guaranteed that larger firms employ factors of productioIl that arc 
necessarily less mobile across sectors. 
The terms-of-trade component of trade liberalisation received little support 
in the data, although using the FEVD est.imator there appeared to be an effect 
in the year Mexico and the US signed t.he N AFTA. This is cont.rary to Bagwell 
and Staiger (2006) who finds that terms-of-trade mot.ives form an important part 
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of tariff reductions in trade agreements9• They use the value of imports and 
the volume of imports to explain tariff reductions, but unlike me they average 
the import flows over a certain period, not necessarily a period which is in the 
same year of signing trade agreements. I have also attempted to do the same by 
averaging the value of net imports JO , but the results do not change much, and I 
did not obtain significance on any coefficients. The fact that the US may be a 
small country with respect to its trading partners is consistent with Magee and 
Magee (2008) who find that US tariffs have a very small impact on world prices, 
and conclude that even if it is the largest economy in the world, for trade purposes 
it may still be a small country which cannot influence world prices through trade 
policy. 
The model has plenty of scope for further empirical examination and theorcti-
cal extensions. For example, the model postulates that there is an overinvestment 
problem in protected sectors in the non-cooperative equilibrium. It would be in-
teresting to examine the extent of this overinvestment in protected industries, and 
how these industries contract in response to trade liberalisation. Such hypotheses 
could be applied to the use of alternative forms of protection, such as anti-dumping 
measures and non-tariff barriers, as these are more commonly observed as means 
of protection in the developed world in the 21st century. 
The empirical examination could also be extended to a WTO framework to 
conduct a cross-country examination of trade liberalisation and inter-industry cap-
ital mobility. It might be argued, however, that a WTO framework is less fit for the 
purposes of the theoretical model. This is because the model compares a situation 
where two countries have never cooperated over trade policy to a pha..,e of gradual 
tariff reductions. Trade liberalisation under the auspices of the GATT /WTO ha.'i 
!lThey use a sample of countries that joined the WTO in thc 1 9 9 0 ~ . .
1°1 use the value of net imports in lieu of the valuc of imports. \VhCll I use imports til(' resllib 
do not change in any significant way. I also think that nct imports should perform hettt'r at 
explaining terms-of trade motives. The government may not wish to distort trad!' if t II(' country 
it represents produces a large amount of cxports. 
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taken more than half a century of multiple rounds of trade liberalisation, however, 
so it may be argued that it is hard for one variable, such as for example persistence 
of profits, to capture the variation in tariffs for such a long time period. 
The theoretical model could also be extended to look at a framework with 
several factors of production, and the conflicting interests of the owners of these 
factors could be examined, as is done empirically in Hiscox (2002a). 
Moreover, it is possible to consider foreign lobbying over domestic tariffs and 
see how the relative mobility of foreign and domestic industries mayor may not 
change the results. Following the discussion in Gray (1973) it would not be hard 
to imagine how an extension to include foreign lobbying would turn out. I will 
only consider extreme cases of fixed and perfectly mobile factors of production as 
the intermediate case of imperfectly mobile factors of production only translate 
into changing degrees rather than absolute results. The model extension would 
have to have curvature in the production function to avoid complete specialisation. 
Consider the case where the home and foreign governments both employ factors 
of production that are perfectly mobile in a particular sector. If the horne country 
is an importer and the foreign country is an exporter, then the trade agreement 
would maximise the joint surplus of the two governments and the two lobbies. 
However, since both lobbies own perfectly mobile factors of production, they will 
not achieve any rents from protection and the result is free trade. Also, consider 
the case where both lobbies employ factors of production that arc fixed. In this 
case, the home lobby would lobby for protection whereas the foreign lobby would 
lobby for free trade. The outcome of a free trade agreement would thus depend 
on the strengths of the lobbying efforts in the two countries. The ca.<;e where the 
home government employs fixed factors of production and the foreign employs 
perfectly mobile factors of production for the particular industry translates into 
a slow liberalisation phase, as the home lobby would lobby for protection but the 
170 
foreign would not, as capital owners would not realise any rents from this. This 
discussion implies that what matters is relative mobility of the home and foreign 
sectors. 
4.11 Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.11.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 
Using the expression for the price of country H's imported good in (4.1), and the 
expression for contributions in (4.8), I can write the equal-returns condition (4.10) 
as: 
1 (3a) W 2 v - 2" (k + 1 - T) - 8k (T - T (k)) = 1. 
Setting T = T J (k) from (4.6) and solving for k yields, after substantial algebraic 
manipulations, an expression for the unique capital allocation in the long-run 
political equilibrium: 
k=2a -- . ~ ~ (3V - 4) 
4a - 1 (4.36) 
The condition assumed in (4.11) ensures a > ~ ~ such that the denominator of the 
previous expression is positive. The numerator is also positive since I assume that 
v > ~ ~ in (4.4). Using (4.11) and (4.4), it can also be verified that k < 1. The 
equilibrium tariff can be solved by plugging (4.36) back into (4.6). This yields: 
~ ~ _ J (k) _ ~ ~ ( (4 - 2a) (3v - 4) ) 
T - T - 3 1 + 4a _ 1 > O. 
The sign of this expression can be verified from (4.11) and (3.10). q.e.d. 
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4.11.2 Proof that (4.16) is decreasing in T 
I would like to show that the following expression is decreasing in "T: 
{ 
aW(TW(ker("T), ker(7)) + aW*(T, ker(7)) + k for"T 2 T"' } 
w("T, ker("T)) = . 
aW(T, ker("T)) + aW*(T, ker(7)) + k for 7 < TW 
If"T < TW, there will be no contributions, and ker("T) is a line with slope equal 
to 1, making the claim easy to verify. The less straight-forward case is to show 
that a W (TW (ker (7), ker (7)) + a W*( T, ker ("T)) + k is decrea.-.ing in "T for "T 2 TW. 
Applying the envelope theorem yields: 
Since Wt*< 0 and dk;J'f) > 0 it suffices to show that Wk(TW(ker (7), ker("T)) and 
Wt*(T,ker("T)) are both negative. The sign of Wt*(T,ker("T)) can be established 
by noting that the only effect of k and W* is through terms of trade, and an 
increase in k worsens country F's terms-of-trade. What remains to show is that 
Wk(TW(ker(7),ker("T)) < O. This is equivalent to showing that WdTW(k),k) < 0 
for k > kW. Some algebra reveals that: 
Given that p( TW (kW), kW) = 1 the claim follows. q.e.d. 
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Chapter 5 
Concluding Remarks 
Deeper economic integration is central to our understanding of welfare and growth 
in the 20th and 21st centuries, and while the literature is in a growing pha.<;c, there 
is much more to be learned about the drivers of political barriers and the desire 
to abolish them. The present doctoral thesis ha.<; contributed to this strand of 
literature with three core chapters that identified a.<;pects of the nature and causes 
of trade liberalisation. 
In Chapter 2, I constructed a model of oligopoly to study the relationship 
between natural trade costs and unilateral and cooperative import tariffs. Uni-
lateral trade policy seeks to optimally exploit a country's monopoly power over 
its terms of trade, in addition to shifting profits towards the domestic market. 
When trade costs decline, the incentive to manipulate the terms-of-trade and shift 
profits increases. This is because when trade costs are lower, the degree of natural 
manipulation of consumer prices and the degree of natural profit shifting is lower, 
making import tariffs more effective at doing the job. Cooperative t r a d ( ~ ~ policy, 
on the other hand, aims to minimise losses in transit, and hence, when trade costs 
decline, cooperative tariffs are lowered. This implies that when trade costs decline, 
a conflict of interest between what is optimal unilaterally and cooperatively in-
tensifies. In a framework where cooperative trade policy mllst be sllstained by a 
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reputational mechanism, I demonstrated that import tariffs depend crucially on 
the discount factor and natural trade costs. If the countries in a trade agreement 
are sufficiently patient, they will be able to lower tariffs in response to falling 
trade costs, whereas if they care too much about short-run gains, import tariffs 
must be raised in response to falling trade costs to ensure that countries resist the 
temptation to switch terms of trade in their favour and shift profits towards their 
respective domestic markets. I further demonstrated that a free trade agreement 
can be sustained for a larger range of discount factors when trade costs fall. 
In the second core chapter, Chapter 3, I introduced a dynamic inconsistency, 
in addition to standard terms-of-trade manipulations, to study the sustaillabil-
ity of unilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation. Investors incur investments in 
physical capital which are irreversible in any given period, that is what I call the 
short run, but allowed to be freely reallocated after one period, which is what I 
call the long run. This brings about a conflict of interest in terms of the optimal 
trade policy in the short run where capital is sunk, and in the long run where it is 
perfectly mobile. The government and a lobby bargaiu efficiently over an import 
tariff and a level of contributions, and the bargaining power of the two parties 
is a crucial parameter in the determination of the sustainability of trade liber-
alisation. Unilateral trade liberalisation involves committing to the dynamically 
optimal trade policy, which implies setting the import tariff at the socially optimal 
level, or the level which optimally exploits a country's terms of trade, and giving 
up campaign contributions from the lobby. Bilateral trade liberalisation involves 
signing a trade agreement, which implies that international terms of trade exter-
nalities are solved in addition to the time-inconsistency problem. I a."isumed that 
any type of trade liberalisation must be sustained by a reputational mechanism. 
In this framework I found that if the government ha."i all the bargaining power, 
unilateral trade liberalisation can be supported for every discount factor, but a."i 
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the government's bargaining power increa.'les, the degree of patience required to 
sustain unilateral trade liberalisation increa."les. As the bargaining power exceeds 
a critical threshold, the government is better off continuing its political relation-
ship with the lobby, and unilateral trade libcralisation cannot be support for any 
discount factor. Since bilateral trade liberalisation involves punishment from a 
country's trading partner in case of deviation, this imposes further sanctions on 
the part of a deviating country. I demonstrated that bilateral trade liberalisation 
can be supported for every discount factor, provided the government is sufficiently 
patient. However, for low bargaining powers, unilateral trade liberalisation can be 
supported for the largest range of discount factors, whereas for high bargaining 
powers, a trade agreement is needed to ensure commitment. 
In Chapter 4, I used the political-economy model of Maggi and RodriglIe7,-Clare 
(2007) to empirically study the nature rather than the causes of trade liberalisation 
as was the case in the previous two chapters. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007) set 
up a theoretical model very similar to the one in Chapter 3, but with two important 
differences. First, I assume the lobby has all the bargaining power, and that a 
bilateral trade agreement is perfectly enforceable. It is a.'lsumed that for whichever 
reason the two countries have decided to sign a trade agreement. When doing so 
they solve international terms-of-trade externalities as well as a time-inconsistency 
problem as described in the previous chapter. The extent of trade liberalisation 
depends on a terms-of-trade component determined by the degree of terms-of-
trade distortions in the non-cooperative equilibrium, and inter-industry capital 
mobility. The intuition is that the greater the inter-industry capital mobility the 
smaller the losses incurred by trade liberalisation since capital can more easily be 
employed elsewhere. I took a dynamic version of the model to the dat.a. I Ilsed 
US tariff cuts on Mexican products and regress these cuts on net imports, which 
captures terms-of-trade distortions, and inter-industry eapital mobility n l e a . " l u f ( ~ d d
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by persistence of profits, capital-labour ratios, and four-firm concentration ratios. 
I found that the empirical results on the relationship between tariff cuts on capital 
mobility were consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model using the 
first two measures of capital mobility, whereas the last mea.'lure cannot explain 
the variation in tariff cuts. The term capturing the terms-of-trade component is 
correctly signed on most specifications but is scarcely statistically significant. 
The research questions addressed in all of the core chapters are relevant in 
terms of explaining the nature and causes of trade liberalisation, and each of them 
identify distinct and novel features of this issue. It has been a major goal to keep 
all three papers as closely related to one another as possible, while ensuring each 
of them posed separate research questions. I shall devote the last paragraphs of 
this thesis to discussing potential extensions. 
Symmetry of the countries analysed in the models ha.'l been recurrent through-
out the entire thesis. This has been done to keep the analysis simple yet informa-
tive. The assumption of symmetry, however, most certainly cannot be a.'lsumed 
for the real world, and many interesting results might obtain if the assumption 
was relaxed. In the concluding section of Chapter 3, I discussed intuitively how 
asymmetric bargaining powers between the two countries could result in a more 
complex prediction regarding the sustainability of trade liberalisation. I argued 
that a government with a low bargaining power vis-a.-vis a lobby would have low 
benefits of deviating from a trade agreement, but would also face a low punishment 
on the part of the trading partner following retaliation. The reverse would be the 
case for a country where the government has a large bargaining power. Hence, the 
analysis becomes less straight-forward with such an extension. ASYIllmetry could 
also be introduced to the model in Chapter 4. Inter-industry capital mobility and 
lobbying over trade policy were restricted to the import-competing sectors in the 
two countries. Imagine for example that I introduced mobility of capital for the 
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exporting sectors and allowed their owners to lobby for their desired trade policy 
during the negotiation of an agreement. In this case, what would matter for the 
speed of trade liberalisation would not only be inter-industry mobility of capital 
in the importing sectors, but also that of the exporting sectors. The sign of the re-
lationship between capital mobility of the exporting sector and the speed of trade 
liberalisation, however, would be the opposite. If capital owners in the foreign 
exporting sector employed fixed capital, for example, they would lobby for faster 
trade liberaiisation, as opposed to owners of capital in the import-competing sec-
tor which would lobby for slower trade liberalisation. What would matter is thus 
the relatively degree of inter-industry capital mobility. 
Throughout the entire thesis I have also restricted attention to two country-
frameworks. By doing this, I have been ignoring potentially important trade-
diverting effects of trade liberalisation. If it is assumed that trade agreements are 
signed between natural trading partners, the problem of trade diversion may not 
be very large. Moreover, it may also be argued that a lot of cooperation over trade 
policy takes place in multilateral negotiations under the WTO. 
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